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All Best Bits participants are now invited to finalise a joint
submission to the CSTD Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation, which
we are to submit by the end of August. This will be a very
important submission in its own right, and also a key preparatory
document to three upcoming Best Bits meetings - our <a
href="http://2013.rigf.asia/workshop-proposal-7/">APrIGF workshop
in Seoul</a>, Day 1 of our Best <a
href="http://bestbits.net/bestbits2013/">Bits meeting in Bali</a>,
and one of our two <a
href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2013/workshop_2013_accomplish_list_view.php?xpsltipq_je=36">workshops
at the global IGF</a>.<br>
<br>
Its importance is that it addresses a question, unresolved for the
last eight years, about how global Internet governance (in the broad
sense that goes beyond technical issues) should evolve in response
to states claims of sovereignty over public policy issues relating
to the Internet. I wrote a <a
href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2013/workshop_background_paper/64_1367863304.pdf">background
paper</a> about this general question (and <a
href="https://www.unesco-ci.org/cmscore/sites/default/files/2013wsis10/internet_freedom_in_a_world_of_states.pdf">slides</a>)
for our WSIS+10 workshop in Paris. Post-PRISM, the question has
only assumed greater importance.<br>
<br>
For the past few weeks, a civil society-only <a
href="http://lists.bestbits.net/wws/info/ec">Best Bits working
group</a> (which also includes, though not in an official
capacity, civil society members of the CSTD working group) has been
working hard on this, to hone in on the core issues and to state
them clearly and fairly, taking into account the wide divergence in
views that exists even within civil society. The result of our work
is open for your comment for one week, at which time we will close
for endorsements:<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://igcaucus.org:9001/p/ec">http://igcaucus.org:9001/p/ec</a><br>
<br>
The current text is also pasted below. We aim for this submission
to be as broadly inclusive of the views of Best Bits participants as
possible, so after reading and considering the existing text
carefully, if you have any changes to suggest, please speak up. If
the changes are minor, you can just make them on the Etherpad. If
major, we would ask that you raise them on the list first. The more
groups that can endorse the submission, the more influence it will
have.<br>
<br>
Just to reiterate, we are not taking endorsements yet. This will
occur after one week of final comments from this list. (There is no
point in taking endorsements when there might still be changes to
the text.) For the same reason, we ask that you don't forward the
draft text widely yet. If you want to bring other groups into the
discussion that is welcome, but (for now) the best way to do so
would be to ask them to join the Best Bits list.<br>
<br>
Here, then, is the current text (starting from question 2, which is
intentional):<br>
<br>
<b>2. What do you think is the significance, purpose and scope of
enhanced cooperation as per the Tunis Agenda?</b><br>
<br>
<b>a) Significance</b><br>
<br>
The inclusion of the enhanced cooperation mandate in the Tunis
Agenda was a political necessity to account for the view of many
governments and others of the inadequacy of existing Internet
governance arrangements when measured against the criteria
identified in the first phase of the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS): namely transparency, accountability,
multilateralism, and the need to address public policy issues
related to Internet governance in a coordinated manner (WGIG Report,
para 35). In particular it was suggested "that there are many
cross-cutting international public policy issues that require
attention and are not adequately addressed by the current
mechanisms" (Tunis Agenda, para 60).<br>
<br>
Foremost amongst the areas in which a deficit in existing
arrangements was perceived was the issue of internationalizing
Internet oversight beyond the United States, a struggle that had
dominated the entire summit process from the beginning of WSIS I.
But existing arrangements were also seen as failing to adequately
address a broad range of other issues, some discussed below under
question 4. At the conclusion of WSIS, civil society, backed by what
ultimately became a coalition among the US and some other mainly
developed countries, got the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), as a
multi-stakeholder forum to address mainly those other broader
issues. The promise of addressing the narrower issue of Internet
oversight, as sought by a key group of other governments, was
reserved for a process parallel to the IGF, and perhaps as a
counterbalance to it. Those governments got as a result the
'enhanced cooperation' process. It is also significant that even
though the discussion was quite conflictual, member states chose to
use 'positive' words: enhance, and cooperation. The ongoing
discussion about how to improve IG arrangements should continue in
this same positive spirit.<br>
<br>
<b>b) Purpose</b><br>
<br>
Therefore the purpose of enhanced cooperation process mandate, in
conjunction with the closely related mandate for the formation of an
Internet Governance Forum, is to address the perceived deficits
described above. In particular the Tunis Agenda identifies that
enhanced cooperation would enable governments, on an equal footing,
to carry out their roles and responsibilities, in international
public policy issues pertaining to the Internet" (para 69).
Subtextually, the main purpose of Enhanced Cooperation as sought by
governments was to provide a space where they could further deal
with the dominant issue across both the summits -
internatiionalization of Internet oversight. With IGF a mainly civil
society initiative, albeit multi-stakeholder in conception, enhanced
cooperation was a process in which goverments would be the main
actors.<br>
<br>
<b>c) Scope</b><br>
<br>
The enhanced cooperation mandate "should include the development of
globally-applicable principles on public policy issues" (para 70)
and "also could envisage creation of a suitable framework or
mechanisms, where justified" (para 61). But it does not envision the
involvement of governments "in the day-to-day technical and
operational matters, that do not impact on international public
policy issues" (para 69). <br>
<br>
Although there is an emphasis on what enhanced cooperation means for
governments (who, after all, were the only stakeholder group
required to agree to the enhanced cooperation mandate), the Tunis
Agenda does not suggest that enhanced cooperation is solely for
governments. In paragraph 69, enhanced cooperation is suggested as
a mechanism to "enable" governments to carry out their roles and
responsibilities. To "enable" does not mean that enhanced
cooperation is for governments alone. Indeed the scope of enhanced
cooperation also encompasses all relevant stakeholders as per para
70 ("organisations responsible for essential tasks") and the
process towards enhanced cooperation will involve "all
stakeholders" per para 71.<br>
<br>
<b>3. To what extent has or has not enhanced cooperation been
implemented? Please use the space below to explain and to
provide examples to support your answer.</b><br>
<br>
It follows that for any public policy issue related to Internet
governance that lacks at least one transparent, accountable,
multilateral process, involving all stakeholders, for the
development of globally-applicable principles to enable that issue
to be addressed in a coordinated manner, or any framework or
mechanisms to support such a process, the enhanced cooperation
mandate is yet to be implemented. As the Tunis Agenda does not
necessarily specify that a single or central process or mechanism is
required, and indeed there is none yet, some point to a variety of
independent efforts to coordinate policy development across a number
of issue areas and fora as evidence of the implementation of the
mandate. But the degree of such implementation currently varies.<br>
<br>
For example, the progress made at ICANN with respect to issues of
critical Internet resources, involving the role of the Framework of
Commitments (FoC) AND the Government Advisory Council (GAC) may be
seen as a movement towards fulfilling the enhanced cooperation
mandate in that context. Less evidence of such can be seen in the
work of WIPO on intellectual property enforcement, that of UNCTAD on
cross-border consumer protection, that of the UN Human Rights
Council on the human rights impacts of government surveillance, or
that of the World Wide Web Consortium on online behavioural
advertising. There are other issues still for which there is no
institution with a clear responsibility to implement the enhanced
cooperation mandate: for example, there is no global body that deals
comprehensively with data protection and privacy rights, and similar
gaps exist in many other areas of a social, economic, political and
cultural nature (see question 4).<br>
<br>
Indeed while the IGF has developed, across now seven annual
sessions, enhanced cooperation has not really got off the ground.
There was a session in New York the end of 2010, seeking wider
input. And CSTD has held various meetings on the subject. But
enhanced cooperation - as conceived in the grand bargain of WSIS -
has so far not been taken to serious steps. Meanwhile the tensions
that led to the enhanced cooperation bargain are still very much in
play, as illustrated by the impasse at the ITU's World Conference on
International Telecommunications (WCIT) in 2012 between governments
seeking to assert greater control over the Internet, and those
opposing international treaties as a method of such control. We can
agree with both camps: that the enhanced cooperation mandate has not
been adequately implemented, but also that going for an
intergovernmental treaty is not the right way to begin implementing
the EC imperative.<br>
<br>
<b>4. What are the relevant international public policy issues
pertaining to the Internet?</b><b><br>
</b><b><em>(List in order of priority, if possible)</em></b><br>
<br>
The list of International public policy issues that pertain to the
Internet is not closed, since these change over time as social
conditions change. However, much work has already been done to
elaborate some of the most relevant such issues. This work includes
the WGIG report, the background report that accompanied it, and ITU
Resolution 1305 with regard to “scope of work of ITU on
international Internet-related public policy matters”. Drawing
together and grouping some of the issues identified in these reports
and elsewhere, we present a partial list, roughly categorised into
groups (though many issues do cut across categories):<br>
<br>
Human rights<br>
<ul class="bullet">
<li>Freedom of Expression</li>
<li>Data protection and privacy rights</li>
<li>Consumer rights</li>
<li>Multilingualism</li>
<li>Access to knowledge and free information flows, deepening the
public domain on the Internet</li>
<li>Internet intermediary companies as private agents for
extra-territorial law enforcement (problems with)</li>
<li>Protection of vulnerable sections, like children, women,
traditional communities etc</li>
<li>Net neutrality (that all data is given equal priority on
networks)</li>
<li>Search neutrality (that global search engines give neutral
results)</li>
</ul>
<br>
Access and accessibility<br>
<ul class="bullet">
<li>Multilingualization of the Internet including
Internationalized (multilingual) Domain Names</li>
<li>International Internet Connectivity</li>
<li>Cultural diversity</li>
<li>Accessibility policies for the disabled</li>
<li>Affordable and universal access</li>
<li>Reliability, and quality of service, especially in the
developing world</li>
<li>Contributing to capacity building for Internet governance in
developing countries</li>
<li>Developmental aspects of the Internet</li>
</ul>
<br>
Critical Internet resources management and oversight<br>
<ul class="bullet">
<li>Administration of the root zone files and system</li>
<li>Interconnection costs (especially global interconnection)</li>
<li>Allocation of domain names</li>
<li>IP addressing</li>
<li>Convergence and next generation networks</li>
<li>Technical standards, and technology choices</li>
<li>Continuity, sustainability, and robustness of the Internet</li>
<li>Genuine internationalization of Internet oversight</li>
</ul>
<br>
Security and law enforcement<br>
<ul class="bullet">
<li>Internet stability and security</li>
<li>Combatting cybercrime</li>
<li>Other issues pertaining to the use and misuse of the Internet</li>
<li>Dealing effectively with spam</li>
<li>Protecting children and young people from abuse and
exploitation</li>
<li>Cryptography</li>
<li>Cross border coordination</li>
</ul>
<br>
Trade and commerce<br>
<ul class="bullet">
<li>e-commerce</li>
<li>copyright</li>
<li>patents</li>
<li>trademarks</li>
<li>Cross border Internet flows</li>
<li>Internet service providers (ISPs) and third party liabilities</li>
<li>National policies and regulations (harmonization of)</li>
<li>Competition policy, liberalization, privatization and
regulations</li>
<li>Applicable jurisdiction</li>
<li>Tax allocation among different jurisdictions with regard to
global e-commerce</li>
<li>Development of, and protection to, local content, local
application, local e-services, and local/ domestic Internet
businesses</li>
<li>Internet and health systems, education systems, governance
systems and so on.</li>
<li>Cloud computing (global issues involved)</li>
<li>Economics of personal data (who owns, who makes money from,
and so on)</li>
<li>Media convergence - Internet and traditional media (Internet
companies versus newspapers, radio, cable and TV, book
publishing industry etc)</li>
<li>Regulation of global Internet businesses (in terms of
adherence to competition policies, consumer rights, law
enforcement etc)</li>
</ul>
<br>
<b>5. What are the roles and responsibilities of the different
stakeholders, including governments, in implementation of the
various aspects of enhanced cooperation?</b><br>
<br>
We do not think that the allocation of roles between the
stakeholders that the Tunis Agenda established should be taken as
definitive. We take it that, like the definition of Internet
governance adopted in the Tunis Agenda which was specified as a
"working definition", so too the definitions of the roles of
stakeholders adopted in the Tunis Agenda were also working
definitions that would be subject to review.<br>
<br>
The definition of civil society's "important role ... especially at
community level" is particularly unhelpful. We contend that civil
society's role in contributing to the development of global public
policy principles is much more integral than that definition
suggests. In particular, there are cases in which governments are
not inclined to uphold the human rights of Internet users, such as
the rights of foreigners whose Internet usage is the subject of
official surveillance. Civil society has a key role in representing
the interests of such users, and others whose interests are
otherwise poorly represented due to democratic deficits at national
and international levels.<br>
<br>
But further, the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders cannot
be fixed in Internet governance (or probably in many other areas of
governance either). For example civil society can in some
instances represent specific marginalised communities or user or
interest groups (e.g. the visually impaired). At other times civil
society can be experts providing input and guidance on how to
approach policy issues. At other times civil society can play a
'watch' role to monitor the behaviour of business or government in
order to protect the public interest. And so on. Roles and
responsibilities of stakeholder groups will depend on the type of
process, and the specific interests involved and with a stake in
the outcome of each process.<br>
<br>
Please see also the response to Question 11, below, for some
particulars.<br>
<br>
<b>6. How should enhanced cooperation be implemented to enable
governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and
responsibilities in international public policy issues pertaining
to the Internet?</b><br>
<br>
We acknowledge that governments remain the main representative
structure for international public policy development. This
typically takes place through the UN and other multi-lateral
institutions such as the WTO, etc. But on Internet-related public
policy issues, there are transnational interests and impacts that
governments cannot adequately take into account without the full
participation of other stakeholders. There is room for discussion
about the best way of involving those stakeholders, and it does not
necessarily mean placing them on an equal level with governments.
There would be value in establishing a framework or mechanism to
address Internet related public policy issues that do not already
have a home in any existing global forum, or where that forum does
not fulfil the WSIS process criteria, including the participation of
all stakeholders. Such a framework or mechanism should be
non-duplicative and should take advantage of the expertise of
existing arrangements, mechanisms, institutions or organisations
where relevant.<br>
<br>
There is also a link between the global and national level.
Governments need to put in place transparent, accountable, processes
at the national level to support those at the global level. If one
takes, for example, ICANN and the GAC, many governments are now
participating in the GAC, but their participation is not always
transparent to national stakeholders, and it is not clear who they
are accountable to at national level. Member states need to fulfil
WSIS process criteria at the national level otherwise it does not
make much sense (other than just to large powerful business and CS
actors) to implement them at the global level.<br>
<br>
<b>7. How can enhanced cooperation enable other stakeholders to
carry out their roles and responsibilities?</b><br>
<br>
By bringing governments closer to the other stakeholders, the other
stakeholders are also brought closer to governments. If enhanced
cooperation is a process whereby governments (and existing Internet
governance spaces/processes) are compelled to adhere to WSIS
principles of transparency, accountability, etc., this can serve to
create an approach to IG, and to existing and evolving IG processes
and spaces that is rooted in the public interest and inclusive of
all stakeholders. Even if the public interest is not always clear,
such processes should, and could involve all stakeholders in
negotiating a common understanding of what the broadest possible
public interest is on any particular issue.<br>
<b><br>
</b><b>8. What are the most appropriate mechanisms to fully
implement enhanced cooperation as recognized in the Tunis Agenda,
including on international public policy issues pertaining to the
Internet and public policy issues associated with coordination and
management of critical Internet resources?</b><br>
<br>
The CSTD Working Group is itself an important mechanism for the
stakeholders to set in train a process to fully implement enhanced
cooperation, which may in turn eventually result in changes to
frameworks, structures or institutions. This will not take place
immediately, but in phases. We are now in a kind of distributed
reform/exploration phase with the IGF and IGF-like processes trying
to create more cooprative engagement, and institutions like ICANN
and the ITU putting in place certain reforms, and institutions that
previously ignore the Internet beginning to take it seriously (e.g.
the Human Rights Council). <br>
<br>
This should lead into an intermediate phase of more formalised
transparency and reporting and collaboration among all institutions
or processes dealing with Internet governance. The IGF (with its
mandate to "promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment
of WSIS principles in Internet governance processes") could be the
home for this role. <br>
<br>
Ultimately however, this alone will not fill the gaps that created
the enhanced cooperation mandate. There is also a pressing need to
address very important global Internet related public policy issues,
and to do so at the global level, and this work has to be done by
democratic / representative structures. This may require the
eventual establishment of a new framework or mechanism, particularly
in the case of emerging and orphaned issues that have no other
global home. Although a logical home for such a framework or
mechanism would be the United Nations, we acknowledge the many
weaknesses in UN processes at present, including in relation to
transparency and very uneven support for the inclusion of civil
society influence in the UN system. Certainly, a traditional
intergovernmental organisation is not an appropriate structure.<br>
<br>
In the technical realm of Internet naming and numbering, the
response to the weaknesses and shortcomings of the UN system has
been to establish in ICANN a body which is independent of the UN
system. But even ICANN is overseen by governments, or to be more
precise by one government - the United States. And whilst the UN is
characterised by some as being a haven for tyrranical regimes, the
United States itself is widely criticised as having infringed global
human rights norms through its global surveillance practices, and
for its tyrannical pursuit of whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden
for exposing such practices. Therefore in comparing the respective
merits of a UN-based institution (particularly if it is an
innovative, multi-stakeholder, and semi-autonomous one such as the
IGF), and a non-US based institution that is nonetheless beholden to
governments at some level, the choice is not as stark as it is often
presented to be.<br>
<br>
Therefore in both areas - general public policy issues in which
governments have a leading role through the international system,
and naming and numbering in which ICANN has a leading role - reforms
are eventually required. Taking first the case of ICANN, the
reforms for which we advocate would not be to bring it within the
United Nations, but to broaden its oversight beyond the United
States alone. This may take the form of a new international
oversight board with techno-political membership derived from
different geopolitical regions. The mandate of this oversight
mechanism would be very narrow, more or less the same as exercised
by the Department of Commerce of the United States Government at
present. ICANN would become an international organisation and enter
into a host country agreement with the United States, giving it
complete immunity from US law or any other form of control or
interference.<br>
<br>
It is not necessary that the same new framework or mechanism that
broadens the oversight of ICANN, should also deal with other general
public policy issues. In fact there is considerable merit in looking
at these aspects of enhanced cooperation separately. Because of the
more mature state of the multi-stakeholder model that already
exists around the regime for management of critical Internet
resources, there is good reason to separate out the need to
internationalise existing mechanisms for governmental oversight of
that regime, from the need for new frameworks or mechanisms for
dealing with more general public policy issues of various political,
economic, social and cultural kinds, for which there might be a more
central role for another new framework or mechanism.<br>
<br>
In such fields of public policy outside the narrowly technical,
there would be the choice to build upon the existing global order
that we have in the United Nations, or to rebuild this from scratch
(as in the case of ICANN). Whilst there is merit in the idea of a
post-UN transnational democratic order that derives its legitimacy
from the individual rather than from the nation state, and which
could provide legitimacy and oversight for both technical and
broader public policy bodies, nothing of this kind exists or is a
realistic prospect for the short or medium term. Therefore, if the
mechanism that we begin through the CSTD Working Group does lead
towards a new framework or process, we accept the likelihood that
such framework or process would likely have to be at least loosely
linked with the UN.<br>
<br>
It is sometimes claimed that there is no need for a new framework
or mechanism, because all public policy issues are already covered
by a network of existing mechanisms. But the WGIG and Tunis Agenda
(paragraph 60) concluded that this was not true, and this remains
the case. In fact, the kind of global Internet policy issues that
are not adequately addressed by any existing mechanism has only
grown in number and complexity since the WSIS. Does this mean that
we are asking for a single new mechanism to cover all issues? No.
But there must be at least one such mechanism (that is global,
multi-stakeholder, etc) and if there is none, nor any scope for an
existing narrower body (such as the ITU) to change in order to meet
these criteria, then it follows that at least one new mechanism is
needed. Conversely, whilst we agree that existing mechanisms should
be used where available, we disagree that having a plethora of
overlapping bodies or mechanisms is always a positive thing. This
limits the ability for developing country governments and civil
society representatives to participate, because of their limited
resources.<br>
<br>
If the CSTD does recommend a process that leads to some new
framework or mechanism in the future, any such new framework or
mechanism should be based on the principles of subsidiarity, and be
innovative in terms of mandate, structure, and functions, to be
adequate to the unique requirements of global Internet governance.
It must be participative of all stakeholders, promoting the
democratic and innovative potential of the Internet. Exactly what
shape it takes will emerge through reasoned deliberation. Some of us
believe that governments will accept nothing less than a new
intergovernmental body, like a committee that could be attached to
the UN General Assembly, and accordingly would accept such a body if
and only if it includes an extensive structure of participation by
all stakeholders which could be modelled on the stakeholder
participation mechanisms of the OECD's Internet policy development
body, the CICCP, and would have a close and organic relationship
with the IGF. This option proceeds from the position that global
governance reforms should take place in-outwards, proceeding from
current multilateral toward their further democratisation.<br>
<br>
For some others of us, although understanding the sincerity of
governments and the legitimacy of their claim to set policy norms,
there are too many dangers in proposing such a formal new
intergovernmental body, but may be fewer dangers in an adjunct to
the IGF, as described below in question 9. Whilst we are still
formulating what format a new framework or mechanism might take, and
will be discussing this question further at our meeting ahead of the
Bali IGF, we are in accord that the CSTD should be open to
considering a process that leads to some new framework or mechanism
in the future, that is dedicated to fulfilling the purpose and scope
of enhanced cooperation as mentioned in the Tunis Agenda and as
described above, in a way that the uncoordinated efforts of
individual stakeholders and institutions towards fulfilling that
mandate have been unable to do.<br>
<br>
<b>9. What is the possible relationship between enhanced cooperation
and the IGF?</b><br>
<br>
The IGF complements the enhanced cooperation mandate, but as it
stands, it does not fulfill that mandate. Some of us believe there
is the potential for a significantly strengthened IGF, with
appropriate long-term funding support, to host a new framework or
mechanism to facilitate the development of globally-applicable
principles on public policy issues through a multi-stakeholder
process. If so, this would have be entirely new and supplementary to
the IGF's existing structures and processes, significantly differing
from those that exist now such as the MAG, workshops and dynamic
coalitions. In any case, regardless of whether any such new
framework or mechanism is part of the IGF, the IGF's existing
structures and processes will be valuable in deepening the public
sphere for multi-stakeholder discussion of Internet policy issues,
which will be integral to the work conducted through the new
framework or mechanism.<br>
<br>
<b>10. How can the role of developing countries be made more
effective in global Internet governance?</b><br>
<br>
Developing countries have taken recourse to the ITU because they
feel that they are not otherwise represented in in the existing
global Internet governance arrangements, which are dominated by
developed countries and by companies and organisations based in
those countries. This points to the need for reforms such as those
advocated above.<br>
<br>
However that alone will not be enough. Developing countries are
excluded at so many different levels, and they self-exclude, so
addressing this problem is not at all trivial. The way in which
Internet governance for development (IG4D) has been conceived and
addressed in the IGF and in other global spaces is not helpful. It
is narrow, and top down, and often does not go beyond affordable
access issues. Clarifying the role of governments in Interent
governance (see questions 5, 6, 7 and 11) is the first step.
Developing country governments must be involved in this discussion
otherwise they will not buy into its outcomes. Another necessary
step is to foster more engagement with Internet governance issues at
the national level in developing countries. In the way that
developing countries have made an impact on global issues such as
trade justice for, example, so too they could in Internet
governance. The issues are debated at national level by the labour
movement, local business, social justice groups etc. and this both
pressurises governments and informs governments (not always in the
desired way) at the global level. Critical thinking needs to be
applied at national and regional level, with involvement of
non-governmental stakeholders for more effective developing country
representation at global level. And vice versa. Global Internet
governance processes need to report and feed into national
processes. In short, making developing countries (government and
other stakeholders) play a more effective role in global Internet
governance requires mechanisms at national and regional level as
well as a process of democratisation at the global level.<br>
<br>
<b>11. What barriers remain for all stakeholders to fully
participate in their respective roles in global Internet
governance? How can these barriers best be overcome?</b><br>
<br>
As noted in questions 2a and 2b above, enhanced cooperation was
largely a role taken by governments who required it, through which
they hoped to address the over-arching issue of WSIS, namely
internationalization of Internet oversight. But as question 3 notes,
that has not happened. The apparent problem is that two separate
objectives - the principal aims of either of the power poles - have
been conflated. If these two objectives (in question 4 above) are
treated separately, then there may become the possibility to find
some common ground.<br>
<br>
Specifically, the US and its allies have feared, and have acted to
stop, what they see as the threat of totalitarian control of the
Internet. But it is possible to switch from this negative
characterization, to a positive outlook: the US and its allies have
been centrally concerned with freedom of expression, for our new
global communications medium, the Internet. The other governmental
power pole has been concerned, from the beginning of WSIS, and even
well before, that oversight for the Internet move from the US, to a
global arrangement. Both objectives are laudable, and reconcilable.<br>
<br>
The way forward, as suggested in question 8, is to treat those two
objectives separately. In fact, continuing to conflate them - so
that there can be no action on one, without impact on the other -
assures deadlock. Separating them creates a freedom of maneuver that
may permit to find ways forward, between the two, so-far implacable
camps.<br>
<br>
Related to this, the bi-polar opposition between groups of states
has come to be mirrored among (what have become) the states'
frontline troops: the stakeholders. Multi-stakeholderism has been
used as a point of distinction between the Internet governance model
favoured by the US and its allies from those of the countries who
have been calling for internationalisation of policy oversight.
Thus multi-stakeholderism, perhaps the most important innovation of
WSIS, which formally acknowledges governance roles for multiple
stakeholders, has been co-opted into this struggle between the two
governmental power poles.<br>
<br>
But this is a false dichotomy. Whilst it is fundamental that
public policy issues be determined through democratic means, and in
the ideal conception of democracy, this would fall to elected
governments, we have found that even supposed governmental defenders
of democracy abuse their state power - as the Snowden episode, and
before it the Manning episode, and even the Wikileaks story, have
revealed (not least through the treatment of the individuals
themselves). In truth no governement has fully lived up to its
fundamental democratic responsibilities, and then within that to the
new promise of multi-stakeholderism at the national or the global
level.<br>
<br>
Real multi-stakeholderism offers to formalize government
consultation with its constituencies, as governments formulate
policy. Among other purposes, this offers a safeguard against the
abuses of state power, when 'the people' may otherwise be forgotten.
This - real multi-stakeholderism - means consulting widely,
certainly beyond the usual suspects who may frequent UN meetings.
Thence, the people of a democracy may be empowered, with voices
speaking from all corners, and providing a bulwark against the
ever-present temptations, for those temporarily entrusted with
governmental power, to abuse that power.<br>
<br>
Thus civil society - instead of being used as pawns in a global
power tussle - may instead use the new regime, to assume a rightful
place in democracy.<br>
<br>
<b>12. What actions are needed to promote effective participation of
all marginalised people in the global information society?</b><br>
<br>
Information and communication policy and practice at national level
that is based on (and committed to) information and communication
processes supporting political, social and economic development.
Access to ICTs can empower marginalised people and create more
inclusion, but political and economic processes need to enable this
for the full potential of this empowerment to make a difference.<br>
<br>
<b>13. How can enhanced cooperation address key issues toward
global, social and economic development?</b><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<b>14. What is the role of various stakeholders in promoting the
development of local language content?</b><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<b>15. What are the international internet-related public policy
issues that are of special relevance to developing countries?</b><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<b>16. What are the key issues to be addressed to promote the
affordability of the Internet, in particular in developing
countries and least developed countries?</b><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<b>17. What are the national capacities to be developed and
modalities to be considered for national governments to develop
Internet-related public policy with participation of all
stakeholders?</b><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<b>18. Are there other comments, or areas of concern, on enhanced
cooperation you would like to submit?</b><br>
<br>
In institutionalizing and operationalizing enhanced cooperation, it
is critically important to create a deliberative process in which
all stakeholder perspectives are appropriately taken into
consideration. It is not enough to just allow the various
stakeholders to voice their perspectives. All the various comments
must also be taken in consideration in a logical analysis process,
in which for every important policy question, a set of possible
answers is worked out, and each of the possible answers is evaluated
against the objective of sustainable global, social and economic
development as well as in regard to the fundamental principles of
democracy, rule of law, and the internationally recognized human
rights.<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<p style="font-size:9.0pt;color:black"><b>Dr Jeremy Malcolm<br>
Senior Policy Officer<br>
Consumers International | the global campaigning voice for
consumers</b><br>
Office for Asia-Pacific and the Middle East<br>
Lot 5-1 Wisma WIM, 7 Jalan Abang Haji Openg, TTDI, 60000 Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia<br>
Tel: +60 3 7726 1599</p>
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