[governance] India's communications minister - root server misunderstanding (still...)
parminder
parminder at itforchange.net
Thu Aug 9 06:23:20 EDT 2012
On Thursday 09 August 2012 01:53 AM, Ian Peter wrote:
> Re: [governance] India's communications minister - root server
> misunderstanding (still...) As someone who has consistently expressed
> opposition to the US unilateral position as regards root zone file
> authorisation, let me say also that I do not believe Parminder’s
> scenario 2 is workable.
Ian,
I am fine with your political reasoning, and see some merit in it. But,
we should accept that this is indeed a political debate. And also, when
we do discuss root file authorisation issue it is not right to bring in
the 13 server backup as a political justification of not doing anything
or much - something which got done in the earlier discussions on the
IANA role.
However, dont you see that it is becoming politically unsustainable to
not do anything about the issue of the control of the root. Should we
inform the African and the Indian, minister, and I am sure, numerous
other ministers, that civil society had a long discussion on their
concerns regarding unequitous distribution of root operators, and came
to the conclusion that other than the US and a few western countries we
are not able to trust anyone - even if it were a regional system like an
RIR - with root operations, even when root server operation in a non
monopoly multi point redundancy operation.
I dont think it will look nice at all. For instance, in the middle of
the ITU staff and some authoritarian countries canvassing for more
'innovative' solutions through the ITU and perhaps other means as well.
Do you think that as a premier global IG civil society group, we are
giving the appropriate response to the developing situation by just
keeping mum and thus supporting the status quo. It will be most
unfortunate if we simply dont have any position on these issues, or even
maybe 2-3 different sets, in these crucial times for global IG. I repeat
that seeking 3 US organisations to cede their root server operation to 3
RIRs in developing world will be an important first step. It will in
fact look so good for the CS to make such a demand solidly, (for
instance, to the political actors in the South - non gov and gov - who
I can tell you, have limited trust in the neutrality of what is called
the global IG civil society).
However I do full agree with you, Carlos and others that the real issue
is the IANA authority with the US. For this see below....
> snip
>
> I come back to my original position – and perhaps the only one where
> we might get some agreement and also even the possibility of some
> action. The authorisation role is completely unnecessary, whether
> carried out by USA or UN or whatever. Please do not transfer it to
> another body – just remove it. The authorisation is based on
> recommendations involving a set of very consultative and exhaustive
> procedures. Once the ICANN processes recommend a change after these
> consultations, let that be the final authorisation.
You know that even if the US agreed to such a position in its contract
with ICANN, all ICANN actions remain subject to US court directives and
to the emergency executive powers in the US. So, the ICANN has to be an
international body, drawing its constitutive authority from a source
other than the US state.
Also, since ICANN has a huge operational role, it is always better to
have an oversight review structure above and separate from the
operational body, This is a general sound political principle. So, I
still go back to my proposal for a non UN international, say, Technical
Oversight Board, with members from different regions selected through an
innovative process (which can be discussed) and who have a very clearly
laid out and constrained mandate of oversight and confirming root
changes, and whose decisions are to be taken only by a big majority.....
>
>
> I can perceive a situation where USA might actually accept that
> proposition, consistent with increasing independence of ICANN. I cant
> see a situation where they transfer their authorisation function to
> any other body.
US will finally have to accept what the world's opinion comes out
solidly in favour of. That is how global politics play out. It has huge
stakes in global Internet system, especially economic, and must talk,
negotiate, and where needed make concessions. It is just that we give up
too easily.... parminder
>
> Ian Peter
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From: *parminder <parminder at itforchange.net>
> *Reply-To: *<governance at lists.igcaucus.org>, parminder
> <parminder at itforchange.net>
> *Date: *Wed, 08 Aug 2012 16:46:35 +0530
> *To: *<governance at lists.igcaucus.org>
> *Subject: *Re: [governance] India's communications minister - root
> server misunderstanding (still...)
>
>
>
> On Wednesday 08 August 2012 12:35 PM, Dr. Alejandro Pisanty Baruch wrote:
>
>
>
> Parminder,
>
>
>
> it may be useful to separate your problem into two parts:
>
>
>
>
> 1. authorization for changes in the root;
>
>
>
> Thanks for the kind advice, Alex. In fact, I have insisted repeatedly
> that I am only dealing with the second part as below. The first part
> was dealt in an earlier discussion in June with the subject line
> 'oversight'.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 2. operation of the independent root servers, including their
> submission or not to an outrageously arbitrary and deletereous
> change in the root.
>
>
> Yes, this alone is the issue under consideration here.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> That, I think, will help you parse the apparent contradictions. We
> all have a problem with the first's asymmetric-power situation;
> the second is a fail-safe mechanism for the potential excesses of
> the first.
>
>
>
>
> So you agree that independence of root server operators indeed serves
> as a 'fail-safe mechanism for the potential excesses' of the
> unilateral root changing power with the US.
>
> In that case, you may agree that making MORE sure that the root
> operators are MORE independent of US gov will make the system MORE
> fail-safe or capture-resistant. In practical terms I mean what if
> instead of the present distribution of root server operators, 9 in the
> US and 3 in US friendly countries, we have these servers distributed
> in a more geopolitically equitous manner - as I suggested, for a start
> RIRs of Africa, LA and Asia Pacific get one each, and perhaps one more
> in each of these continents at a reputed public technical institute.
> What do you say?
>
> Lets first agree on the need and desirability of such re-allocation,
> before we go to the question of how to do it.
>
> (apologies for some repeat language from my email to Roland)
>
> parminder
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> (Fail-safe does not mean "it cannot fail"; it means "if it fails
> it devolves to a safe state", sort of when well designed elevators
> go out of electrical power they don't sink to the bottom and
> crash, nor just get stuck; they fall to the next floor down and
> open the doors)
>
>
>
>
> (As a side: it may be valuable for IT4Change to recruit the
> assistance of some Internet engineers, for example by forming an
> all-volunteer Technical Advisory Board, if you don't find this too
> meddlesome. I've seen such an Rx work wonders in other, similar
> organizations elsewhere and it's a win-win. If too meddlesome
> please ignore. Again, happy to be corrected by those more
> knowledgeable.)
>
>
>
>
> Yours,
>
>
>
>
> Alejandro Pisanty
>
>
>
>
> ! !! !!! !!!!
>
> NEW PHONE NUMBER - NUEVO NÚMERO DE TELÉFONO
>
>
>
>
>
> +52-1-5541444475 FROM ABROAD
>
>
> +525541444475 DESDE MÉXICO
>
>
> SMS +525541444475
> Dr. Alejandro Pisanty
> UNAM, Av. Universidad 3000, 04510 Mexico DF Mexico
>
> Blog: http://pisanty.blogspot.com
> LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/pisanty
> Unete al grupo UNAM en LinkedIn,
> http://www.linkedin.com/e/gis/22285/4A106C0C8614
> Twitter: http://twitter.com/apisanty
> ---->> Unete a ISOC Mexico, http://www.isoc.org
> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> *Desde:*governance-request at lists.igcaucus.org
> [governance-request at lists.igcaucus.org] en nombre de parminder
> [parminder at itforchange.net]
> *Enviado el:* miércoles, 08 de agosto de 2012 01:38
> *Hasta:* governance at lists.igcaucus.org; Norbert Klein
> *Asunto:* Re: [governance] India's communications minister - root
> server misunderstanding (still...)
>
>
>
> Norbert,
>
>
> On Wednesday 08 August 2012 07:08 AM, Norbert Klein wrote:
>
>
> I do NOT understand what the debate here is about - discussing
> the location of the 12, or of the many mirrors - when it is a
> debate over possible changes in the political control of this
> system.
>
> Only what happens or does not happen on the Alpha Server
> makes any difference (and it is replicated down the lines
> throughout all the sub-systems) I understand. Wrong?
>
> So any question about control of the 12 and the mirrors is
> only about technical details. If the "control" question is
> pointing at anything else but the Alpha Server it is not
> changing anything fundamentally. Correct or wrong?
>
>
> You have asked a good question - what is the debate here :)
>
> You seem to agree with Carlos that the political issue is ONLY
> vis a vis the control over the alpha server, which we now know is
> in fact not the alpha server that a new 'stealth server'. All
> other root servers, including their anycast extensions, simply and
> ONLY reflect the root zone file, and so it does not matter who
> controls them. As for location, there has not been any known
> difficulty to locate new anycasts anywhere. Fair enough.
>
> Now, I will have to take you, and others who may still be with
> us, to a long discussion on 'US's oversight' over CIRs - chiefly
> the IANA function, that took place in June on this list. David was
> greatly involved in it. When I and others argued why US cannot be
> relied on to have the unilateral authority to change the root file
> at its will - the MAIN argument by David and others was; the 13,
> or at least 9, root zone operators will very likely simply refuse
> to publish a file so changed by the US. This 'system feature' was
> listed as the MAIN defence that things are not as problematic as
> some of us are making them to be. McTim, Lee and others made the
> same argument of the 'independent decision making' by root server
> operators, to minimise what was seen as the 'scare' over US's
> fiddling with the root in its own interest. At the end of this
> email I provide a few quotes from among several on how this single
> argument was repeated employed.
>
> Whereby, when we argue about the problem with US's unilateral
> control over the root, the argument of 'independence of root
> operators' is invoked. Such independence means that the '13 root
> operators' systems is seen, if required, as being able to go
> beyond simply reflecting the root zone file. Well, it has to be
> one of the two;
>
> (1) Either, root operators can and will ONLY reflect the root
> zone file in the 'stealth server', whatever happens - in which
> case, we should not use the argument of their deemed independence
> in discussions on problems vis a vis US's unilateral IANA
> oversight powers
>
> (2) Or, indeed, at least potentially, root operators can refuse
> to publish what is considered as an improperly changed file by the
> US, and support the internet system continuing to work on the
> basis of the original 'proper' file - whereby, it is useful to
> redistribute root server operator-ship among agencies that
> together are more likely to resist US unilateralism.
>
> One of the above two must be true, and both cant be true, because
> they are logically exclusive arguments. It cant be that (2) is
> true in a discussion over IANA authority, but it becomes untrue
> when we discuss distribution of root server operators in a
> geo-political even and just manner. This alone is my case.
>
> I can accept either (1) to be true, in which case the argument
> of independence of root server operators to publish what they want
> should NOT be used in an IANA related argument (David, McTim, Lee
> et all, are you there :) )
>
> Or I can accept (2) to be true, in which case, I will appeal to
> Carlos for sympathy to the argument that redistribution of root
> server operation authority may be useful to be considered, while
> agreeing that IANA authority is a much more important question.
>
> (To be fair to David, he has said even in the present thread of
> discussion that 'The diversity of architecture ( of root server
> operators) and lack of centralized control is seen as a feature as
> it reduces the opportunities for "capture". If I surmise right,
> Carlos, and perhaps you, Norbert, do not think this of being of
> any real significance.)
>
> So, indeed there are real difference of views between, for
> instance David and Carlos, on the political significance of root
> server operator's independence (or absence of it) - and thus of
> political significance of who the 13 root server operators are.
>
> Such independence (or absence of it) of root operators,
> especially in the face of an eventuality of US's rogue behaviour,
> thus remains a key political issue, and in good part is the point
> of debate here. The answer to this question would determine
> whether it is worth the effort to consider reallocating root
> server operation authority in a more equitous manner.
>
> parminder
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Norbert Klein
>
>
> --
> Norbert Klein
> nhklein at gmx.net
> http://www.thinking21.org
>
>
>
>
>
> This is the only place in which there is
> NTIA-authorized/controlled
> change in the root (the so-called "IANA function"), and
> all the other 12
> and the hundreds of Anycast servers just replicate - the
> Anycast servers
> being replicators of replicators in nearly all cases
> (except for six
> replicating directly from a.root-servers.net).
>
> A new gTLD/ccTLD will never become alive if NTIA does not
> give the
> "nihil obstat" to insert it in this file in this "mother
> of all
> servers", which interestingly (or coincidentally,
> depending on your
> level of paranoia :)) sits very close to CIA headquarters
> in Virginia.
> NTIA also must become aware of *any* modification intended
> in existing
> ccTLD or gTLD records in the root zone file, whatever the
> Affirmation of
> Commitments says.
>
> If a saboteur explodes this server installation (each one
> of the 13 is
> actually a cluster for resilience and security), does the
> Internet stop?
> No, of course, the net of replicators will make sure the
> Internet
> continues to operate fine. But no more changes in the
> root, Virginia,
> until the "mother server" is rebuilt in Virginia :)
>
> If there is a worldwide revolt agains the USA regarding
> the DNS, can the
> Anycast net operate and be modified without resorting to
> one of the 13
> servers (an Anycast server is by agreement used tied to
> one of the 12
> "master replicators", the F, I, J and L being the most
> popular for this)?
>
> Technically, yes, of course, but...hmmm... I think it is
> better to keep
> a dialogue with the USA instead. :) Aside from the root
> servers, 16 of
> the largest 20 DNS servers in the planet are in the USA,
> hosting many
> millions of domain pointers to Web services *worldwide* --
> millions of
> websites in Latin America, for example, depend on these
> servers and
> corresponding hosting services.
>
> Is this talk necessary at all? I think this is abundantly
> common
> knowledge since the root system's 13 servers started to
> operate...
>
> frt rgds
>
> --c.a.
>
> On 08/07/2012 02:17 AM, parminder wrote:
>
>
> David,
>
> On Sunday 05 August 2012 10:40 PM, David Conrad wrote:
>
>
> Parminder,
>
> On Aug 5, 2012, at 5:40 AM, parminder
> <parminder at itforchange.net
> <mailto:parminder at itforchange.net>
> <mailto:parminder at itforchange.net%3E>> wrote:
>
>
> Now, we know that there are three kinds of
> root servers, the
> authoritative root server (in which changes
> are made to the root file
> vide the IANA process), 13 root servers and
> then the any number of
> mirrors that can allegedly be created by
> making an investment of 3k
> usd .
>
>
> No.
>
> There is a "distribution master".
>
>
> So, well, apologies for referring to the root zone
> file as the highest
> level of root zone server; I should perhaps simply
> have said 'the
> highest level of Internet's root architecture'.
> However, your chastising
> may be biased. Someone, quite unlike me, with deep
> technical training
> like Daniel said is a recent email;
>
> "As already mentioned, there are hundreds of root
> server instances.
> Each of these is an actual root server."
>
> Isnt this statement as or more untrue, in a discussion
> where we are
> mainly speaking about actual 'control' over the root
> file. The hundreds
> of root servers mentioned above are NOT 'actual root
> servers'. An actual
> root server is a shorthand for an actual root server
> operator, who
> exercises control (at least potentially) over the root
> zone file that he
> publishes. (I learnt this from my earlier discussions
> with you on the
> IANA authority and the US.) The 'ill-informed' Indian
> minister seems
> rather better informed than 'technical experts' here
> on this particular
> issue. He seems to know better which is a true or
> actual root server and
> which is not. Quote from the same interview where he
> quite wrongly said
> that Internet traffic flows through 13 root servers
> (he should have
> said, internet traffic, in a way, gets directed by 13
> root servers).
>
>
> "Currently, India's mirror servers reflect the data
> but without
> mechanisms of control and intervention."
>
> Clearly what some 'technical experts' stress and what
> they suppress (or
> forget to mention) depends on their techno-political
> proclivities. Isnt
> it obvious!
>
> In response to my another email, you have asked me to
> "provide examples
> of supposed 'statements of technical facts' that are
> ''thoroughly
> wrapped in a certain techno-political viewpoint".
> Apart from the above
> example, I will try and find others in your email below :)
>
>
>
> (snip)
>
> That's all. There are no special "13" machines
> that are the "true
> root servers" from which other lesser machines
> mirror the root zone.
>
>
> Well, you did understand early in this discussion that
> the argument is
> not about 'true root servers' but about 'true root
> server operators', so
> why dont we stick to the real point of contestation
> rather than create
> strawmen and defend against them. From your email of a
> few days ago
>
> "The concern (as I understand it) is that the
> administration of
> those root servers is in the hands of 12
> organizations, of which 9
> are US-based. " (David)
>
> Yes, true. It is this what we are discussing here, not
> the network
> latency problem. In that email, you understood the
> concern right. It is
> about root server operators, and the term '13 root
> servers' is loosely
> used to mean '13 root server operators'. That is the
> real issue, and it
> was the issue that bothered the Indian and the African
> ministers the
> latter being wrongly, if not mischievously, retorted
> to in terms to
> availability of root server mirrors - a very different
> issue. Similarly,
> this current discussion is continuously pulled towards
> the convenient
> description of geographic extensions through mirrors
> of root servers,
> away from the real issue of 'concentration' (against
> distribution) of
> power to change root file or resist changes to root
> file that is with
> the root server operators and none at all with anycast
> mirror operators.
>
> It is very interesting that when I did that long
> discussion with you,
> David, on the US's unilateral IANA authority, your
> almost entire case
> was based on how the root server operators are really
> independent (which
> is the same thing as saying they have 'power') and
> this is the insurance
> against any US mischief with the root zone file.
> However, now when we
> are discussing the power of root server operators,
> which is
> geo-politically very unevenly distributed, the 'power'
> with the root
> server operators is sought to be so minimized as to be
> completely
> evaporated. The focus is repeatedly sought to shifted
> to how anyone can
> set up a root server and that those who speak about 13
> root servers
> (meaning, root server operators) being not distributed
> well enough are
> merely stupid!
>
> How does what appears to be the 'same fact' take such
> very different
> manifestations in two different political arguments?
> This is what I mean
> by 'technical advice' being warped by strong
> techno-political
> viewpoints. I am not making any personal accusation. I
> am stating a
> sociological 'fact'.
>
>
>
> (snip)
>
>
> What I see is that, while there are of course
> clearly very
> significant differences between these three
> layers or kinds of root
> servers, much of the 'technical input' on this
> list that I have come
> across seem to focus on the non-difference and
> greatly underplay the
> difference.
>
>
> As discussed above, the distinction you are making
> doesn't exist.
>
>
> Well!! See above for the distinction. A clear
> distinction that you did
> understand and articulate in your earlier email in
> terms of
> concentration of ability for "administration of those
> root servers is in
> the hands of 12 organizations, of which 9 are
> US-based. " There is
> obvious and very important distinction between the
> 'power' of root zone
> operator and someone operating a mirror. This
> distinction is the very
> basis of the whole discussion in this thread. But you
> have easily and
> conveniently dismissed, or minimised, distinctions
> between the root file
> layer, root zone layer and anycast mirror layer, esp
> between these two
> latter layers . This is done through a unilateral
> decision to speak
> about one thing when the other party is speaking about
> quite another, or
> at least another aspect of the issue - which here is
> the issue of
> 'control' rather than availability of root file for
> resolving queries.
>
>
>
>
> This I think is politically motivated, though
> disguised as factual
> neutral/ technical information.
>
>
> Conspiracy theories are tricky things as it makes
> it difficult to
> communicate.
>
>
> :). I made it clear at the onset that I am trying to
> argue that when a
> group has strong political inclinations - as the so
> called technical
> community has - its technical advice gets accordingly
> wrapped... Call
> it my conspiracy theory, but at least I am upfront.
> But also (try to )
> see how the technical community sees deep conspiracies
> in every single
> political utterance from the South. Worse its
> conspiracy theory is
> further compounded by a 'stupidity theory'. Double insult!
>
>
> (snip)
>
> You misread. The 13 IP(v4) address limitation due
> to the default
> maximum DNS message size still exists. While
> there are now ways
> around this limitation (specifically, the EDNS0
> extension to the DNS
> specification), these ways are not universally
> supported and as such,
> cannot be relied upon, particularly for root service.
>
>
> No, I dont think I misread. Just that the fact remains
> that the number
> 13 can be expanded without much difficulty, but you
> are not too
> interested to explore that direction while I am
> (again, political
> proclivities intervene). Wasnt introducing
> multilingual gtlds also
> considered a bit 'difficult to rely upon' just a few
> years back.
> Finally, political considerations helped get over that
> unnecessary and
> exaggerated fear. It depended who were taking the
> decisions, the US
> centric ICANN establishment earlier, but the same
> establishment with
> some WSIS related fears and cautions in the second
> instance.
>
>
>
>
> So if indeed it is not, why not breach it and
> make people of the
> world happy.
>
>
> Even if it were possible, I sincerely doubt
> everyone having their own
> root server would make the people of the world happy.
>
>
> This is 'the' most important point - whether there is
> any justification
> at all to increase the number or root servers and/or
> to reallocate /
> redistribute them in a manner that is politically more
> justifiable and
> thus sustainable. I will take it up in a separate email.
>
> regards
> parminder
>
>
>
>
> Even within the limit of 13, why not allocate
> root servers in a
> geo-graphically equitable manner, as
> Sivasubramanian has suggested,
> especially when it seems to make no difference
> at all to anyone. Why
> not make all these ill-informed ministers happy.
>
>
> As mentioned in a previous note, the operators of
> the root servers are
> independent (modulo "A" and "J" (through the
> Verisign contract with
> the USG) and "E", "G", and "H" (operated by USG
> Departments), albeit
> each of these operators deal with their root
> servers differently). How
> root server operators distribute their instances
> is entirely their
> decision. To date, there has apparently been
> insufficient
> justification for those root server operators to
> decide to distribute
> their machines in a "geo-graphically equitable
> manner".
>
> With that said, there are at least two root server
> operators ("L"
> (ICANN) and "F" (ISC)) who have publicly stated
> they are willing to
> give a root server instance to anyone that asks.
> Perhaps the
> ill-informed ministers could be informed of this
> so they could be happy?
>
>
>
> I read that there is no central control over
> the 13 or at least 9 of
> these root servers. Is it really true?
>
>
> Yes. The diversity of architecture and lack of
> centralized control is
> seen as a feature as it reduces the opportunities
> for "capture".
>
>
>
> Is the 13 root server architecture not
> something that is aligned to
> what goes in and from the authoritative root
> server.
>
>
> Root server architecture is independent of how the
> root zone is
> distributed.
>
>
>
> If it is, why can these root servers not be
> reallocated in the way
> tlds have been reallocated. Can they be
> reallocated or cant they?
>
>
> In practical terms, the "reallocation of a root
> server" boils down to
> transferring the root server's IP address and
> telling the new owner
> the zone transfer password.
>
> Before the DNS became a political battleground,
> root server
> "reallocation" occurred (extremely infrequently)
> when (a) the person
> to whom Jon Postel "gave" the root server changed
> employers or (b) the
> assets of the organization running the root server
> were acquired by
> another company. Today, "reallocation" of a root
> server would either
> require the existing root server operator
> voluntarily giving the root
> server IP address to a different organization or
> that IP address would
> have to be "taken" by eminent domain or somesuch.
>
>
>
> I also read that the it is not about 13
> physical root servers, but 13
> root server operators,
>
>
> Well, 12 operators (since Verisign operates two
> root servers).
>
>
>
> so the number 13 is about the root server
> ownership points, and not
> physical location points.
>
>
> In the sense that there are 13 IP(v4) addresses
> that are "owned" by 12
> organizations. Geography is largely irrelevant.
>
>
>
> Therefore what is needed is to reallocate the
> ownership points in a
> geo-politically equitious manner. As Siva
> suggests, probably one to
> an Indian Institute of Technology.
>
>
> Somewhat as an aside, my understanding is that
> efforts to provide
> infrastructure (not root server infrastructure
> specifically albeit the
> same folks do provide anycast instances for a root
> server operator) in
> India were blocked by demands for bribes greater
> than the value of
> hardware being shipped into the country (see
> http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.org.operators.nanog/100786).
>
>
>
> Why this is not done, or cant be done are the
> real questions in the
> present debate. Any answers?
>
>
> Sure. You are assuming a top-down model that does
> not exist. There is
> no single entity that can dictate to the root
> server operators "you
> will give your root server to IIT". You and
> others that care about
> this are free to make the case to (say) Verisign
> that it would be in
> their corporate best interests for them to
> relocate administrative
> control of one of their root servers to India, but
> it would be up to
> Verisign (or perhaps more accurately, its
> shareholders) to make that
> decision.
>
>
>
> Is the real problem here that if root server
> allocation issue is
> opened up, countries would like to go
> country-wise on root servers
> (as the recent China's proposal for
> 'Autonomous Internet') which will
> skew the present non-nation wise Internet
> topology (other than its US
> centricity), which is an important feature of
> the Internet.
>
>
> No. Placement of root servers has no impact on
> Internet topology.
> Really. Distributing root server instances can be
> helpful in reducing
> root query latency and improving resiliency in the
> event of network
> disruption. That's pretty much it. Opening up the
> "root server
> allocation issue" is a red herring, particularly
> given pretty much
> anyone can get a root server instance if they care
> and are willing to
> abide by the restrictions inherent in operating a
> root server.
>
> Merging a subsequent note:
>
> On Sunday 05 August 2012 06:10 PM, parminder wrote:
>
>
> ' administrative access will not be available'
> to the anycast
> operator to his own anycast server.
>
>
> Yes. However, if you ask anyone familiar with
> computer systems, you
> will be told that if you have physical access to a
> machine, you can
> gain control of that machine. Obtaining such
> control would violate
> the terms by which the machine was granted, but
> that's irrelevant.
>
>
>
> This is a pretty centralised control, not at
> all the picture one got
> from all the technically well informed
> insiders who seem to suggest
> on this list that everything is open,
> uncontrolled and hunky-dory and
> kind of anyone can set up and operate root
> servers.
>
>
> I'm getting the impression that you read what you
> prefer to read, not
> what is actually written. No one (to my
> knowledge) has suggested
> "everything is open, uncontrolled and hunky-dory".
> Root service is
> considered critical infrastructure and is treated
> as such, so anyone
> asserting it is "open and uncontrolled" would be
> confused at best.
> Can you provide a reference to anyone making this
> suggestion?
>
> As for "hunky-dory", I suppose some folks would
> say the way the root
> servers are operated is "hunky-dory". I am not
> among them.
>
>
>
> Was the African minister really so wrong, or
> even the Indian minister?
>
>
> Yes. Really.
>
> Regards,
> -drc
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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