[bestbits] Important new joint submission to CSTD Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation
Jeremy Malcolm
jeremy at ciroap.org
Mon Aug 19 00:16:23 EDT 2013
All Best Bits participants are now invited to finalise a joint
submission to the CSTD Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation, which we
are to submit by the end of August. This will be a very important
submission in its own right, and also a key preparatory document to
three upcoming Best Bits meetings - our APrIGF workshop in Seoul
<http://2013.rigf.asia/workshop-proposal-7/>, Day 1 of our Best Bits
meeting in Bali <http://bestbits.net/bestbits2013/>, and one of our two
workshops at the global IGF
<http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2013/workshop_2013_accomplish_list_view.php?xpsltipq_je=36>.
Its importance is that it addresses a question, unresolved for the last
eight years, about how global Internet governance (in the broad sense
that goes beyond technical issues) should evolve in response to states
claims of sovereignty over public policy issues relating to the
Internet. I wrote a background paper
<http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2013/workshop_background_paper/64_1367863304.pdf>
about this general question (and slides
<https://www.unesco-ci.org/cmscore/sites/default/files/2013wsis10/internet_freedom_in_a_world_of_states.pdf>)
for our WSIS+10 workshop in Paris. Post-PRISM, the question has only
assumed greater importance.
For the past few weeks, a civil society-only Best Bits working group
<http://lists.bestbits.net/wws/info/ec> (which also includes, though not
in an official capacity, civil society members of the CSTD working
group) has been working hard on this, to hone in on the core issues and
to state them clearly and fairly, taking into account the wide
divergence in views that exists even within civil society. The result
of our work is open for your comment for one week, at which time we will
close for endorsements:
http://igcaucus.org:9001/p/ec
The current text is also pasted below. We aim for this submission to be
as broadly inclusive of the views of Best Bits participants as possible,
so after reading and considering the existing text carefully, if you
have any changes to suggest, please speak up. If the changes are minor,
you can just make them on the Etherpad. If major, we would ask that you
raise them on the list first. The more groups that can endorse the
submission, the more influence it will have.
Just to reiterate, we are not taking endorsements yet. This will occur
after one week of final comments from this list. (There is no point in
taking endorsements when there might still be changes to the text.) For
the same reason, we ask that you don't forward the draft text widely
yet. If you want to bring other groups into the discussion that is
welcome, but (for now) the best way to do so would be to ask them to
join the Best Bits list.
Here, then, is the current text (starting from question 2, which is
intentional):
*2. What do you think is the significance, purpose and scope of
enhanced cooperation as per the Tunis Agenda?*
*a) Significance*
The inclusion of the enhanced cooperation mandate in the Tunis Agenda
was a political necessity to account for the view of many governments
and others of the inadequacy of existing Internet governance
arrangements when measured against the criteria identified in the first
phase of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS): namely
transparency, accountability, multilateralism, and the need to address
public policy issues related to Internet governance in a coordinated
manner (WGIG Report, para 35). In particular it was suggested "that
there are many cross-cutting international public policy issues that
require attention and are not adequately addressed by the current
mechanisms" (Tunis Agenda, para 60).
Foremost amongst the areas in which a deficit in existing arrangements
was perceived was the issue of internationalizing Internet oversight
beyond the United States, a struggle that had dominated the entire
summit process from the beginning of WSIS I. But existing arrangements
were also seen as failing to adequately address a broad range of other
issues, some discussed below under question 4. At the conclusion of
WSIS, civil society, backed by what ultimately became a coalition among
the US and some other mainly developed countries, got the Internet
Governance Forum (IGF), as a multi-stakeholder forum to address mainly
those other broader issues. The promise of addressing the narrower issue
of Internet oversight, as sought by a key group of other governments,
was reserved for a process parallel to the IGF, and perhaps as a
counterbalance to it. Those governments got as a result the 'enhanced
cooperation' process. It is also significant that even though the
discussion was quite conflictual, member states chose to use 'positive'
words: enhance, and cooperation. The ongoing discussion about how to
improve IG arrangements should continue in this same positive spirit.
*b) Purpose*
Therefore the purpose of enhanced cooperation process mandate, in
conjunction with the closely related mandate for the formation of an
Internet Governance Forum, is to address the perceived deficits
described above. In particular the Tunis Agenda identifies that enhanced
cooperation would enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry out
their roles and responsibilities, in international public policy issues
pertaining to the Internet" (para 69). Subtextually, the main purpose
of Enhanced Cooperation as sought by governments was to provide a space
where they could further deal with the dominant issue across both the
summits - internatiionalization of Internet oversight. With IGF a mainly
civil society initiative, albeit multi-stakeholder in conception,
enhanced cooperation was a process in which goverments would be the main
actors.
*c) Scope*
The enhanced cooperation mandate "should include the development of
globally-applicable principles on public policy issues" (para 70) and
"also could envisage creation of a suitable framework or mechanisms,
where justified" (para 61). But it does not envision the involvement of
governments "in the day-to-day technical and operational matters, that
do not impact on international public policy issues" (para 69).
Although there is an emphasis on what enhanced cooperation means for
governments (who, after all, were the only stakeholder group required to
agree to the enhanced cooperation mandate), the Tunis Agenda does not
suggest that enhanced cooperation is solely for governments. In
paragraph 69, enhanced cooperation is suggested as a mechanism to
"enable" governments to carry out their roles and responsibilities. To
"enable" does not mean that enhanced cooperation is for governments
alone. Indeed the scope of enhanced cooperation also encompasses all
relevant stakeholders as per para 70 ("organisations responsible for
essential tasks") and the process towards enhanced cooperation will
involve "all stakeholders" per para 71.
*3. To what extent has or has not enhanced cooperation been
implemented? Please use the space below to explain and to provide
examples to support your answer.*
It follows that for any public policy issue related to Internet
governance that lacks at least one transparent, accountable,
multilateral process, involving all stakeholders, for the development of
globally-applicable principles to enable that issue to be addressed in a
coordinated manner, or any framework or mechanisms to support such a
process, the enhanced cooperation mandate is yet to be implemented. As
the Tunis Agenda does not necessarily specify that a single or central
process or mechanism is required, and indeed there is none yet, some
point to a variety of independent efforts to coordinate policy
development across a number of issue areas and fora as evidence of the
implementation of the mandate. But the degree of such implementation
currently varies.
For example, the progress made at ICANN with respect to issues of
critical Internet resources, involving the role of the Framework of
Commitments (FoC) AND the Government Advisory Council (GAC) may be seen
as a movement towards fulfilling the enhanced cooperation mandate in
that context. Less evidence of such can be seen in the work of WIPO on
intellectual property enforcement, that of UNCTAD on cross-border
consumer protection, that of the UN Human Rights Council on the human
rights impacts of government surveillance, or that of the World Wide Web
Consortium on online behavioural advertising. There are other issues
still for which there is no institution with a clear responsibility to
implement the enhanced cooperation mandate: for example, there is no
global body that deals comprehensively with data protection and privacy
rights, and similar gaps exist in many other areas of a social,
economic, political and cultural nature (see question 4).
Indeed while the IGF has developed, across now seven annual sessions,
enhanced cooperation has not really got off the ground. There was a
session in New York the end of 2010, seeking wider input. And CSTD has
held various meetings on the subject. But enhanced cooperation - as
conceived in the grand bargain of WSIS - has so far not been taken to
serious steps. Meanwhile the tensions that led to the enhanced
cooperation bargain are still very much in play, as illustrated by the
impasse at the ITU's World Conference on International
Telecommunications (WCIT) in 2012 between governments seeking to assert
greater control over the Internet, and those opposing international
treaties as a method of such control. We can agree with both camps: that
the enhanced cooperation mandate has not been adequately implemented,
but also that going for an intergovernmental treaty is not the right way
to begin implementing the EC imperative.
*4. What are the relevant international public policy issues pertaining
to the Internet?**
**/(List in order of priority, if possible)/*
The list of International public policy issues that pertain to the
Internet is not closed, since these change over time as social
conditions change. However, much work has already been done to
elaborate some of the most relevant such issues. This work includes the
WGIG report, the background report that accompanied it, and ITU
Resolution 1305 with regard to "scope of work of ITU on international
Internet-related public policy matters". Drawing together and grouping
some of the issues identified in these reports and elsewhere, we present
a partial list, roughly categorised into groups (though many issues do
cut across categories):
Human rights
* Freedom of Expression
* Data protection and privacy rights
* Consumer rights
* Multilingualism
* Access to knowledge and free information flows, deepening the public
domain on the Internet
* Internet intermediary companies as private agents for
extra-territorial law enforcement (problems with)
* Protection of vulnerable sections, like children, women, traditional
communities etc
* Net neutrality (that all data is given equal priority on networks)
* Search neutrality (that global search engines give neutral results)
Access and accessibility
* Multilingualization of the Internet including Internationalized
(multilingual) Domain Names
* International Internet Connectivity
* Cultural diversity
* Accessibility policies for the disabled
* Affordable and universal access
* Reliability, and quality of service, especially in the developing world
* Contributing to capacity building for Internet governance in
developing countries
* Developmental aspects of the Internet
Critical Internet resources management and oversight
* Administration of the root zone files and system
* Interconnection costs (especially global interconnection)
* Allocation of domain names
* IP addressing
* Convergence and next generation networks
* Technical standards, and technology choices
* Continuity, sustainability, and robustness of the Internet
* Genuine internationalization of Internet oversight
Security and law enforcement
* Internet stability and security
* Combatting cybercrime
* Other issues pertaining to the use and misuse of the Internet
* Dealing effectively with spam
* Protecting children and young people from abuse and exploitation
* Cryptography
* Cross border coordination
Trade and commerce
* e-commerce
* copyright
* patents
* trademarks
* Cross border Internet flows
* Internet service providers (ISPs) and third party liabilities
* National policies and regulations (harmonization of)
* Competition policy, liberalization, privatization and regulations
* Applicable jurisdiction
* Tax allocation among different jurisdictions with regard to global
e-commerce
* Development of, and protection to, local content, local application,
local e-services, and local/ domestic Internet businesses
* Internet and health systems, education systems, governance systems
and so on.
* Cloud computing (global issues involved)
* Economics of personal data (who owns, who makes money from, and so on)
* Media convergence - Internet and traditional media (Internet
companies versus newspapers, radio, cable and TV, book publishing
industry etc)
* Regulation of global Internet businesses (in terms of adherence to
competition policies, consumer rights, law enforcement etc)
*5. What are the roles and responsibilities of the different
stakeholders, including governments, in implementation of the various
aspects of enhanced cooperation?*
We do not think that the allocation of roles between the stakeholders
that the Tunis Agenda established should be taken as definitive. We
take it that, like the definition of Internet governance adopted in the
Tunis Agenda which was specified as a "working definition", so too the
definitions of the roles of stakeholders adopted in the Tunis Agenda
were also working definitions that would be subject to review.
The definition of civil society's "important role ... especially at
community level" is particularly unhelpful. We contend that civil
society's role in contributing to the development of global public
policy principles is much more integral than that definition suggests.
In particular, there are cases in which governments are not inclined to
uphold the human rights of Internet users, such as the rights of
foreigners whose Internet usage is the subject of official
surveillance. Civil society has a key role in representing the
interests of such users, and others whose interests are otherwise poorly
represented due to democratic deficits at national and international levels.
But further, the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders cannot be
fixed in Internet governance (or probably in many other areas of
governance either). For example civil society can in some instances
represent specific marginalised communities or user or interest groups
(e.g. the visually impaired). At other times civil society can be
experts providing input and guidance on how to approach policy issues.
At other times civil society can play a 'watch' role to monitor the
behaviour of business or government in order to protect the public
interest. And so on. Roles and responsibilities of stakeholder groups
will depend on the type of process, and the specific interests involved
and with a stake in the outcome of each process.
Please see also the response to Question 11, below, for some particulars.
*6. How should enhanced cooperation be implemented to enable
governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and
responsibilities in international public policy issues pertaining to the
Internet?*
We acknowledge that governments remain the main representative structure
for international public policy development. This typically takes place
through the UN and other multi-lateral institutions such as the WTO,
etc. But on Internet-related public policy issues, there are
transnational interests and impacts that governments cannot adequately
take into account without the full participation of other stakeholders.
There is room for discussion about the best way of involving those
stakeholders, and it does not necessarily mean placing them on an equal
level with governments. There would be value in establishing a
framework or mechanism to address Internet related public policy issues
that do not already have a home in any existing global forum, or where
that forum does not fulfil the WSIS process criteria, including the
participation of all stakeholders. Such a framework or mechanism should
be non-duplicative and should take advantage of the expertise of
existing arrangements, mechanisms, institutions or organisations where
relevant.
There is also a link between the global and national level. Governments
need to put in place transparent, accountable, processes at the national
level to support those at the global level. If one takes, for example,
ICANN and the GAC, many governments are now participating in the GAC,
but their participation is not always transparent to national
stakeholders, and it is not clear who they are accountable to at
national level. Member states need to fulfil WSIS process criteria at
the national level otherwise it does not make much sense (other than
just to large powerful business and CS actors) to implement them at the
global level.
*7. How can enhanced cooperation enable other stakeholders to carry out
their roles and responsibilities?*
By bringing governments closer to the other stakeholders, the other
stakeholders are also brought closer to governments. If enhanced
cooperation is a process whereby governments (and existing Internet
governance spaces/processes) are compelled to adhere to WSIS principles
of transparency, accountability, etc., this can serve to create an
approach to IG, and to existing and evolving IG processes and spaces
that is rooted in the public interest and inclusive of all
stakeholders. Even if the public interest is not always clear, such
processes should, and could involve all stakeholders in negotiating a
common understanding of what the broadest possible public interest is on
any particular issue.
*
**8. What are the most appropriate mechanisms to fully implement
enhanced cooperation as recognized in the Tunis Agenda, including on
international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet and public
policy issues associated with coordination and management of critical
Internet resources?*
The CSTD Working Group is itself an important mechanism for the
stakeholders to set in train a process to fully implement enhanced
cooperation, which may in turn eventually result in changes to
frameworks, structures or institutions. This will not take place
immediately, but in phases. We are now in a kind of distributed
reform/exploration phase with the IGF and IGF-like processes trying to
create more cooprative engagement, and institutions like ICANN and the
ITU putting in place certain reforms, and institutions that previously
ignore the Internet beginning to take it seriously (e.g. the Human
Rights Council).
This should lead into an intermediate phase of more formalised
transparency and reporting and collaboration among all institutions or
processes dealing with Internet governance. The IGF (with its mandate
to "promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS
principles in Internet governance processes") could be the home for this
role.
Ultimately however, this alone will not fill the gaps that created the
enhanced cooperation mandate. There is also a pressing need to address
very important global Internet related public policy issues, and to do
so at the global level, and this work has to be done by democratic /
representative structures. This may require the eventual establishment
of a new framework or mechanism, particularly in the case of emerging
and orphaned issues that have no other global home. Although a logical
home for such a framework or mechanism would be the United Nations, we
acknowledge the many weaknesses in UN processes at present, including in
relation to transparency and very uneven support for the inclusion of
civil society influence in the UN system. Certainly, a traditional
intergovernmental organisation is not an appropriate structure.
In the technical realm of Internet naming and numbering, the response to
the weaknesses and shortcomings of the UN system has been to establish
in ICANN a body which is independent of the UN system. But even ICANN
is overseen by governments, or to be more precise by one government -
the United States. And whilst the UN is characterised by some as being
a haven for tyrranical regimes, the United States itself is widely
criticised as having infringed global human rights norms through its
global surveillance practices, and for its tyrannical pursuit of
whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden for exposing such practices.
Therefore in comparing the respective merits of a UN-based institution
(particularly if it is an innovative, multi-stakeholder, and
semi-autonomous one such as the IGF), and a non-US based institution
that is nonetheless beholden to governments at some level, the choice is
not as stark as it is often presented to be.
Therefore in both areas - general public policy issues in which
governments have a leading role through the international system, and
naming and numbering in which ICANN has a leading role - reforms are
eventually required. Taking first the case of ICANN, the reforms for
which we advocate would not be to bring it within the United Nations,
but to broaden its oversight beyond the United States alone. This may
take the form of a new international oversight board with
techno-political membership derived from different geopolitical regions.
The mandate of this oversight mechanism would be very narrow, more or
less the same as exercised by the Department of Commerce of the United
States Government at present. ICANN would become an international
organisation and enter into a host country agreement with the United
States, giving it complete immunity from US law or any other form of
control or interference.
It is not necessary that the same new framework or mechanism that
broadens the oversight of ICANN, should also deal with other general
public policy issues. In fact there is considerable merit in looking at
these aspects of enhanced cooperation separately. Because of the more
mature state of the multi-stakeholder model that already exists around
the regime for management of critical Internet resources, there is good
reason to separate out the need to internationalise existing mechanisms
for governmental oversight of that regime, from the need for new
frameworks or mechanisms for dealing with more general public policy
issues of various political, economic, social and cultural kinds, for
which there might be a more central role for another new framework or
mechanism.
In such fields of public policy outside the narrowly technical, there
would be the choice to build upon the existing global order that we have
in the United Nations, or to rebuild this from scratch (as in the case
of ICANN). Whilst there is merit in the idea of a post-UN transnational
democratic order that derives its legitimacy from the individual rather
than from the nation state, and which could provide legitimacy and
oversight for both technical and broader public policy bodies, nothing
of this kind exists or is a realistic prospect for the short or medium
term. Therefore, if the mechanism that we begin through the CSTD Working
Group does lead towards a new framework or process, we accept the
likelihood that such framework or process would likely have to be at
least loosely linked with the UN.
It is sometimes claimed that there is no need for a new framework or
mechanism, because all public policy issues are already covered by a
network of existing mechanisms. But the WGIG and Tunis Agenda
(paragraph 60) concluded that this was not true, and this remains the
case. In fact, the kind of global Internet policy issues that are not
adequately addressed by any existing mechanism has only grown in number
and complexity since the WSIS. Does this mean that we are asking for a
single new mechanism to cover all issues? No. But there must be at least
one such mechanism (that is global, multi-stakeholder, etc) and if there
is none, nor any scope for an existing narrower body (such as the ITU)
to change in order to meet these criteria, then it follows that at least
one new mechanism is needed. Conversely, whilst we agree that existing
mechanisms should be used where available, we disagree that having a
plethora of overlapping bodies or mechanisms is always a positive thing.
This limits the ability for developing country governments and civil
society representatives to participate, because of their limited resources.
If the CSTD does recommend a process that leads to some new framework
or mechanism in the future, any such new framework or mechanism should
be based on the principles of subsidiarity, and be innovative in terms
of mandate, structure, and functions, to be adequate to the unique
requirements of global Internet governance. It must be participative of
all stakeholders, promoting the democratic and innovative potential of
the Internet. Exactly what shape it takes will emerge through reasoned
deliberation. Some of us believe that governments will accept nothing
less than a new intergovernmental body, like a committee that could be
attached to the UN General Assembly, and accordingly would accept such a
body if and only if it includes an extensive structure of participation
by all stakeholders which could be modelled on the stakeholder
participation mechanisms of the OECD's Internet policy development body,
the CICCP, and would have a close and organic relationship with the IGF.
This option proceeds from the position that global governance reforms
should take place in-outwards, proceeding from current multilateral
toward their further democratisation.
For some others of us, although understanding the sincerity of
governments and the legitimacy of their claim to set policy norms, there
are too many dangers in proposing such a formal new intergovernmental
body, but may be fewer dangers in an adjunct to the IGF, as described
below in question 9. Whilst we are still formulating what format a new
framework or mechanism might take, and will be discussing this question
further at our meeting ahead of the Bali IGF, we are in accord that the
CSTD should be open to considering a process that leads to some new
framework or mechanism in the future, that is dedicated to fulfilling
the purpose and scope of enhanced cooperation as mentioned in the Tunis
Agenda and as described above, in a way that the uncoordinated efforts
of individual stakeholders and institutions towards fulfilling that
mandate have been unable to do.
*9. What is the possible relationship between enhanced cooperation and
the IGF?*
The IGF complements the enhanced cooperation mandate, but as it stands,
it does not fulfill that mandate. Some of us believe there is the
potential for a significantly strengthened IGF, with appropriate
long-term funding support, to host a new framework or mechanism to
facilitate the development of globally-applicable principles on public
policy issues through a multi-stakeholder process. If so, this would
have be entirely new and supplementary to the IGF's existing structures
and processes, significantly differing from those that exist now such as
the MAG, workshops and dynamic coalitions. In any case, regardless of
whether any such new framework or mechanism is part of the IGF, the
IGF's existing structures and processes will be valuable in deepening
the public sphere for multi-stakeholder discussion of Internet policy
issues, which will be integral to the work conducted through the new
framework or mechanism.
*10. How can the role of developing countries be made more effective in
global Internet governance?*
Developing countries have taken recourse to the ITU because they feel
that they are not otherwise represented in in the existing global
Internet governance arrangements, which are dominated by developed
countries and by companies and organisations based in those countries.
This points to the need for reforms such as those advocated above.
However that alone will not be enough. Developing countries are
excluded at so many different levels, and they self-exclude, so
addressing this problem is not at all trivial. The way in which Internet
governance for development (IG4D) has been conceived and addressed in
the IGF and in other global spaces is not helpful. It is narrow, and top
down, and often does not go beyond affordable access issues. Clarifying
the role of governments in Interent governance (see questions 5, 6, 7
and 11) is the first step. Developing country governments must be
involved in this discussion otherwise they will not buy into its
outcomes. Another necessary step is to foster more engagement with
Internet governance issues at the national level in developing
countries. In the way that developing countries have made an impact on
global issues such as trade justice for, example, so too they could in
Internet governance. The issues are debated at national level by the
labour movement, local business, social justice groups etc. and this
both pressurises governments and informs governments (not always in the
desired way) at the global level. Critical thinking needs to be applied
at national and regional level, with involvement of non-governmental
stakeholders for more effective developing country representation at
global level. And vice versa. Global Internet governance processes need
to report and feed into national processes. In short, making developing
countries (government and other stakeholders) play a more effective role
in global Internet governance requires mechanisms at national and
regional level as well as a process of democratisation at the global level.
*11. What barriers remain for all stakeholders to fully participate in
their respective roles in global Internet governance? How can these
barriers best be overcome?*
As noted in questions 2a and 2b above, enhanced cooperation was largely
a role taken by governments who required it, through which they hoped to
address the over-arching issue of WSIS, namely internationalization of
Internet oversight. But as question 3 notes, that has not happened. The
apparent problem is that two separate objectives - the principal aims of
either of the power poles - have been conflated. If these two objectives
(in question 4 above) are treated separately, then there may become the
possibility to find some common ground.
Specifically, the US and its allies have feared, and have acted to stop,
what they see as the threat of totalitarian control of the Internet. But
it is possible to switch from this negative characterization, to a
positive outlook: the US and its allies have been centrally concerned
with freedom of expression, for our new global communications medium,
the Internet. The other governmental power pole has been concerned,
from the beginning of WSIS, and even well before, that oversight for the
Internet move from the US, to a global arrangement. Both objectives are
laudable, and reconcilable.
The way forward, as suggested in question 8, is to treat those two
objectives separately. In fact, continuing to conflate them - so that
there can be no action on one, without impact on the other - assures
deadlock. Separating them creates a freedom of maneuver that may permit
to find ways forward, between the two, so-far implacable camps.
Related to this, the bi-polar opposition between groups of states has
come to be mirrored among (what have become) the states' frontline
troops: the stakeholders. Multi-stakeholderism has been used as a point
of distinction between the Internet governance model favoured by the US
and its allies from those of the countries who have been calling for
internationalisation of policy oversight. Thus multi-stakeholderism,
perhaps the most important innovation of WSIS, which formally
acknowledges governance roles for multiple stakeholders, has been
co-opted into this struggle between the two governmental power poles.
But this is a false dichotomy. Whilst it is fundamental that public
policy issues be determined through democratic means, and in the ideal
conception of democracy, this would fall to elected governments, we have
found that even supposed governmental defenders of democracy abuse their
state power - as the Snowden episode, and before it the Manning episode,
and even the Wikileaks story, have revealed (not least through the
treatment of the individuals themselves). In truth no governement has
fully lived up to its fundamental democratic responsibilities, and then
within that to the new promise of multi-stakeholderism at the national
or the global level.
Real multi-stakeholderism offers to formalize government consultation
with its constituencies, as governments formulate policy. Among other
purposes, this offers a safeguard against the abuses of state power,
when 'the people' may otherwise be forgotten. This - real
multi-stakeholderism - means consulting widely, certainly beyond the
usual suspects who may frequent UN meetings. Thence, the people of a
democracy may be empowered, with voices speaking from all corners, and
providing a bulwark against the ever-present temptations, for those
temporarily entrusted with governmental power, to abuse that power.
Thus civil society - instead of being used as pawns in a global power
tussle - may instead use the new regime, to assume a rightful place in
democracy.
*12. What actions are needed to promote effective participation of all
marginalised people in the global information society?*
Information and communication policy and practice at national level that
is based on (and committed to) information and communication processes
supporting political, social and economic development. Access to ICTs
can empower marginalised people and create more inclusion, but political
and economic processes need to enable this for the full potential of
this empowerment to make a difference.
*13. How can enhanced cooperation address key issues toward global,
social and economic development?*
*14. What is the role of various stakeholders in promoting the
development of local language content?*
*15. What are the international internet-related public policy issues
that are of special relevance to developing countries?*
*16. What are the key issues to be addressed to promote the
affordability of the Internet, in particular in developing countries
and least developed countries?*
*17. What are the national capacities to be developed and modalities to
be considered for national governments to develop Internet-related
public policy with participation of all stakeholders?*
*18. Are there other comments, or areas of concern, on enhanced
cooperation you would like to submit?*
In institutionalizing and operationalizing enhanced cooperation, it is
critically important to create a deliberative process in which all
stakeholder perspectives are appropriately taken into consideration. It
is not enough to just allow the various stakeholders to voice their
perspectives. All the various comments must also be taken in
consideration in a logical analysis process, in which for every
important policy question, a set of possible answers is worked out, and
each of the possible answers is evaluated against the objective of
sustainable global, social and economic development as well as in regard
to the fundamental principles of democracy, rule of law, and the
internationally recognized human rights.
--
*Dr Jeremy Malcolm
Senior Policy Officer
Consumers International | the global campaigning voice for consumers*
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