[governance] Finding IGC voice... again, on NETMundial and beyond.

Mawaki Chango kichango at gmail.com
Thu Mar 6 07:40:30 EST 2014 

As it has been brought to my attention that my comments and question were
not clear enough to some, here is another way of stating my concerns
quoting from the original text (with a reiteration of my comments in square
brackets and caps).

<quote>

The DNSA would require a binding contract with ICANN regarding the
conditions under which

it would agree to implement changes in the root zone or other associated
databases to reflect policies

emerging from ICANN's policy development processes [WHO WILL BE THE
ENFORCER IN ODER TO MAKE SUCH CONTRACT BINDING?]. The contract should
ensure that the DNSA

has no policy authority but merely implements valid requests for additions
or deletions emerging from

ICANN's policy process [NOTED!]. DNSA would promise to abide by ICANN
policy directives on the

condition that ICANN's policy decisions related to the root not be used to
impose requirements on

registries, via registry agreements, to regulate content or otherwise
locally lawful behavior of registrants.

The existence of this contract would provide the opportunity for developing
an additional accountability

check on ICANN [HOW SO? AGAIN WHO IS THE AUTHORITY THAT WOULD MAKE THIS
SO-CALLED "ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY" EFFECTIVE?]. For example, if the
contract was not in perpetuity but was renewable every five

years, diverse entities might compete to replace the existing ICANN as the
policy development

authority [SO HERE IS THE CRUX: YOU SEEM TO BE SUGGESTING THAT ONE OF THOSE
PARTIES, THE DNSA, IS IN A POSITION TO AWARD THIS CONTRACT TO THE OTHER,
AND SO IT MIGHT AT SOME POINT WITHDRAW IT FROM THAT OTHER PARTY AND AWARD
IT TO ANOTHER -- NOT UNLIKE THE POSITION THE USG WAS IN WITH ICANN. DO YOU
UNDERSTAND THE TENSION? AT THE VERY LEAST THERE IS A GAP IN YOUR EXPLAINING
REGARDING THE FULL MECHANISMS OF THIS CONTRACTING, BUT YOU CAN'T JUST SAY
DNSA HAS NO POLICY AUTHORITY WHILE IMPLYING IT MIGHT TAKE THE CONTRACT AWAY
FROM ICANN (SINCE YOU HAVEN'T EXPLAINED WHERE ELSE THE AUTHORITY FOR DOING
THAT WOULD LIE IN THAT RELATIONSHIP OR GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE.] As for the
DNSA, as a private association of incumbent registries, any attempt by it to

manipulate root zone management to thwart competition or discriminate
against eligible members would

be easily challenged by competition law authorities in Europe, the U.S., or
elsewhere

</quote>


Mawaki


On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 9:09 AM, Mawaki Chango <kichango at gmail.com> wrote:

> Milton,
>
>
> [Note: Sorry for duplication. I thought your original post was sent to
> both the IGC list and the 1net list and wanted also to reply to both lists
> but it was apparently sent only to the latter list. So for IGC I am posting
> my comments and questions in this thread as we are here considering your
> proposal as a potential reference in possible IGC statement for the
> NETmundial. Your quick response to the following as well as to the previous
> question (both of which are connected at some point) would be appreciated.
> Again, sorry for any confusion.]
>
>
> Thank you and Brenden for putting together this innovative attempt to
> solving the challenges of the evolving institutional field for Internet
> governance, and for sharing it. I have two points about your proposal.
>
>
> First, it is not clear to me how combining the IANA functions (which your
> proposal define as clerical) with the Root Zone Maintainer functions (which
> I would think are technical, with no more decision making power than the
> IANA functions) in a new entity provides that entity with the authority you
> seem to be giving it.
>
> Indeed, it sounds like you're proposing to end the _political_ oversight
> from USG by replacing it with the industry (DNSA) oversight. You say the
> existence of a contract between ICANN and the DNSA provides check and
> balance to ICANN and that other entities may even compete to replace ICANN
> if that contract were to (as it could) be made renewable every 5 years for
> instance, etc. In other words, this contract doesn't seem like a contract
> between peer organizations with each just having specific different roles
> toward the other, but a contract between a principal and an agent, or in
> any case between an entity that has (a higher) authority over the other
> since the former can put an end to the raison d'etre of the latter and give
> it away to a competitor.
>
>
> While I understand the incentive-based rationale for the membership of the
> DNSA, I fail to see where you make the case for such larger authority as
> you attribute to it, again merely by combining the IANA functions with the
> Root Zone Maintainer functions. What is the source of the DNSA authority
> which makes it competent to exercise an oversight that matches the previous
> political oversight (since removing the term "political" from "oversight"
> doesn't seem to narrow it to only the clerical and technical roles DNSA is
> supposed to carry out in the new governance structure) and competent to
> decide to grant or not to grant ICANN its contract?
>
>
> I think clarifying this will also help resolve the question as to whether
> political considerations (in the larger sense of political) need to be
> brought to bear in deciding who should be part of the DNSA - which can be a
> decisive factor for the success or failure of this proposal.
>
>
> My second point is much shorter and concerns your reference to a treaty,
> at last twice. I don't seem to find anywhere in the text an explanation
> about what the purpose of a treaty would be within the framework of this
> proposal. Would you mind elaborate on that?
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
> Mawaki
>
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 12:28 AM, Norbert Klein <nhklein at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>>  +1
>>
>> ..."democratic and equitable representation across world regions"...
>>
>> Norbert Klein
>> in Cambodia
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 3/5/2014 2:10 AM, Mawaki Chango wrote:
>>
>> Milton,
>>
>>  How would you address the challenge of democratic (assuming you agree
>> that this is or may be applicable here) and equitable representation across
>> world regions within the framework or under the fundamental principle of
>> the solution you and Brenden are proposing in that paper?
>>
>>  From my experience, there is no denying that minorities are or feel
>> even more isolated in a setting when the elements that define the
>> delineation between (a large) majority and (a small) minority prominently
>> albeit silently or de facto include culture.
>>
>>  Mawaki
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 5:49 AM, parminder <parminder at itforchange.net>wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On the other hand, my organisations and 45 others had suggested a
>>> Technical Oversight Board which will consist of 2-3 persons from each geo-
>>> political region, these people being from key technical academic
>>> institutions, and a method selection/ election from among possible
>>> candidates from each region could be devised... Plus, one member from each
>>> region could come from the respective RIR...
>>>
>>> This is a much more democratic spread then getting root operators as
>>> ICANN's overseers (an overwhelming number from the US, and all from
>>> developed countries) , or even TLD operators, who are mostly from the US,
>>> apart from the root operator/ TLD owners proposal suffering from the
>>> problem of those regulated overseeing the regulators....
>>>
>>> parminder
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday 04 March 2014 06:06 AM, parminder at itforchange.net wrote:
>>>
>>>   I do think it's worth having a bullet on the IANA issue
>>> --internalization/
>>> internationalization/ globalization-- as part of an IGC submission.
>>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 3, 2014 at 2:33 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  There are two proposals on the table: Ian's, which would strengthen
>>> ICANN
>>> by simply giving it control of IANA, and the IGP proposal, which takes
>>> IANA
>>> out of ICANN and makes it an independent entity controlled by all the
>>> world's TLD registries and root server operators.
>>>
>>> At the very least, a statement from IGC could reference both proposals
>>> as
>>> something worth considering.
>>>
>>>  This sounds to me like a good compromise under the current time
>>> constraints.
>>>
>>>  I am unable to agree to a model where those who are supposed to be
>>> regulated supervise the regulators.... .(next, telcos supervise FCC and
>>> such telecom regulators!?) I would even call it weird.
>>>
>>> parminder
>>>
>>>
>>>  Preferably, however, we should have a substantive discussion about the
>>> merits of either approach.
>>>
>>>
>>>  Do you mean by the March 8th deadline? Otherwise we may certainly have
>>> this
>>> discussion not only for a possible oral contribution during Sao Paulo
>>> proceedings but also for potential input in further processes beyond Sao
>>> Paulo (I'm sure the NETMundial will net be the end of all this search for
>>> the future of Ig.)
>>>
>>> Mawaki
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
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>> For all other list information and functions, see:
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>
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