[governance] "Oversight"

[parminder]

Hi All

Good that there is a discussion on affirmation of commitments (AoC). I 
had earlier wanted to respond to Wolfgang's call to discuss this issue.

My biggest problem with the AoC is that it is a trusteeship model of 
governance and not a democratic one. Why cant the AoC be signed by all 
countries, why only the US?

(A larger political context is: In many ways, the US is emerging as the 
political centre for a new global middle class which is, to that extent, 
getting more and more distanced from their more disadvantaged 
compatriots. This global middle class is unhappy with their national 
political structures - ostensibly for good reasons like corruption etc - 
but also because political systems tend towards redistributive 
activities. A US centred global image and ascendant ideology of social 
darwinism, of so called ' merit' and privilege, is what appeals to 
them... I will cut this analysis short, but enough to say that in these 
circumstances, non-democratic trusteeship based US centric governance 
models appeal to this class. Correspondingly, I am even more opposed to 
them  beyond their simple un-democratic-ness.)

My second problem is; AoC does not include the crucial IANA function, in 
terms of which there seems to an increasingly greater desire to micro 
manage by the US gov then ever before (thus there is not even an 
evolutionary internationalisation). So starting an AoC discussion when 
the real big issue for most countries is the IANA part may really be a 
distraction.

The third problem is; I think every technical body needs some kind of 
political oversight at a higher level. (I think Milton agrees with this, 
although he thinks that the US law is the best form of political 
oversight). I will like to ask Bill and others, if they remember that 
NCUC has at numerous occasions said that ICANN should stick to its 
narrow technical mandate and not get into public policy considerations? 
Now, with an ICANN only responsible to itself, are they suggesting that 
it (1) also decides and forms the public policy framework that informs 
its work, if only FoE, competition law, IP etc and (2) also acts as the 
appeal body unto itself on any alleged public policy violations.

In short, are they now suggesting that ICANN exceeds its technical 
mandate, which I understand it has always professed for itself? If the 
technical mandate of ICANN has to grow towards public policy issues, its 
whole structure developed in accordance with its narrow technical 
mandate may have to be revisited.

As for the review committees being the oversight mechanism, it really 
strains the concept of oversight. These are very nebulous structures 
with unclear role and authority. Interestingly, in the present 
discussion on this thread, two members of the review committees (Alex 
and David) actually completely differed on whether the review committees 
report to GAC or they do not. This is a bit strange for any kind of 
effectual arrangement. They also completely differ whether the review 
structure has any impact on 'weakening of those aspects of ICANN that 
are under direct US control', which issue is the biggest problem.

looking at the membership structure, one can see that the review 
structure carries forward the very problematic tendency of inbreeding 
and strong in-group loyalty that for me is perhaps the biggest issue 
with the ICANN system. Something which quite unabashedly, and in a 
storngly positive sense, gets called as the icann community... Almost 
all members of review structures are those closely associated with the 
'ICANN system'. To try an analogy, would one appreciate something like a 
environment regulators community, and, further, have its structures 
reviewed by those closely involved with environment regulation, as proud 
members of such a community.   Looking at the membership of one review 
committee one sees two vacancies caused by people who have, in the 
meantime, joined ICANN !! What extra-ordinary example of good governance 
systems.

Although review is a subsidiary task to oversight, and not oversight, if 
one has to be done, it has to be done largely by informed and capable 
outsiders. Why does the ICANN community completely distrusts that a 
committee of, say, a few respected and informed newspaper editors, some 
renowned global media specialists etc would simply get together and 
sabotage the nicely done up ICANN system. This deep distrust of 
outsiders itself suggests how much must be wrong and unjustifiable with 
the system.

parminder

On Wednesday 13 June 2012 01:05 PM, William Drake wrote:
> Hi Milton
>
> On Jun 13, 2012, at 4:43 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:
>
>> [Milton L Mueller]
>>
>> So ICANN's Board is accountable to....ICANN's Board. And the GAC! You 
>> invoke the GAC!
>>
>> So, let me see if I have it right: it is a terrible thing to make 
>> ICANN report to a UN agency, or governed by a treaty, but it is OK to 
>> make it report to a committee of governmental representatives that 
>> exactly mirror the UN in membership eligibility, and which is 
>> composed of the exact same governments who comprise the UN.
>>
>> The difference being that the GAC is unburdened by any law or treaty, 
>> its decisions or pronouncements do not have to be consistent with its 
>> members own national law, nor ratified by any democratically elected 
>> entity.
>>
>> Thank you for making the flaws of the AoC so evident. No wonder the 
>> Parminders of the world are dissatisfied. This is grist for their 
>> mill, really. 
>
> Given what we've experienced and discussed endlessly within ICANN with 
> regard to GAC's inability to meaningfully interface with the PDP, 12th 
> hour objections to aspects of the new gTLD program, insistent 
> channeling of IPR/LEA special interests, etc etc., I'm not sure I get 
> what you're now advocating:
>
> 1.  A "stronger" GAC that's more than advisory (as per, it seems, the 
> ALAC proposal)?
> 2.  A GAC whose members are bound by/reflective of 
> greater accountability, transparency and inclusion at the national level?
> 3.  A GAC whose members are bound by/reflective of 
> greater accountability, transparency and inclusion at the 
> international level, to be achieved through treaty negotiations (what 
> fun!)?
> 4.  A GAC that reports to or is even replaced by some UN entity?
> 5.  A GAC that just goes back into the sleepy hibernation of years 
> past, or goes away?
>
> I would certainly favor 2.  And I'd like to see 3 pursued through an 
> expanded, multilateralized/multistakeholderized AoC, rather than a 
> treaty.  1 and 4 not so much, and 5's not happening.
>
> It's easy to agree that the AoC has had flaws and limitations in its 
> first iteration.  Do you think these are so integral that the model is 
> irredeemably messed up and worse than conceivable alternatives like a 
> treaty instrument and/or new UN body?  I'm pretty far from convinced, 
> and think we should be exploring ways of refining and expanding it to 
> provide a new form of global community-wide mutual surveillance and 
> accountability for a hopefully progressively more independent ICANN 
> operating under a properly defined host country agreement etc.
>
> Care to elaborate?
>
> Cheers
>
> Bill
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