[governance] Oversight, was [liberationtech] Chinese preparing for a "Autonomous Internet" ?

Ian Peter ian.peter at ianpeter.com
Thu Jun 28 16:47:05 EDT 2012


Hi Parminder, more comments in line.



From: parminder <parminder at itforchange.net>
Reply-To: <governance at lists.igcaucus.org>, parminder
<parminder at itforchange.net>
Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 12:16:09 +0530
To: <governance at lists.igcaucus.org>
Subject: [governance] Oversight, was [liberationtech] Chinese preparing for
a "Autonomous Internet"  ?

Ian,

Thanks for your comments.

Just to summarize or paraphrase areas of agreements which can help us move
forward. You agree that ICANN should become an international organisation,
cutting its special links with the US, and enter into a host country
agreement (for which you say there is a rough consensus on this list). You
also agree that this will require some kind of an international law and
international charter, which therefore should be worked towards. I
understand that AoC is not the kind of thing we are asking for here, which
Carlos defined as "an agreement of behavior and procedures between a
contractor (Icann) and its client (DOC/NTIA)". We seek  a 'really'
international law and status for ICANN.

IP ­ not quite ­ I am not sure any new international law is needed. A
charter, yes, but derived from within ICANN and accepted on a
multistakeholder basis.

Perhaps we can park these two elements has having a good degree of agreement
among the proposals for dealing with the oversight issue that we have seen
lately in this group.

This then brings us to the issue of how to deal with the 'oversight'
function - defined as dealing with public policy issues concerning CIR
management (which includes names, numbers and protocols). This issue also
pointedly comes to the fore from the discussion in the FBI-DEA-IPv6 thread.
I am a surprised at the lack of clarity even among veterans of this space
about who deals with such a key public policy issue and how, with clear
opposite views whether ICANN should be dealing with it or not. We know that
important public policy issues connecting directly to CIR management will
keep on arising in the future, and perhaps, multiplying in number. We need
to foresight  how to deal with this situation. It is not possible to sweep
this important issues under the carpet.

So, either we have a (1) separate mechanism for 'oversight' as defined
above, or (2) ICANN takes up the role of directly confronting such public
policy issues, and correspondingly being accountable for them. Many of these
issues are just too important for us to allow institutional vacuums to exist
around them, and they will be increasingly more so.

This then is the key 'oversight' question left to be discussed.

IP ­ what you are getting at here became clearer to me in your response to
McTim in which you stated ³Issues of competition policies, FoE, IP, security
concerns..... are all  public policy issues² . Now I agree they are of
course, but I wouldn¹t for one second think they should be ICANN¹s business
and these are vastly different in scope to the rather more narrow root zone
authorisation scope which was where my comments began. I think ICANN should
deal with this as previously suggested, and that no external oversight of
the sort you are suggesting is necessary for that role. On the more general
issue of how we deal with IP, FoE, security etc ­ that¹s an entirely
different discussion and my personal belief is that ICANN is not
appropriately structured to deal with issues other than those specifically
related to DNS administration.

You dont want a separate oversight mechanism, and so you must explain how
ICANN would systematically address the various public policy issues, and not
duck them, or try to find ways around them as it often typically does
(including in the case of Carlos's recent poser to the ICANN on the FBI-IPv6
issue). 

ICANN has to clearly accept and define its larger public policy role with
regard to CIR management, something which doesnt exist at present.
Correspondingly, it also has to show how its structures and functioning
match this new larger role. (At present, its structure is developed in terms
of a narrower technical policy role, and you will accept that the
requirements of the two kind of roles can be different).

The civil society involved with ICANN, especially NCUC, may also express
whether they agree with this new expanded role of ICANN, whereby it would,
itself, fully get into public policy considerations in making its decisions.
This, as per my understanding, is contrary to NCUC's stand till now. There
are some key NCUC members on this list who can clarify.

parminder 

On Thursday 28 June 2012 02:28 AM, Ian Peter wrote:
>  Re: [governance] [liberationtech] Chinese preparing for a "Autonomous
> Internet"  ? Hi Parminder, comments inline
>  
>  
>  
> 
> From: parminder <parminder at itforchange.net>
>  Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 18:14:54 +0530
>  To: Ian Peter <ian.peter at ianpeter.com>
>  Cc: <governance at lists.igcaucus.org>, David Conrad <drc at virtualized.org>
>  Subject: Re: [governance] [liberationtech] Chinese preparing for a
> "Autonomous Internet"  ?
>  
>  Dear Ian
>  
> I am willing to discuss your proposal, if we can put some flesh over it.
>  
> So the baseline is; ICANN, both in its DNS and IANA roles, becomes an
> international organisation, through an express agreement among all actors,
> which includes US and other govs, and it gets into a host country agreement
> which gives it various immunities. Right?
>  
> IP ­ yes, and the host country agreement seems to have broad support as a step
> for ICANN across this list
>  
>  
> Beyond that you seem to want ICANN to self-regulate and self-oversee, without
> any separate oversight body. Which means that the ICANN board is the final
> authority for everything.
>  
>  IP ­ Yes, subject to a body of international law and its charter. The Board
> is elected (mostly, perhaps it should be fully) and as such provides a good
> level of accountability. If there were to be an oversight, I think it should
> be something like a High Court or Federal Court that determines the lawfulness
> of ICANN actions when and if required ­ certainly not another elected body or
> governmental body.
>  
> Dont you think that having a body that can check possible abuse of power by
> the ICANN board, and hold it accountable to some basic parametres and general
> law/policies, would be useful/ necessary? Do you think that such institutional
> separation of roles and power can be done within ICANN? If so, how do you
> suggest to go about it?
>  
>  IP ­ Yes, see above
>  
> (The international oversight body that I suggested can be considered a part of
> ICANN, that isnt a big issue. The issue is whether to have such a body as
> different from the board as the executive body, for basic law/policy
> compliance related accountability, or not. And if so, how to populate it, and
> how to structure its relationship with other parts of ICANN, especially its
> board. And of course, how to ensure that it itself does not abuse its power.)
>  
>  IP ­ see above.
>  
> Another issue is, how does ICANN define its mandate. Is it narrowly defined as
> technical policy development, or is it indeed mandated to take up wider
> 'public policy issues associated with the coordination and management of
> critical Internet resources' (to quote Tunis agenda). If not so mandated, is
> it now your proposal that it now takes up such a role. That is an important
> issue to clarify.
>  
>  IP. A difficult one, and the ³thick vs thin² ICANN debates have run for a
> long time. I don¹t have an immediate answer, but I don¹t see it as
> advantageous to have numerous bodies each dealing with a little bit of the
> picture. Where there are gaps I think it is at least worth considering whether
> the appropriate way to fill them is to expand the ICANN brief. But there will
> always be other bodies with specific area of interest (WIPO etc) and I don¹t
> think that¹s a bad thing
>  
> I have read numerous statements by NCUC (one of the civil society
> constituencies within the ICANN) that ICANN should employ only technical,
> financial and operational criteria in arriving at its decisions,  and not go
> into public policy considerations? Are you now opposed to any such assertion?
> What is the current stand of NCUC in this regard?
>  
>  IP ­ although I think I am still nominally a member of NCUC ­ like others I
> was asked to join to support the work of the constituency ­ I removed myself
> from the mailing list several years ago because I was disinterested in much of
> the administrivia that seems to dominate ICANN constituency considerations. So
> I cant help here. My non-involvement does not suggest that what ICANN does is
> unimportant ­ I think it is, but I also think that what bank tellers do in
> their organisations is important too. But in both cases I think their work and
> daily procedures is of little interest to me (until such time as something
> goes wrong of course). In any case, clearly ICANN raises public policy issues
> and these should be discussed.
>  
> IP -As a last remark on this ­ my suggestion that ICANN be responsible for
> these issues is not really an endorsement of the way it currently is. I find
> it very bloated and quite eccentric. However, it does involve all stakeholders
> and genuinely tries to represent their interests.
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> On Tuesday 26 June 2012 09:31 AM, Ian Peter wrote:
>   
>>  Re: [governance] [liberationtech] Chinese preparing for a "Autonomous
>> Internet"  ? Parminder suggests a structure to take over the unilateral USG
>> role in root zone management (among other things).
>>  
>> I have a different proposal altogether ­ just strike it. The oversight
>> function is completely unnecessary, and there enough checks and balances in
>> current procedures to not need such a role.
>>  
>> Just get rid of it. Make a decision that it is in the best interests of the
>> internet not to have the perception of unilateral control of any functions.
>>  
>> If the USG insists on maintaining a role, sign  a similarly worded agreement
>> with GAC. 
>>  
>> If nothing is done, the default solutions governments will come up with are
>> likely to be far worse.
>>  
>> Which is why we should act. I get frustrated by those organisations and
>> individuals who are in a position to take a lead on such matters but instead
>> do nothing. A pro-active stance is needed!
>>  
>> This is just part of the DNS, as Louis Pouzin points out. The current
>> appropriate forum for governance in DNS matters is ICANN. Improvement of
>> ICANN is another matter, but we do not need another body- or another function
>> or an anachronistic agreement or set of agreements - to get in the way of
>> sensible internet governance.
>>  
>> The Internet has grown up, some old procedures are now not only unneccessary
>> but unhealthy. For the health of the Internet, we should get rid of them.
>>  
>> Ian Peter
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> 
>> From: parminder <parminder at itforchange.net>
>>  Reply-To: <governance at lists.igcaucus.org>, parminder
>> <parminder at itforchange.net>
>>  Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 18:25:12 +0530
>>  To: <governance at lists.igcaucus.org>, David Conrad <drc at virtualized.org>
>>  Subject: Re: [governance] [liberationtech] Chinese preparing for a
>> "Autonomous Internet"  ?
>>  
>>  
>> On Monday 25 June 2012 02:16 AM, David Conrad wrote:
>>   
>>   
>>>  
>>> Parminder,
>>>  
>>> On Jun 21, 2012, at 6:36 PM, parminder wrote:
>>>   
>>>  
>>>   
>>>   
>>>>  
>>>>   
>>>>   
>>>>>  
>>>>>   
>>>>>   
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> But even if we were to agree to what you argue, why would the same
>>>>>> safe-guards not operate in case of a international oversight mechanism?
>>>>>>         
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>    
>>>>> They probably would, but hard to say for certain without a concrete
>>>>> example of said "international oversight mechanism". Can you point me at
>>>>> one?
>>>>>       
>>>>>  
>>>>>  
>>>>>  
>>>>    
>>>> I have proposed some outlines of such a possible model and I you want I can
>>>> re state it.
>>>>     
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>    
>>>  
>>> I was actually looking for a concrete (ideally peer-reviewed) proposal or,
>>> more preferably, an operational example or prototype, not an outline of
>>> lofty goals or possible models.  Does such exist?
>>>   
>>>  
>>>  
>>   
>> In socio-political arena, the method of seeking 'solutions' or the 'way
>> forward'  normally is that we first try to agree on larger ideas and
>> principles,  and then progressively move towards the details. Those
>> approaching this debate from the technical side must respect this general
>> method as they want their method of deciding on technical issues respected.
>> The main broad points of the model that I had proposed are
>>  
>> (1) An international treaty clearly lays out the scope, procedures and limits
>> of an international CIR oversight body, as it provides it with the required
>> authority
>>  
>> (2) ICANN itself becomes an international technical body under the same
>> statute as above, and it enters into a host country agreement with the
>> hosting country, which could be the US
>>  
>> (3) The same treaty sanctifies the broad principles of the current
>> distributed CIR and tech standards development model (ICANN, RIRs, IETF etc)
>>  
>> (4) The oversight body is a stand-alone body set up under the mentioned
>> treaty - outside the UN system but perhaps with some loose coupling with it,
>> in a manner that it is not subject to typical UN rules. It would ab initio
>> evolve its own rules, procedures etc.
>>  
>> (5) The oversight body can have 15-20 members, with equitable regional
>> representation. Within each region the country from which members would come
>> will get rotated. ( Here, we will need some degree of innovation to ensure
>> that although the member will have some clear relationship/ backing of the
>> government, her selection/ affirmation would require a broader national
>> process. Some linkages with highest level national technical institutions can
>> also be explored. More ideas are welcome here.)
>>  
>> (6) The role of the oversight body will be minimal, clearly constrained by
>> the relevant international law, exercised through clearly detailed
>> procedures, and based on a sufficiently high majority, if not consensus.
>>  
>> (7) Its decision will be subject to a separate judicial process  (can look at
>> a possible role for the International court of justice)
>>  
>>   
>>   
>>>  
>>> I'll admit I'm still not clear what you believe the "international oversight
>>> mechanism" should do.
>>>  
>>>  
>>   
>> More or less what the US gov does in relation to CIR management.
>>   
>>   
>>>  
>>>  You've been talking about how the evil USG will trample the contents of the
>>> root zone.  Presumably, the "international oversight mechanism" will be
>>> overseeing the operations of root zone modification as the USG does today.
>>>  
>>>  
>>   
>> yes
>>   
>>   
>>>  
>>> Since those operations must be based in some country, it isn't clear to me
>>> how the "international oversight mechanism" would be able to stop that
>>> country's government from going rogue and doing what you believe the evil
>>> USG will do.
>>>   
>>>  
>>>  
>>   
>> No, it doesnt happen that way at all. Host country agreement and the
>> authorising international law are there precisely to prevent such a thing.
>> Today, if the US 'interferes' with root zone operation, it breaks no law,
>> neither domestic nor international. To forcibly break into an international
>> body's premises which is protected by host country agreement and based on
>> international treaty, and interfering in its work, will be an extraordinary
>> defiance of international law, the kind which even the US doesnt do :). It
>> can be subject to further international processes like those from the UN and
>> the international court of justice. BTW, the fact that the US is one of the
>> countries with the uneasiest of relationships with the international court of
>> justice may be  a good reason to seek ICANN's and the oversight body's
>> hosting outside the US. However, perhaps for, historical continuity's sake US
>> would do as well.
>>  
>> regards, parminder
>>  
>>   
>>   
>>>  
>>>  
>>> Regards,
>>> -drc
>>>  
>>>  
>>>   
>>>  
>>>  
>>   
>>  
>>  
>> 
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>  
>  


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