[bestbits] substantive proposals for Brazil summit - IG governance

[parminder]

Thanks Andrew, a very important work..

Would comment later, but yes, it is this kind of clear positions on what 
one seeks that it needed at this stage.

(Of course I do not agree with a good part of the analysis and 
conclusions/ outcomes :), and would engage in detail soon.)

parminder

On Monday 13 January 2014 05:35 PM, Andrew Puddephatt wrote:
>
> Shortly before Xmas Global Partners Digital and Article 19 met to look 
> at the responses to the survey monkey I sent out in November.  Taking 
> advantage of the presence of other groups in Geneva earlier the same 
> week, we managed to bring in representatives from CDT, CTS/FGV, 
> Access, and Internet Democracy Project.  The results of our 
> conversation are set out below and in a word attachment. Drawing upon 
> the responses to the survey and other reading (listed at the end of 
> the document) we looked at:
>
> ·The case for reform
>
> ·Possible criteria for reforming IG governance
>
> ·An evaluation of the different proposals for reform
>
> ·Preliminary conclusions.
>
> Our main preliminary conclusion was, after considering the criteria we 
> set out for an IG system, that a _dispersed system of governance_ has 
> more benefits and fewer risks than a centralised system of 
> governance.  We go on to conclude in favour of maintaining a 
> distributed governance regime, but that it should be strengthened 
> through improving the IGF, introducing a new coordinating function and 
> a process for ad hoc issue-specific multistakeholder working groups to 
> deal with new issues. We also agreed that reforms were needed in order 
> to globalise oversight at ICANN, but more research is needed about the 
> options and risks here.
>
> It is going to be a complex process to try and co-ordinate a response 
> from then list.   To simplify things I suggest that people submit 
> three categories of comments.
>
> 1. There will be those who fundamentally disagree with the approach 
> put forward.  I suggest that they develop their own approach find 
> their own collaborators and work on their own ideas. May a hundred 
> flowers bloom.
>
> 2. Those who broadly agree but who have substantive comments to make 
> which require further discussion.  I will then collect these put 
> together an online conference call or some other mechanism to discuss 
> then in a structured fashion.
>
> 3.  Those who broadly agree but have preferences for different 
> phrasing etc. but who can live with the differences.  These I will 
> collect and try and resolve through e-mail conversation.
>
> We’ve spent a lot of energy on the question of representation so it 
> would be good to focus on what it is we would say if we were 
> represented.  And although we should aim to submit something to Brazil 
> by March 1^st , this position is one we can develop and utilise in 
> other forums.  If you have other suggestins on how to pull together 
> different comments, do let me know.
>
> Andrew Puddephatt
>
> *_Internet Governance: proposals for reform _*
>
> ***Contributors: Access, Article 19, CDT, CTS/FGV, GPD, Internet 
> Democracy Project***
>
> In an effort to work towards a joint civil society proposal for 
> internet governance reform - with the aim of feeding into the upcoming 
> Brazilian Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet 
> Governance and other relevant forums – Global Partners Digital and 
> Article 19 coordinated a small group of civil society organisations.
>
> In order to brainstorm and report back as clearly as possible, the 
> group worked through four stages in considering both the Best Bits 
> survey responses and the most prominent civil society proposals for 
> reforming the IG institutional framework that the contributors were 
> aware of:
>
> 1.What is the case for reform of IG and do we have a common 
> understanding of what the problems with the existing arrangements are?
>
> 2.If there is a case for reform what are the criteria for a reformed 
> system of IG that should be applied, assuming we have a basic 
> commitment to human rights and social justice?
>
> 3.How do the various proposals for reform stack up against these 
> criteria – what are their strengths and weaknesses and what potential 
> risks and benefits.
>
> 4.What are the crucial elements of a reformed IG system and what are 
> those which we desire but would be willing to compromise around. 
> Considering the previous questions, is there a rough consensus among 
> the group present that we could share with the wider BB community to 
> enrich the approach?
>
> The below draft represents a summary of the group analysis and 
> discussion.
>
> *1) Case for reform*
>
> Reviewing and building on the survey responses, the group identified 
> the following criticisms of the current IG arrangements:
>
> ·There is an imbalance of power with many people and groups, 
> particularly from the global south, feeling marginalised.
>
> ·There is insufficient diversity of voices, including gender and language.
>
> ·Development issues, as set out in the original Tunis Agenda, have not 
> been adequately tackled.
>
> ·The IGF has not satisfactorily delivered on all elements of its mandate.
>
> ·Multistakeholderism remains poorly defined which creates difficulty 
> in its implementation and evaluation. The term is seen to be 
> increasingly used as a cover by those resisting change.
>
> ·There are jurisdictional issues which remain unresolved. This also 
> often leaves powerful ICT companies to take important human 
> rights/public interest decisions.
>
> ·There is an absence of forums where jurisdictional issues or global 
> public policies relating to the internet can be thrashed out. This 
> means governments are falling back on different national laws and 
> technical responses which encroach on the global and distributed 
> functioning of the internet.
>
> ·Furthermore because of the issues with the current regime, many 
> governments are pursuing/establishing separate international 
> initiatives to tackle important issues (such as cybersecurity) which 
> are not sufficiently transparent, open, multi-stakeholder or global.
>
> ·Some governments are increasingly asserting a doctrine of “state 
> sovereignty” on the global internet.
>
> ·There is a lack of clarity about how or where decisions are made – 
> there is a plurality of forums with unclear relationships between them.
>
> ·The internet is unusual as a communication tool, it has developed 
> from the beginning as an international medium, and its international 
> character and the benefits of free expression and access to 
> information that it brings need to be preserved.
>
> ·There is a unique property to the internet that requires global 
> cooperation and coordination to make it effective.
>
> *2) Criteria for Internet Governance *
>
> NB - The group recognised that there was an overlap with the BB second 
> Workstream looking at high level principles. The current suggested 
> baseline for Workstream 2 are the Brazilian CGI.br principles. 
> Depending on the outcome of Workstream 2, there could be potential to 
> unite around a core set of principles.
>
> After some discussion, the group set out criteria that they felt were 
> an essential element of any democratic international governance 
> system. The aim was to find criteria that could apply to any system of 
> international governance rather than looking for criteria that only 
> applied to the internet – in order to avoid the pitfalls of “internet 
> exceptionalism”. Rather, in a globalised world, where there are 
> generally very weak lines of accountability between a government's 
> positions on the international stage and its electorate back at home, 
> open international spaces with broad-based participation can be 
> important opportunities for bringing international decisions much 
> closer to citizens across the world. In this context, the group found 
> that the international IG regime, if developed appropriately, could 
> have implications for wider international governance systems (beyond 
> the Internet). The group recognised that these criteria are 
> aspirational and that any proposed reform would probably not meet all 
> the criteria. Nonetheless it was found that they provide a useful 
> framework for assessing any proposed changes.
>
> The following mutually-supporting criteria were found necessary for 
> the governance of complex global phenomena:
>
> *a)**Processes*
>
> ·Transparent and comprehensible: it should be possible for anyone to 
> understand how it works and how things happen/decisions are made;
>
> ·Accountable: internal and external accountability process should 
> exist, including a way of challenging decisions;
>
> ·Effective: in that it can deliver whatever it is meant to deliver
>
> ·Adaptable: so that it can take account of new innovations and 
> developments in the field.
>
> **
>
> *b) Participation*
>
> ·Inclusive and open: not be a small exclusive club, but open to many.
>
> ·All necessary points of view are included in order to arrive at good 
> decisions/agreements
>
> ·Possessing the necessary expertise to make informed decisions
>
> ·Meaningful participation: anybody affected by decision should be able 
> to impact upon decision-making processes. The group recognised that 
> this would likely involve mechanisms for consensus based decision 
> making. But where consensus was not possible there may need to be 
> alternative supplementary frameworks, such as decision-making by 
> majority vote.
>
> **
>
> *c) Underlying Values*
>
> ·Human rights values should be at the core of any governance process 
> and outcomes.
>
> ·Driven by global public interest (motivated by an understanding of 
> the internet as a global public good).
>
> *3) Evaluating Proposals for Reform *
>
> The next stage was to look at various suggested reforms to the current 
> system, drawn from the survey and other sources. The list of models 
> analysed below is not exhaustive.  Please forgive the brevity and 
> crudeness of the model titles and their descriptions - they are 
> indicative only. More details about the proposals can be found in the 
> sources listed at the end of the document.
>
> */_UN Committee Model_/*
>
> /Model proposed by the Indian government for a new UN Committee made 
> up of 50 member states, with four advisory committees made up of 
> different stakeholder groups. The Committee would have mandate over 
> global internet-related public policy issues, and oversight of the 
> technical bodies. IT for Change has also promoted this model with the 
> exception that oversight of the technical bodies would reside in a 
> separate Technical Oversight and Advisory Board formed of technical 
> experts nominated by governments./
>
> //
>
> */_Multi-stakeholder Internet Policy Council (as proposed by Jeremy 
> Malcolm)_/*
>
> /A new multi-stakeholder internet policy council (MIPC) under the 
> auspices of the IGF. MIPC would be made up of equal numbers from civil 
> society, private sector, government and technical/academic 
> communities, and observers from international organisations). The MIPC 
> would take up issues forwarded to it by rough consensus in IGF 
> plenaries. The MIPC would attempt to agree, by rough consensus, an IGF 
> recommendation on that issue. The recommendations would be 
> non-binding, but could call for the development of binding rules by 
> other institutions where appropriate, which would generally be at the 
> national level. /
>
> */__/*
>
> */_Multi-stakeholder Internet Policy Council (as proposed by Wolfgang 
> Kleinwachter)_/*
>
> /A new multi-stakeholder internet policy council (MIPOC) attached to 
> the IGF. MIPOC could be composed similarly to the WG on Enhanced 
> Cooperation. The MIPOC would be a coordinating body – identifying 
> issues raised at the IGF and recommending an appropriate mechanism to 
> address those issues, either a pre-existing mechanism (e.g. an 
> intergovernmental organisation, a technical organisation, a 
> combination) or a new one. New mechanisms could be ad hoc 
> multistakeholder working groups with mandates to address specific 
> issues by rough consensus. /
>
> */__/*
>
> */_Distributed Multi-stakeholder Processes Model (as proposed by 
> Internet Democracy Project)_/*
>
> /This model also envisions a coordinating body on the lines of the 
> MIPOC model above, however the coordinating body would be housed in 
> the CSTD instead of the IGF. The function of the IGF would in this 
> model be one of a clearing house only. In addition, this model 
> suggests that, where possible, the WSIS action lines should be taken 
> as a guideline for deciding which pre-existing institution has a 
> mandate covering a specific internet issue. Once an appropriate 
> institution is identified, this institution would then be responsible 
> for developing an appropriate multi-stakeholder process to respond to 
> that issue./
>
> */__/*
>
> */_Self-forming multi-stakeholder issue processes (as demonstrated by 
> Internet & Jurisdiction Project) _/*
>
> /Processes can self-create to develop voluntary solutions to specific 
> internet issues. Similarly to the model for adoption of technical 
> standards: the better a solution the more likely it is to be adopted. 
> For higher likelihood of voluntary adoption, these processes should 
> involve experts and powerful players, such as key governments. 
> However, the Internet & Jurisdiction Project’s model appears to be 
> more of a ‘proof of concept’ that could feasibly be institutionalized 
> within one of the models outlined above. /
>
> //
>
> Looking at the UN Committee model and applying the criteria above, the 
> model has real strengths in the clarity of process and therefore 
> enabling anyone to understand how it works and how things 
> happen/decisions are made. It could also meet the effectiveness 
> criteria in terms of coming up with detailed policy recommendations. 
> On the other hand, its proposed mandate seemed very broad and more 
> clarification is needed about potential clashes with existing 
> mandates, such as that of the ITU or UNESCO. As a UN Committee with a 
> central role for governments, and based on experience of similar 
> bodies, there is a real risk it would be dominated by geo-political 
> interests. As a single body with oversight – potentially – of all 
> public policy issues related to the internet, the group felt there was 
> a risk that the body would not have the requisite expertise to make 
> informed decisions across all issues. While it could draw upon the 
> work of advisory groups, it was unclear how they would be composed and 
> whether any fixed group of people would have the capability to tackle 
> a wide range of policy issues. The advisory nature of the stakeholder 
> groups would also create risks that those impacted by decisions would 
> not necessarily be able to help shape them. Furthermore there was a 
> question over the feasibility (time-wise) of a single group responding 
> to all issues, particularly as it is envisaged meeting just a few 
> times per year.
>
> Other proposals for reform, while varied in their level of 
> centralisation, suggest a greater role for non-governmental 
> stakeholder groups. All of these models seem to envision the IGF 
> playing a more or less central role as a clearing house for 
> identifying issues which need tackling and for each issue process to 
> inform, engage and be accountable to a wider Internet community. One 
> advantage of these models was seen to be the possibility for enabling 
> pathways from the national through regional to global level discussion 
> and back down by tying all processes to a wider discussion at the 
> IGFs. Another advantage was seen to be that building on the strengths 
> of the IGF could foster openness, inclusivity and accountability to 
> the wider internet community.  There were, however, concerns given 
> that the IGF hasn’t satisfactorily delivered on all elements of its 
> mandate.  For example, should the MIPC/MIPOC models derive their 
> mandate and agenda from IGF discussions – this would require a more 
> output-oriented IGF. Thus, improving the IGF was seen as critical to 
> instituting these models.
>
> A key feature of most of the above models, which the group strongly 
> supported, was the introduction of a new coordinating function in the 
> current internet governance regime. The multi-stakeholder makeup of 
> the coordinating body was also strongly supported by the group.  The 
> advantage of these models was seen to be the fact that they would 
> provide greater clarity (compared to the current situation) about how 
> public policy issues are addressed.
>
> In looking at these models, they also all maintain a distributed 
> approach where many institutions are involved in different aspects of 
> internet-related public policy. The group specifically supported the 
> concept of maintaining/instituting separate processes for separate 
> issues for several reasons. Distributing power was seen as protection 
> against power-grabs, which many saw as the main concern with the more 
> centralised approach in the UN Committee model – and to a lesser 
> extent Jeremy’s MIPC model.
>
> A distributed model was seen as having the advantage of drawing in 
> expertise as necessary based on the issue at hand, and of being more 
> dynamic and adaptable given the fast-changing internet environment. 
> However, a degree of institutionalisation of any distributed model was 
> seen to be essential to counteract power imbalances. For example, 
> self-forming multi-stakeholder processes are likely to disadvantage 
> those without power and resources.
>
> There were, however, questions about the effectiveness of the 
> distributed models as they retain some of the challenges of the 
> current regime. The UN Committee model was more similar to existing 
> governance frameworks making it easier to understand. The other models 
> involve new and innovative ways of working. The group felt that the 
> Internet & Jurisdiction project may be a useful test bed for the 
> modalities of such an approach.
>
> **
>
> *4) Existing Institutions*
>
> The group looked at a strand of suggestions around sustaining the 
> current structures, particularly the IGF and ICANN, but reforming them 
> to an extent that would allow issues with the current system to be 
> sufficiently addressed. NB these reforms could happen alongside the 
> ideas above considering the overall governance regime.
>
> **
>
> *IGF *
>
> The group looked at proposals for improving the IGF (see list of 
> sources below). There were a number of areas where necessary reforms 
> were identified:
>
> ·Providing stronger leadership;
>
> ·A better funded and supported secretariat;
>
> ·Stronger links between the IGF (and discussions at the IGF) and all 
> spaces involved in the dispersed internet governance system;
>
> ·Clearing house function;
>
> ·More output-orientated;
>
> ·Connecting the global annual IGF to a more structured series of 
> national and regional IGFs to ensure that this is a clear path for 
> issues of concern raised at a national and regional level finding 
> their way to global consideration and back down to the regional and 
> national levels;
>
> ·Widening participation (esp. unrepresented e.g. global south 
> governments and civil society, high level policy-makers, staff of all 
> institutions involved in internet-related policy making, small to 
> medium businesses);
>
> ·Reforming the Multistakeholder Advisory Group.
>
> *ICANN *
>
> In the case of ICANN, the group felt that globalising ICANN (including 
> removing the privilege of the US which was seen as  important though 
> largely symbolic) remains an issue to be resolved as it might involve 
> both location and structure.  However, the group felt that it was 
> necessary to examine closely the different options - and timeframes - 
> for doing so in order to determine their potential risks and suggest 
> appropriate solutions. Article 19 agreed to co-ordinate further work 
> on this issue.
>
> **
>
> *5) Preliminary conclusions *
>
> From the response to the survey and by analysing various alternative 
> models using the criteria set out above, there seems to be potential 
> to come to a rough consensus combining a number of ideas commanding 
> broad support among civil society.
>
> _Dispersed vs. centralised_
>
> A key point was whether a single decision making space would be more 
> appropriate versus a dispersed system whereby the right kind of 
> expertise could be assembled issue by issue. A centralised system 
> could be easier to navigate but a dispersed system had fewer risks for 
> political or corporate capture and enabled issue-based expertise 
> (including from civil society) to engage on specific issues. *On 
> balance we felt the risk/benefit of both approaches weighed more on 
> the side of a dispersed model of governance*.
>
> _Broad participation & role of reformed IGF_
>
> Another key point of agreement was in looking for ways to involve as 
> broad as possible communities in internet governance. The IGF was seen 
> as an important space for achieving this. For instance, a reformed IGF 
> could act as a central space for learning about and feeding into all 
> internet-related public policies within a dispersed system. *The 
> reform could entail: a stronger leadership, a better supported 
> secretariat, stronger links between the IGF and all other 
> internet-related policy-making spaces, a strong link to national and 
> regional IGFs, more output-orientated, widening participation and 
> reforming the MAG.*
>
> _A new co-ordinating function_
>
> There was general interest in the idea of creating a new coordinating 
> function to facilitate the coherence and effectiveness of 
> internet-related policy making within a distributed model. All agreed 
> that the coordinating group should be multi-stakeholder but there was 
> no decision on where that group should be constituted (e.g. at the 
> CSTD or attached to the IGF). *A new coordinating function is needed. 
> More discussion is needed about the form, location and processes by 
> which that function is exercised. *
>
> __
>
> _Issue-specific multistakeholder working groups _
>
> When a new issue arises that needs a policy response, there was broad 
> agreement that these should be resolved through ad hoc 
> multi-stakeholder working groups were developed to deal with specific 
> issues. There wasn’t a decision yet on where/how those working groups 
> should be formed (i.e. by different institutions with mandate over 
> different issues, by a working group tied to CSTD, by a working group 
> tied to IGF). Also, on decision making there was broad agreement that 
> the groups would ideally work by consensus with the option to shift to 
> another process where necessary and appropriate (including 
> multilateral processes, e.g. to draft a treaty). *New internet policy 
> issues should be dealt with through ad hoc multi-stakeholder working 
> groups which are issue specific.* *More discussion is needed about the 
> form, location and processes of those multi-stakeholder working groups.*
>
> __
>
> _ICANN reform_
>
> *A reformed ICANN – details to be worked on further.*
>
> **
>
> *6) List of Sources*
>
> http://internetdemocracy.in/reports/a-third-way-proposal-for-a-decentralised-democratic-internet-governance-involving-all-stakeholders/
>
> http://www.internetjurisdiction.net/
>
> http://www.itforchange.net/sites/default/files/ITfC/%20%20Dev%20agenda%20in%20IG%20200412.pdf
>
> http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-statement-un-cirp
>
> http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/india-to-push-for-freeing-internet-from-us-control/article5434095.ece?homepage=true
>
> http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions/IETF-as-model.pdf
>
> http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/a67d65_en.pdf
>
> http://unctad.org/Sections/un_cstd/docs/cstd2011d22_Major_EN.pdf
>
> http://bestbits.net/notes-on-an-igf-plus/
>
> http://www.internetgovernance.org/2013/10/16/a-blueprint-for-the-future-oversight-of-icann/
>
> http://igfwatch.org/discussion-board/my-proposal-to-the-cstd-working-group-on-enhanced-cooperation#-8xHg3pRMAMtJ2UVoZcsOg
>
> http://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/May%202013%20IG%20webinar%20PDF%20-%20Dr%20Jeremy%20Malcolm.pdf
>
> http://unctad.org/en/Pages/CSTD/WGEC-Responses.aspx
>
> *Andrew Puddephatt***| *GLOBAL PARTNERS*DIGITAL
>
> Executive Director
>
> Development House, 56–64 Leonard Street, London EC2A 4LT
>
> T: +44 (0)20 7549 0336 | M: +44 (0)771 339 9597 | Skype: andrewpuddephatt
> *gp-digital.org*
>

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