[governance] APPLE'S LETTER TO CUSTOMERS

[Akinremi Peter Taiwo]

The U.S government action needs to be stop on this because millions of
lives is at stakes here. I would implore those that have not signed the
petition to US president from accessnow to do so. Kindly click on this URL
www.accessnow.org

Cheers
On Feb 18, 2016 4:20 PM, "Kwasi Boakye-Akyeampong" <kboakye at gmail.com>
wrote:

> http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/
>
> February 16, 2016A Message to Our Customers
>
> The United States government has demanded that Apple take an unprecedented
> step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order,
> which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand.
>
> This moment calls for public discussion, and we want our customers and
> people around the country to understand what is at stake.
> The Need for Encryption
>
> Smartphones, led by iPhone, have become an essential part of our lives.
> People use them to store an incredible amount of personal information, from
> our private conversations to our photos, our music, our notes, our
> calendars and contacts, our financial information and health data, even
> where we have been and where we are going.
>
> All that information needs to be protected from hackers and criminals who
> want to access it, steal it, and use it without our knowledge or
> permission. Customers expect Apple and other technology companies to do
> everything in our power to protect their personal information, and at Apple
> we are deeply committed to safeguarding their data.
>
> Compromising the security of our personal information can ultimately put
> our personal safety at risk. That is why encryption has become so important
> to all of us.
>
> For many years, we have used encryption to protect our customers’ personal
> data because we believe it’s the only way to keep their information safe.
> We have even put that data out of our own reach, because we believe the
> contents of your iPhone are none of our business.
> The San Bernardino Case
>
> We were shocked and outraged by the deadly act of terrorism in San
> Bernardino last December. We mourn the loss of life and want justice for
> all those whose lives were affected. The FBI asked us for help in the days
> following the attack, and we have worked hard to support the government’s
> efforts to solve this horrible crime. We have no sympathy for terrorists.
>
> When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided
> it. Apple complies with valid subpoenas and search warrants, as we have in
> the San Bernardino case. We have also made Apple engineers available to
> advise the FBI, and we’ve offered our best ideas on a number of
> investigative options at their disposal.
>
> We have great respect for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe
> their intentions are good. Up to this point, we have done everything that
> is both within our power and within the law to help them. But now the U.S.
> government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something
> we consider too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a backdoor
> to the iPhone.
>
> Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone
> operating system, circumventing several important security features, and
> install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong
> hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the
> potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.
>
> The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no
> mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would
> undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its
> use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such
> control.
> The Threat to Data Security
>
> Some would argue that building a backdoor for just one iPhone is a simple,
> clean-cut solution. But it ignores both the basics of digital security and
> the significance of what the government is demanding in this case.
>
> In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece of
> information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the
> protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass
> the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that
> knowledge.
>
> The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one phone.
> But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over
> and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would
> be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions
> of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No reasonable
> person would find that acceptable.
>
> The government is asking Apple to hack our own users and undermine decades
> of security advancements that protect our customers — including tens of
> millions of American citizens — from sophisticated hackers and
> cybercriminals. The same engineers who built strong encryption into the
> iPhone to protect our users would, ironically, be ordered to weaken those
> protections and make our users less safe.
>
> We can find no precedent for an American company being forced to expose
> its customers to a greater risk of attack. For years, cryptologists and
> national security experts have been warning against weakening encryption.
> Doing so would hurt only the well-meaning and law-abiding citizens who rely
> on companies like Apple to protect their data. Criminals and bad actors
> will still encrypt, using tools that are readily available to them.
> A Dangerous Precedent
>
> Rather than asking for legislative action through Congress, the FBI is
> proposing an unprecedented use of the All Writs Act of 1789 to justify an
> expansion of its authority.
>
> The government would have us remove security features and add new
> capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input
> electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute
> force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a
> modern computer.
>
> The implications of the government’s demands are chilling. If the
> government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your
> iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to capture
> their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand
> that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access
> your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access
> your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge.
>
> Opposing this order is not something we take lightly. We feel we must
> speak up in the face of what we see as an overreach by the U.S. government.
>
> We are challenging the FBI’s demands with the deepest respect for American
> democracy and a love of our country. We believe it would be in the best
> interest of everyone to step back and consider the implications.
>
> While we believe the FBI’s intentions are good, it would be wrong for the
> government to force us to build a backdoor into our products. And
> ultimately, we fear that this demand would undermine the very freedoms and
> liberty our government is meant to protect.
>
> Tim Cook
>
> --
> *We should be taught not to wait for inspiration to start a thing. Action
> always generates inspiration. Inspiration seldom generates action. *-- *Frank
> Tibolt*
>
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