[governance] ITU work on IP traceback

Carlos Afonso ca at rits.org.br
Tue Sep 16 10:38:11 EDT 2008


Milton, I managed to catch the first document but not the second (which
actually seems a list of restricted work in progress).

--c.a.

Milton L Mueller wrote:
> Here are some more sources of information about the development of the
> standard directly from the ITU
> 
> Note two things: 1) this is real. 2) the impetus for it cannot be blamed
> entirely on China, as some journalists imply, the US Defense Dept and
> Cisco and VeriSign are also involved. 
> 
>  
> 
> http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/WSIS/3rd_meeting_docs/Rutkowski
> _IPtraceback_callerID_rev0.pdf
> 
>  
> 
> http://www.itu.int/md/meetingdoc.asp?lang=en&parent=T05-SG17-070416-TD&q
> uestion=Q6/17
> 
>  
> 
> --Milton Mueller
> 
>  
> 
> ________________________________
> 
> From: expression-bounces at ipjustice.org
> [mailto:expression-bounces at ipjustice.org] On Behalf Of Robin Gross
> Sent: Friday, September 12, 2008 3:53 PM
> To: expression at ipjustice.org
> Cc: Laura DeNardis; Nick Dearden; nicholas.dearden at amnesty.org
> Subject: [Expression] Fwd: [oni] U.N. agency eyes curbs on Internet
> anonymity
> 
>  
> 
> Colleagues,
> 
>  
> 
> Below is a concerning story about the ITU and the NSA working together
> to dismantle Internet anonymity via technical standards despite the
> well-recognized right to anonymous speech in international treaties and
> national constitutions. 
> 
>  
> 
> I'd like to see this Free Expression Dynamic Coalition explore this
> issue further in Hyderabad.
> 
>  
> 
> Has anyone else heard about this initiative or have any information
> about it? Can this report be confirmed?
> 
>  
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Robin
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 	---------- Forwarded Message ---------
> 
> 	Subject: [oni] U.N. agency eyes curbs on Internet anonymity
> 
> 	Date: Friday, 12 September 2008
> 
> 	From: Rafal Rohozinski <rafal at cambridgesecurity.net>
> 
> 	To: "oni at eon.law.harvard.edu Initiative" <
> oni at eon.law.harvard.edu>
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	September 12, 2008 4:00 AM PDT
> 
> 	U.N. agency eyes curbs on Internet anonymity
> 
> 	Posted by Declan McCullagh
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	A United Nations agency is quietly drafting technical standards,
> 
> 
> 	proposed by the Chinese government, to define methods of tracing
> the 
> 
> 	original source of Internet communications and potentially
> curbing the 
> 
> 	ability of users to remain anonymous.
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	The U.S. National Security Agency is also participating in the
> "IP 
> 
> 	Traceback" drafting group, named Q6/17, which is meeting next
> week in 
> 
> 	Geneva to work on the traceback proposal. Members of Q6/17 have 
> 
> 	declined to release key documents, and meetings are closed to
> the 
> 
> 	public.
> 
> 	The potential for eroding Internet users' right to remain
> anonymous, 
> 
> 	which is protected by law in the United States and recognized in
> 
> 
> 	international law by groups such as the Council of Europe, has
> alarmed 
> 
> 	some technologists and privacy advocates. Also affected may be 
> 
> 	services such as the Tor anonymizing network.
> 
> 	"What's distressing is that it doesn't appear that there's been
> any 
> 
> 	real consideration of how this type of capability could be
> misused," 
> 
> 	said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy
> Information 
> 
> 	Center in Washington, D.C. "That's really a human rights
> concern."
> 
> 	Nearly everyone agrees that there are, at least in some
> circumstances, 
> 
> 	legitimate security reasons to uncover the source of Internet 
> 
> 	communications. The most common justification for tracebacks is
> to 
> 
> 	counter distributed denial of service, or DDoS, attacks.
> 
> 	But implementation details are important, and governments 
> 
> 	participating in the process -- organized by the International 
> 
> 	Telecommunication Union, a U.N. agency -- may have their own
> agendas. 
> 
> 	A document submitted by China this spring and obtained by CNET
> News 
> 
> 	said the "IP traceback mechanism is required to be adapted to
> various 
> 
> 	network environments, such as different addressing (IPv4 and
> IPv6), 
> 
> 	different access methods (wire and wireless) and different
> access 
> 
> 	technologies (ADSL, cable, Ethernet) and etc." It adds: "To
> ensure 
> 
> 	traceability, essential information of the originator should be
> logged."
> 
> 	The Chinese author of the document, Huirong Tian, did not
> respond to 
> 
> 	repeated interview requests. Neither did Jiayong Chen of China's
> state-
> 
> 	owned ZTE Corporation, the vice chairman of the Q6/17's parent
> group 
> 
> 	who suggested in an April 2007 meeting that it address IP
> traceback.
> 
> 	A second, apparently leaked ITU document offers surveillance and
> 
> 
> 	monitoring justifications that seem well-suited to repressive
> regimes:
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	Steve Bellovin
> 
> 	(Credit: Declan McCullagh/mccullagh.org)
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	A political opponent to a government publishes articles putting
> the 
> 
> 	government in an unfavorable light. The government, having a law
> 
> 
> 	against any opposition, tries to identify the source of the
> negative 
> 
> 	articles but the articles having been published via a proxy
> server, is 
> 
> 	unable to do so protecting the anonymity of the author.
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	That document was provided to Steve Bellovin, a well-known
> Columbia 
> 
> 	University computer scientist, Internet Engineering Steering
> Group 
> 
> 	member, and Internet Engineering Task Force participant who
> wrote a 
> 
> 	traceback proposal eight years ago. Bellovin says he received
> the ITU 
> 
> 	document as part of a ZIP file from someone he knows and trusts,
> and 
> 
> 	subsequently confirmed its authenticity through a second source.
> (An 
> 
> 	ITU representative disputed its authenticity but refused to make
> 
> 
> 	public the Q6/17 documents, including a ZIP file describing
> traceback 
> 
> 	requirements posted on the agency's password-protected Web
> site.)
> 
> 	Bellovin said in a blog post this week that "institutionalizing
> a 
> 
> 	means for governments to quash their opposition is in direct 
> 
> 	contravention" of the U.N.'s own Universal Declaration of Human 
> 
> 	Rights. He said that traceback is no longer that useful a
> concept, on 
> 
> 	the grounds that few attacks use spoofed addresses, there are
> too many 
> 
> 	sources in a DDoS attack to be useful, and the source computer 
> 
> 	inevitably would prove to be hacked into anyway.
> 
> 	Another technologist, Jacob Appelbaum, one of the developers of
> the 
> 
> 	Tor anonymity system, also was alarmed. "The technical nature of
> this 
> 
> 	'feature' is such a beast that it cannot and will not see the
> light of 
> 
> 	day on the Internet," Appelbaum said. "If such a system was
> deployed, 
> 
> 	it would be heavily abused by precisely those people that it
> would 
> 
> 	supposedly trace. No blackhat would ever be caught by this."
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	Jacob Appelbaum
> 
> 	(Credit: Declan McCullagh/mccullagh.org)
> 
> 	Adding to speculation about where the U.N. agency is heading are
> 
> 
> 	indications that some members would like to curb Internet
> anonymity 
> 
> 	more broadly:
> 
> 	An ITU network security meeting a few years ago concluded that 
> 
> 	anonymity should not be permitted. The summary said: "Anonymity
> was 
> 
> 	considered as an important problem on the Internet (may lead to 
> 
> 	criminality). Privacy is required but we should make sure that
> it is 
> 
> 	provided by pseudonymity rather than anonymity."
> 
> 	A presentation in July from Korea's Heung-youl Youm said that 
> 
> 	groups such as the IETF should be "required to develop standards
> or 
> 
> 	guidelines" that could "facilitate tracing the source of an
> attacker 
> 
> 	including IP-level traceback, application-level traceback,
> user-level 
> 
> 	traceback." Another Korean proposal -- which has not been made
> public 
> 
> 	-- says all Internet providers "should have procedures to assist
> in 
> 
> 	the lawful traceback of security incidents."
> 
> 	An early ITU proposal from RAD Data Communications in Israel
> said: 
> 
> 	"Traceability means that all future networks should enable
> source 
> 
> 	trace-back, while accountability signifies the responsibility of
> 
> 
> 	account providers to demand some reasonable form of
> identification 
> 
> 	before granting access to network resources (similar to what
> banks do 
> 
> 	before opening a bank accounts)."
> 
> 	Multinational push to curb anonymous speech
> 
> 	By itself, of course, the U.N. has no power to impose Internet 
> 
> 	standards on anyone. But U.N. and ITU officials have been
> lobbying for 
> 
> 	more influence over the way the Internet is managed, most
> prominently 
> 
> 	through the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia
> and a 
> 
> 	followup series of meetings.
> 
> 	The official charter of the ITU's Q6/17 group says that it will
> work 
> 
> 	"in collaboration" with the IETF and the U.S. Computer Emergency
> 
> 
> 	Response Team Coordination Center, which could provide a path
> toward 
> 
> 	widespread adoption -- especially if national governments end up
> 
> 
> 	embracing the idea.
> 
> 	Patrick Bomgardner, the NSA's chief of public and media affairs,
> told 
> 
> 	CNET News on Thursday that "we have no information to provide on
> this 
> 
> 	issue." He would not say why the NSA was participating in the
> process 
> 
> 	(and whether it was trying to fulfill its intelligence-gathering
> 
> 
> 	mission or its other role of advancing information security).
> 
> 	Toby Johnson, a communications officer with the ITU's 
> 
> 	Telecommunication Standardization Bureau in Geneva, also refused
> to 
> 
> 	discuss Q6/17. "It may be difficult for experts to comment on
> what 
> 
> 	state deliberations are in for fear of prejudicing the outcome,"
> he 
> 
> 	said in an e-mail message on Thursday.
> 
> 	U.N. "IP traceback" documents
> 
> 	China's proposal obtained by CNET News says "to ensure
> traceability, 
> 
> 	essential information of the originator should be logged."
> 
> 	Leaked requirements document says governments may need "to
> identify 
> 
> 	the source of the negative articles" posted by political
> adversaries.
> 
> 	Korean presentation says standards bodies should be "required to
> 
> 
> 	develop standards or guidelines" to facilitate unmasking users.
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	Verisign executive's summarysummarizes presentation saying
> protocols 
> 
> 	must have "a strong traceback capability, and establishing
> traceback 
> 
> 	considerations in developing any new standards."
> 
> 	When asked about the impact on Internet anonymity, Johnson
> replied: "I 
> 
> 	am not fully acquainted with this topic and therefore not
> qualified to 
> 
> 	provide an answer." He said that he expects that any final ITU 
> 
> 	standard would comport with the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of
> Human 
> 
> 	Rights.
> 
> 	It's unclear what happens next. For one thing, the traceback
> proposal 
> 
> 	isn't scheduled to be finished until 2009, and one industry
> source 
> 
> 	stressed that not all members of Q6/17 are in favor of it. The
> five 
> 
> 	"editors" are: NSA's Richard Brackney; Tian Huirong from China's
> 
> 
> 	telecommunications ministry; Korea's Youm Heung-Youl; Cisco's
> Gregg 
> 
> 	Schudel; and Craig Schultz, who works for a Japan-based network 
> 
> 	security provider. (In keeping with the NSA's penchant for
> secrecy, 
> 
> 	Brackney was the lone ITU participant in a 2006 working group
> who 
> 
> 	failed to provide biographical information.)
> 
> 	In response to a question about the eventual result, Schultz,
> one of 
> 
> 	the editors, replied: "The long answer is, as you can probably 
> 
> 	imagine, this subject can get a little 'tense.' The main issue
> is the 
> 
> 	protection of privacy as well as not having to rely on 'policy'
> as 
> 
> 	part of a process. A secondary issue is feasibility and cost
> versus 
> 
> 	benefit." He said a final recommendation is at least a year off.
> 
> 	Another participant is Tony Rutkowski, Verisign's vice president
> for 
> 
> 	regulatory affairs and longtime ITU attendee, who wrote a
> three-page 
> 
> 	summary for IP traceback and a related concept called
> "International 
> 
> 	Caller-ID Capability."
> 
> 	In a series of e-mail messages, Rutkowski defended the creation
> of the 
> 
> 	IP traceback "work item" at a meeting in April, and disputed the
> 
> 
> 	legitimacy of the document posted by Bellovin. "The political 
> 
> 	motivation text was not part of any known ITU-T proposal and
> certainly 
> 
> 	not the one which I helped facilitate," he wrote.
> 
> 	Rutkowski added in a separate message: "In public networks, the 
> 
> 	capability of knowing the source of traffic has been built into 
> 
> 	protocols and administration since 1850! It's widely viewed as 
> 
> 	essential for settlements, network management, and
> infrastructure 
> 
> 	protection purposes. The motivations are the same here. The OSI 
> 
> 	Internet protocols (IPv5) had the capabilities built-in. The
> ARPA 
> 
> 	Internet left them out because the infrastructure was a private
> DOD 
> 
> 	infrastructure."
> 
> 	Because the Internet Protocol was not designed to be traceable,
> it's 
> 
> 	possible to spoof addresses -- both for legitimate reasons, such
> as 
> 
> 	sharing a single address on a home network, and for malicious
> ones as 
> 
> 	well. In the early part of the decade, a flurry of academic
> research 
> 
> 	focused on ways to perform IP tracebacks, perhaps byembedding
> origin 
> 
> 	information in Internet communications, or Bellovin's suggestion
> of 
> 
> 	occasionally automatically forwarding those data in a separate
> message.
> 
> 	If network providers and the IETF adopted IP traceback on their
> own, 
> 
> 	perhaps on the grounds that security justifications outweighed
> the 
> 
> 	harm to privacy and anonymity, that would be one thing.
> 
> 	But in the United States, a formal legal requirement to adopt IP
> 
> 
> 	traceback would run up against the First Amendment. A series of
> court 
> 
> 	cases, including the 1995 decision in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
> 
> 
> 	Commission, provides a powerful shield protecting the right to
> remain 
> 
> 	anonymous. In that case, the majority ruled: "Under our
> Constitution, 
> 
> 	anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent
> practice, but 
> 
> 	an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is
> a 
> 
> 	shield from the tyranny of the majority."
> 
> 	More broadly, the ITU's own constitution talks about "ensuring
> the 
> 
> 	secrecy of international correspondence." And the Council of
> Europe's 
> 
> 	Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet adopted
> in 
> 
> 	2003 says nations "should respect the will of users of the
> Internet 
> 
> 	not to disclose their identity," while acknowledging law
> enforcement-
> 
> 	related tracing is sometimes necessary.
> 
> 	"When NSA takes the lead on standard-setting, you have to ask
> yourself 
> 
> 	how much is about security and how much is about surveillance,"
> said 
> 
> 	the Electronic Privacy Information Center's Rotenberg. "You
> would 
> 
> 	think (the ITU) would be a little more sensitive to spying on
> Internet 
> 
> 	users with the cooperation of the NSA and the Chinese
> government."
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	-------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	--
> 
> 	If you want to know what is going on in Cambodia,
> 
> 	please visit us regularly - you can find something new every
> day:
> 
> 	 
> 
> 	http://cambodiamirror.wordpress.com (English)
> 
> 	http://kanhchoksangkum.wordpress.com (Khmer)   
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> IP JUSTICE
> 
> Robin Gross, Executive Director
> 
> 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA 94117 USA
> 
> p: +1-415-553-6261 f: +1-415-462-6451
> 
> w: http://www.ipjustice.org e:robin at ipjustice.org
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 

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