[governance] "Oversight"

Wed Jun 13 21:40:38 EDT 2012

Parminder,

too long to reply in detail for the ROI on effort. You bring in a fundamental, unbridgeable ideological difference to bear; at least Louis makes the same clear in a lot less words. Many of your statements are counterfactual, red herrings, or unwarranted assumptions about others' intent, and the uselessness of trying to get them straight has been proven over too long a time.

ICANN and many other organizations, fortunate to be out of your field of view, are being built with long-term goals of independence, accountability, etc. which you fail to identify.

For the people at work in these systems, waiting to write "perfect" rules before getting things done is not only putting the cart before the horse, but not an option. That guys like David Conrad and John Curran have taken so many hours to peel off the many layers of non-understanding is commendable, all the more so when they are actually doing the work you revile.

Yours,

Alejandro Pisanty

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________________________________
Desde: governance-request at lists.igcaucus.org [governance-request at lists.igcaucus.org] en nombre de parminder [parminder at itforchange.net]
Enviado el: miércoles, 13 de junio de 2012 06:29
Hasta: governance at lists.igcaucus.org
Asunto: Re: [governance] "Oversight"

Hi All

Good that there is a discussion on affirmation of commitments (AoC). I had earlier wanted to respond to Wolfgang's call to discuss this issue.

My biggest problem with the AoC is that it is a trusteeship model of governance and not a democratic one. Why cant the AoC be signed by all countries, why only the US?

(A larger political context is: In many ways, the US is emerging as the political centre for a new global middle class which is, to that extent, getting more and more distanced from their more disadvantaged compatriots. This global middle class is unhappy with their national political structures - ostensibly for good reasons like corruption etc - but also because political systems tend towards redistributive activities. A US centred global image and ascendant ideology of social darwinism, of so called ' merit' and privilege, is what appeals to them... I will cut this analysis short, but enough to say that in these circumstances, non-democratic trusteeship based US centric governance models appeal to this class. Correspondingly, I am even more opposed to them  beyond their simple un-democratic-ness.)

My second problem is; AoC does not include the crucial IANA function, in terms of which there seems to an increasingly greater desire to micro manage by the US gov then ever before (thus there is not even an evolutionary internationalisation). So starting an AoC discussion when the real big issue for most countries is the IANA part may really be a distraction.

The third problem is; I think every technical body needs some kind of political oversight at a higher level. (I think Milton agrees with this, although he thinks that the US law is the best form of political oversight). I will like to ask Bill and others, if they remember that NCUC has at numerous occasions said that ICANN should stick to its narrow technical mandate and not get into public policy considerations? Now, with an ICANN only responsible to itself, are they suggesting that it (1) also decides and forms the public policy framework that informs its work, if only FoE, competition law, IP etc and (2) also acts as the appeal body unto itself on any alleged public policy violations.

In short, are they now suggesting that ICANN exceeds its technical mandate, which I understand it has always professed for itself? If the technical mandate of ICANN has to grow towards public policy issues, its whole structure developed in accordance with its narrow technical mandate may have to be revisited.

As for the review committees being the oversight mechanism, it really strains the concept of oversight. These are very nebulous structures with unclear role and authority. Interestingly, in the present discussion on this thread, two members of the review committees (Alex and David) actually completely differed on whether the review committees report to GAC or they do not. This is a bit strange for any kind of effectual arrangement. They also completely differ whether the review structure has any impact on 'weakening of those aspects of ICANN that are under direct US control', which issue is the biggest problem.

looking at the membership structure, one can see that the review structure carries forward the very problematic tendency of inbreeding and strong in-group loyalty that for me is perhaps the biggest issue with the ICANN system. Something which quite unabashedly, and in a storngly positive sense, gets called as the icann community... Almost all members of review structures are those closely associated with the 'ICANN system'. To try an analogy, would one appreciate something like a environment regulators community, and, further, have its structures reviewed by those closely involved with environment regulation, as proud members of such a community.   Looking at the membership of one review committee one sees two vacancies caused by people who have, in the meantime, joined ICANN !! What extra-ordinary example of good governance systems.

Although review is a subsidiary task to oversight, and not oversight, if one has to be done, it has to be done largely by informed and capable outsiders. Why does the ICANN community completely distrusts that a committee of, say, a few respected and informed newspaper editors, some renowned global media specialists etc would simply get together and sabotage the nicely done up ICANN system. This deep distrust of outsiders itself suggests how much must be wrong and unjustifiable with the system.

parminder

On Wednesday 13 June 2012 01:05 PM, William Drake wrote:
Hi Milton

On Jun 13, 2012, at 4:43 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:

[Milton L Mueller]

So ICANN's Board is accountable to....ICANN's Board. And the GAC! You invoke the GAC!

So, let me see if I have it right: it is a terrible thing to make ICANN report to a UN agency, or governed by a treaty, but it is OK to make it report to a committee of governmental representatives that exactly mirror the UN in membership eligibility, and which is composed of the exact same governments who comprise the UN.

The difference being that the GAC is unburdened by any law or treaty, its decisions or pronouncements do not have to be consistent with its members own national law, nor ratified by any democratically elected entity.

Thank you for making the flaws of the AoC so evident. No wonder the Parminders of the world are dissatisfied. This is grist for their mill, really.

Given what we've experienced and discussed endlessly within ICANN with regard to GAC's inability to meaningfully interface with the PDP, 12th hour objections to aspects of the new gTLD program, insistent channeling of IPR/LEA special interests, etc etc., I'm not sure I get what you're now advocating:

1.  A "stronger" GAC that's more than advisory (as per, it seems, the ALAC proposal)?
2.  A GAC whose members are bound by/reflective of greater accountability, transparency and inclusion at the national level?
3.  A GAC whose members are bound by/reflective of greater accountability, transparency and inclusion at the international level, to be achieved through treaty negotiations (what fun!)?
4.  A GAC that reports to or is even replaced by some UN entity?
5.  A GAC that just goes back into the sleepy hibernation of years past, or goes away?

I would certainly favor 2.  And I'd like to see 3 pursued through an expanded, multilateralized/multistakeholderized AoC, rather than a treaty.  1 and 4 not so much, and 5's not happening.

It's easy to agree that the AoC has had flaws and limitations in its first iteration.  Do you think these are so integral that the model is irredeemably messed up and worse than conceivable alternatives like a treaty instrument and/or new UN body?  I'm pretty far from convinced, and think we should be exploring ways of refining and expanding it to provide a new form of global community-wide mutual surveillance and accountability for a hopefully progressively more independent ICANN operating under a properly defined host country agreement etc.

Care to elaborate?

Cheers

Bill
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