[governance] APPLE'S LETTER TO CUSTOMERS
Kwasi Boakye-Akyeampong
kboakye at gmail.com
Thu Feb 18 10:19:55 EST 2016
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/
February 16, 2016A Message to Our Customers
The United States government has demanded that Apple take an unprecedented
step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order,
which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand.
This moment calls for public discussion, and we want our customers and
people around the country to understand what is at stake.
The Need for Encryption
Smartphones, led by iPhone, have become an essential part of our lives.
People use them to store an incredible amount of personal information, from
our private conversations to our photos, our music, our notes, our
calendars and contacts, our financial information and health data, even
where we have been and where we are going.
All that information needs to be protected from hackers and criminals who
want to access it, steal it, and use it without our knowledge or
permission. Customers expect Apple and other technology companies to do
everything in our power to protect their personal information, and at Apple
we are deeply committed to safeguarding their data.
Compromising the security of our personal information can ultimately put
our personal safety at risk. That is why encryption has become so important
to all of us.
For many years, we have used encryption to protect our customers’ personal
data because we believe it’s the only way to keep their information safe.
We have even put that data out of our own reach, because we believe the
contents of your iPhone are none of our business.
The San Bernardino Case
We were shocked and outraged by the deadly act of terrorism in San
Bernardino last December. We mourn the loss of life and want justice for
all those whose lives were affected. The FBI asked us for help in the days
following the attack, and we have worked hard to support the government’s
efforts to solve this horrible crime. We have no sympathy for terrorists.
When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided
it. Apple complies with valid subpoenas and search warrants, as we have in
the San Bernardino case. We have also made Apple engineers available to
advise the FBI, and we’ve offered our best ideas on a number of
investigative options at their disposal.
We have great respect for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe
their intentions are good. Up to this point, we have done everything that
is both within our power and within the law to help them. But now the U.S.
government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something
we consider too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a backdoor
to the iPhone.
Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone
operating system, circumventing several important security features, and
install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong
hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the
potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.
The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake:
Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would
undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its
use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such
control.
The Threat to Data Security
Some would argue that building a backdoor for just one iPhone is a simple,
clean-cut solution. But it ignores both the basics of digital security and
the significance of what the government is demanding in this case.
In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece of
information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the
protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass
the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that
knowledge.
The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one phone.
But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over
and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would
be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions
of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No reasonable
person would find that acceptable.
The government is asking Apple to hack our own users and undermine decades
of security advancements that protect our customers — including tens of
millions of American citizens — from sophisticated hackers and
cybercriminals. The same engineers who built strong encryption into the
iPhone to protect our users would, ironically, be ordered to weaken those
protections and make our users less safe.
We can find no precedent for an American company being forced to expose its
customers to a greater risk of attack. For years, cryptologists and
national security experts have been warning against weakening encryption.
Doing so would hurt only the well-meaning and law-abiding citizens who rely
on companies like Apple to protect their data. Criminals and bad actors
will still encrypt, using tools that are readily available to them.
A Dangerous Precedent
Rather than asking for legislative action through Congress, the FBI is
proposing an unprecedented use of the All Writs Act of 1789 to justify an
expansion of its authority.
The government would have us remove security features and add new
capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input
electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute
force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a
modern computer.
The implications of the government’s demands are chilling. If the
government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your
iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to capture
their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand
that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access
your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access
your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge.
Opposing this order is not something we take lightly. We feel we must speak
up in the face of what we see as an overreach by the U.S. government.
We are challenging the FBI’s demands with the deepest respect for American
democracy and a love of our country. We believe it would be in the best
interest of everyone to step back and consider the implications.
While we believe the FBI’s intentions are good, it would be wrong for the
government to force us to build a backdoor into our products. And
ultimately, we fear that this demand would undermine the very freedoms and
liberty our government is meant to protect.
Tim Cook
--
*We should be taught not to wait for inspiration to start a thing. Action
always generates inspiration. Inspiration seldom generates action. *-- *Frank
Tibolt*
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