[governance] ICANN and INTELSAT (1971)

[Hans Klein]

Most of us on this list are probably not that familiar with international 
treaties.

To see a real example of such a treaty, I read through the INTELSAT 
Agreement of 1971:
         http://www.islandone.org/Treaties/BH585.html
It is an example of an operative international agreement on global 
communications.

What is perhaps most germane to our discussions here is the Agreement's 
hierarchy of authority.  There are four levels of authority:

(i)The Assembly of Parties
The Assembly of Parties is where governments predominate.  It is the 
highest level organ.  It focuses on those aspects
of INTELSAT related to sovereignty. It only meets every 2 years.

(ii)The Meeting of Signatories;
The Meeting of Signatories is more operational body of governmental 
reps.  As I understand the treaty, its members include telecom operating 
entities (state agencies).
It is a general oversight body. It reviews annual reports, financial 
statements, and rates.
It meets once per year.

(iii)The Board of Governors
This is an operating board that oversees the managers. It is similar to the 
ICANN board.
Its responsibilities include: procurement, policies, establishment of 
rates, loans, appointment and review of staff, etc.
It has about 20 members. It meets quarterly.
Membership is weighted (according to the capital investment of the country.)

(iv) Management/Staff ("executive organ")
There is a chief executive and staff, selected for integrity, competency, 
and efficiency. They run the organization.


Other interesting aspects of the Agreement:

Headquarters Agreement ("Host Country Agreement"): main focus is that 
employees don't pay income taxes. (The full agreement is a separate document.)

Amendments to Agreement: must be approved by 2/3 of the signatory states. 
(i.e. a fairly high threshold.)

Dispute Settlement: Disputes are decided by arbitral tribunals composed of 
3 experts.  Each signatory state provides the name of up to two 
experts.  This creates a total pool of people to serve on tribunals.



COMMENTS
=========

Separating Sovereignty from Operations
The hierarchical structure separates sovereignty from operational issues.

This approach can be used with ICANN.  Putting ICANN under international 
oversight does not mean that governments have free reign to meddle.

At its lower operational levels ICANN could continued to employ 
multi-stakeholder processes.  Only at a higher level would there be a 
governmental oversight body.  The responsibilities of the different levels 
could be specified.

Defense Against Capture
Any agreement for ICANN would have to be robust.  If agreements are easily 
amended, they can be re-written to favor the more powerful 
participants.  (ICANN suffered badly from this.) Roles and responsibilities 
need to be clearly specified and robustly implemented.  An international 
agreement with a high threshold for amendments is a much more robust 
framework than the current ICANN, with its more fluid bylaws.

Review/Disputes
The hierarchical structure facilitates oversight.  Higher levels monitor 
lower levels.
The dispute resolution mechanisms is based on experts.
Since they are backed by the power of governments, experts' decisions are 
more likely to be respected.

Weighted Representation
INTELSAT has formal rules for giving more representation to countries that 
contribute more.  I don't believe this issue has come up in ICANN; it may 
be that ICANN"s representation by "expertise" achieves similar 
weighting.  This merits review and explicit discussion, i.e. is the 
weighting just, etc.


Conclusion
==========
Putting ICANN under international government control would give it the 
appropriate public authority for its regulatory activities.

Internationalization would also lessen the threat of one country imposing 
its national interest on a global medium.

Good institutional design could minimize politicization and 
bureaucratization.  By keeping political oversight distant (higher up in 
the hierarchy) and constrained (by a detailed agreement that is not easily 
amended), political meddling is minimized.  ICANN's current bureaucracy 
need not substantially grow under internationalization.

ICANN's internal procedures would still need to fixed: the 2002 elimination 
of balanced representation would have to itself be undone.  This is 
extremely important and probably merits more attention at WSIS.

Perhaps the most important point is that government oversight is pretty 
mundane.  We all have it in our home countries (e.g. the NTIA in the US), 
and there are numerous examples of it in the international arena.  Despite 
all the hype and expressions of alarm, we are dealing with well-known 
policy issues.

HK


=========================================================
   Hans K. Klein
   Associate Professor                                Tel: 404-894-2258
   School of Public Policy, MC:0345            Fax: 404-894-0535
   Georgia Institute of 
Technology               hans.klein at pubpolicy.gatech.edu
   Atlanta, GA 30332-0345
   http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~hk28/

   Director, Internet and Public Policy Project (IP3) of Georgia Tech
   http://www.ip3.gatech.edu/

   Partner, Internet Governance Project
   http://www.InternetGoverannce.org

=========================================================
















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