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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Hi All<br>
<br>
Good that there is a discussion on affirmation of commitments (AoC). I
had earlier wanted to respond to Wolfgang's call to discuss this issue.
<br>
<br>
My biggest problem with the AoC is that it is a trusteeship model of
governance and not a democratic one. Why cant the AoC be signed by all
countries, why only the US?<br>
<br>
(A larger political context is: In many ways, the US is emerging as the
political centre for a new global middle class which is, to that
extent, getting more and more distanced from their more disadvantaged
compatriots. This global middle class is unhappy with their national
political structures - ostensibly for good reasons like corruption etc
- but also because political systems tend towards redistributive
activities. A US centred global image and ascendant ideology of social
darwinism, of so called ' merit' and privilege, is what appeals to
them... I will cut this analysis short, but enough to say that in these
circumstances, non-democratic trusteeship based </font><font
face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">US centric </font><font
face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">governance models appeal to this
class. Correspondingly, I am even more opposed to them beyond their
simple un-democratic-ness.)<br>
<br>
My second problem is; AoC does not include the crucial IANA function,
in terms of which there seems to an increasingly greater desire to
micro manage by the US gov then ever before (thus there is not even an
evolutionary internationalisation). So starting an AoC discussion when
the real big issue for most countries is the IANA part may really be a
distraction.<br>
<br>
The third problem is; I think every technical body needs some kind of
political oversight at a higher level. (I think Milton agrees with
this, although he thinks that the US law is the best form of political
oversight). I will like to ask Bill and others, if they remember that
NCUC has at numerous occasions said that ICANN should stick to its
narrow technical mandate and not get into public policy considerations?
Now, with an ICANN only responsible to itself, are they suggesting that
it </font><font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">(1) </font><font
face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">also decides and forms the public
policy framework that informs its work, if only FoE, competition law,
IP etc and (2) also acts as the appeal body unto itself on any alleged
public policy violations. <br>
<br>
In short, are they now suggesting that ICANN exceeds its technical
mandate, which I understand it has always professed for itself? If the
technical mandate of ICANN has to grow towards public policy issues,
its whole structure developed in accordance with its narrow technical
mandate may have to be revisited. <br>
<br>
As for the review committees being the oversight mechanism, it really
strains the concept of oversight. These are very nebulous structures
with unclear role and authority. Interestingly, in the present
discussion on this thread, two members of the review committees (Alex
and David) actually completely differed on whether the review
committees report to GAC or they do not. This is a bit strange for any
kind of effectual arrangement. They also completely differ whether the
review structure has any impact on 'weakening of those aspects of ICANN
that are under direct US control</font><font
face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">', which issue is the biggest
problem. <br>
<br>
looking at the membership structure, one can see that the review
structure carries forward the very problematic tendency of inbreeding
and strong in-group loyalty that for me is perhaps the biggest issue
with the ICANN system. Something which quite unabashedly, and in a
storngly positive sense, gets called as the icann community... Almost
all members of review structures are those closely associated with the
'ICANN system'. To try an analogy, would one appreciate something like
a environment regulators community, and, further, have its structures
reviewed by those closely involved with environment regulation, as
proud members of such a community. Looking at the membership of one
review committee one sees two vacancies caused by people who have, in
the meantime, joined ICANN !! What extra-ordinary example of good
governance systems. <br>
<br>
Although review is a subsidiary task to oversight, and not oversight,
if one has to be done, it has to be done largely by informed and
capable outsiders. Why does the ICANN community completely distrusts
that a committee of, say, a few respected and informed newspaper
editors, some renowned global media specialists etc would simply get
together and sabotage the nicely done up ICANN system. This deep
distrust of outsiders itself suggests how much must be wrong and
unjustifiable with the system. <br>
<br>
parminder <br>
</font><br>
On Wednesday 13 June 2012 01:05 PM, William Drake wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:449702B7-86FB-4379-9795-0EAACEE42195@uzh.ch"
type="cite">Hi Milton<br>
<div></div>
<br>
<div>
<div>On Jun 13, 2012, at 4:43 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span"
style="border-collapse: separate; font-family: Arial; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; font-size: medium;">[Milton
L Mueller]<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
<br>
So ICANN's Board is accountable to....ICANN's Board. And the GAC! You
invoke the GAC!<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
<br>
So, let me see if I have it right: it is a terrible thing to make ICANN
report to a UN agency, or governed by a treaty, but it is OK to make it
report to a committee of governmental representatives that exactly
mirror the UN in membership eligibility, and which is composed of the
exact same governments who comprise the UN.<span
class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
<br>
The difference being that the GAC is unburdened by any law or treaty,
its decisions or pronouncements do not have to be consistent with its
members own national law, nor ratified by any democratically elected
entity.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br>
<br>
Thank you for making the flaws of the AoC so evident. No wonder the
Parminders of the world are dissatisfied. This is grist for their mill,
really.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<div>Given what we've experienced and discussed endlessly within
ICANN with regard to GAC's inability to meaningfully interface with the
PDP, 12th hour objections to aspects of the new gTLD program, insistent
channeling of IPR/LEA special interests, etc etc., I'm not sure I get
what you're now advocating:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1. A "stronger" GAC that's more than advisory (as per, it
seems, the ALAC proposal)?</div>
<div>2. A GAC whose members are bound by/reflective of
greater accountability, transparency and inclusion at the national
level?</div>
<div>3. A GAC whose members are bound by/reflective of
greater accountability, transparency and inclusion at the international
level, to be achieved through treaty negotiations (what fun!)?</div>
<div>4. A GAC that reports to or is even replaced by some UN entity?</div>
<div>5. A GAC that just goes back into the sleepy hibernation of
years past, or goes away?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I would certainly favor 2. And I'd like to see 3 pursued
through an expanded, multilateralized/multistakeholderized AoC, rather
than a treaty. 1 and 4 not so much, and 5's not happening.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's easy to agree that the AoC has had flaws and limitations in
its first iteration. Do you think these are so integral that the model
is irredeemably messed up and worse than conceivable alternatives like
a treaty instrument and/or new UN body? I'm pretty far from convinced,
and think we should be exploring ways of refining and expanding it to
provide a new form of global community-wide mutual surveillance and
accountability for a hopefully progressively more independent ICANN
operating under a properly defined host country agreement etc.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Care to elaborate?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Cheers</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Bill</div>
</blockquote>
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