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Most of us on this list are probably not that familiar with international
treaties. <br><br>
To see a real example of such a treaty, I read through the INTELSAT
Agreement of 1971:<br>
<x-tab> </x-tab><a href="http://www.islandone.org/Treaties/BH585.html" eudora="autourl">http://www.islandone.org/Treaties/BH585.html<br>
</a>It is an example of an operative international agreement on global
communications.<br><br>
What is perhaps most germane to our discussions here is the Agreement's
hierarchy of authority. There are four levels of
authority:<br><br>
<pre>(i)The Assembly of Parties
</b>The Assembly of Parties is where governments predominate. It is
the highest level organ. It focuses on those aspects
of INTELSAT related to sovereignty. It only meets every 2 years.
(ii)The Meeting of Signatories;
</b>The Meeting of Signatories is more operational body of governmental
reps. As I understand the treaty, its members include telecom
operating entities (state agencies).
It is a general oversight body. It reviews annual reports, financial
statements, and rates.
It meets once per year.
(iii)The Board of Governors
</b>This is an operating board that oversees the managers. It is similar
to the ICANN board.
Its responsibilities include: procurement, policies, establishment of
rates, loans, appointment and review of staff, etc.
It has about 20 members. It meets quarterly.
Membership is weighted (according to the capital investment of the
country.)
(iv) Management/Staff ("executive organ")
</b>There is a chief executive and staff, selected for integrity,
competency, and efficiency. They run the organization.
Other interesting aspects of the Agreement:
Headquarters Agreement</b> ("Host Country Agreement"): main
focus is that employees don't pay income taxes. (The full agreement is a
separate document.)
</pre><font face="Courier New, Courier"><b>Amendments to Agreement</b>:
must be approved by 2/3 of the signatory states. (i.e. a fairly high
threshold.)<br><br>
<b>Dispute Settlement</b>: Disputes are decided by arbitral tribunals
composed of 3 experts. Each signatory state provides the name of up
to two experts. This creates a total pool of people to serve on
tribunals. <br><br>
<br><br>
</font><pre>COMMENTS
=========
Separating Sovereignty from Operations
</b>The hierarchical structure separates sovereignty from operational
issues.
This approach can be used with ICANN. Putting ICANN under
international oversight does not mean that governments have free reign to
meddle.
At its lower operational levels ICANN could continued to employ
multi-stakeholder processes. Only at a higher level would there be
a governmental oversight body. The responsibilities of the
different levels could be specified.
Defense Against Capture
</b>Any agreement for ICANN would have to be robust. If agreements
are easily amended, they can be re-written to favor the more powerful
participants. (ICANN suffered badly from this.) Roles and
responsibilities need to be clearly specified and robustly
implemented. An international agreement with a high threshold for
amendments is a much more robust framework than the current ICANN, with
its more fluid bylaws.
Review/Disputes
</b>The hierarchical structure facilitates oversight. Higher levels
monitor lower levels.
The dispute resolution mechanisms is based on experts.
Since they are backed by the power of governments, experts' decisions are
more likely to be respected.
Weighted Representation
</b>INTELSAT has formal rules for giving more representation to countries
that contribute more. I don't believe this issue has come up in
ICANN; it may be that ICANN"s representation by
"expertise" achieves similar weighting. This merits
review and explicit discussion, i.e. is the weighting just, etc.
Conclusion
</b>==========
Putting ICANN under international government control would give it the
appropriate public authority for its regulatory activities.
Internationalization would also lessen the threat of one country imposing
its national interest on a global medium.
Good institutional design could minimize politicization and
bureaucratization. By keeping political oversight distant (higher
up in the hierarchy) and constrained (by a detailed agreement that is not
easily amended), political meddling is minimized. ICANN's current
bureaucracy need not substantially grow under internationalization.
ICANN's internal procedures would still need to fixed: the 2002
elimination of balanced representation would have to itself be
undone. This is extremely important and probably merits more
attention at WSIS.
Perhaps the most important point is that government oversight is pretty
mundane. We all have it in our home countries (e.g. the NTIA in the
US), and there are numerous examples of it in the international
arena. Despite all the hype and expressions of alarm, we are
dealing with well-known policy issues.
HK
</pre>=========================================================<br>
Hans K. Klein<br>
Associate
Professor
Tel: 404-894-2258<br>
School of Public Policy,
MC:0345
Fax: 404-894-0535<br>
Georgia Institute of
Technology
hans.klein@pubpolicy.gatech.edu<br>
Atlanta, GA 30332-0345<br>
<a href="http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~hk28/" eudora="autourl">http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~hk28/<br><br>
</a> Director, Internet and Public Policy Project (IP3) of Georgia
Tech<br>
<a href="http://www.ip3.gatech.edu/" eudora="autourl">http://www.ip3.gatech.edu/<br><br>
</a> Partner, Internet Governance Project<br>
<a href="http://www.internetgoverannce.org/" eudora="autourl">http://www.InternetGoverannce.org<br><br>
</a>========================================================= <br><br>
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