[governance] GAC Advice Register
Roland Perry
roland at internetpolicyagency.com
Sun Aug 5 02:18:19 EDT 2012
In message
<CAHuaJtPrPPcugLp-1iSXfZ2CAGe15mj8xdE2mTxQ9==838JMgA at mail.gmail.com>, at
05:38:42 on Sat, 4 Aug 2012, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa at gmail.com> writes
>On a desperate and separate note, some countries nearer to my part of the
>world have quietly put in policies quietly through non public directives
>for censorship, filtering, blocking and DPI surveillance wahay before they
>announced preparation for WCIT/ITRs.
>
>For us from this part of the world, the real threat is no more the WCIT/ITR
>recommendations but what are countries doing prior to influence and
>ascertain their positions and proposals.
>
>We can rant about IGF's lack of outcomes, IBSA, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, UN
>Centric Internet Control and Policing, ITU and WCIT/ITRs, educating
>ministers, unilateral propaganda behind a limited IG issue but the reality
>is that Internet Access Denied is happening behind the curtains, a
>submarine cable termination points on to the national trunks, US and
>Canadian companies are selling heaps of surveillance software and hardware
>for DPI in the name of cyber security but we are engrossed in gacs and lack
>of routing knowledge.
There are many different issues that Internet users might be concerned
about. State surveillance is just one of them. It's not advisable, to
concentrate on just one at the exclusion of all others - even if it were
possible to agree on just one issue, which I'm sure it isn't.
However, it's very helpful when tackling any of the issues to understand
the basic concepts of the Internet, whether those are architectural or
policy based. The root name server system is one of the most fundamental
(but nevertheless still only one of many).
An interesting question to ask is: "If nations are convinced that all
traffic flows through the root servers, why not attach your state
surveillance equipment there. It would seem to be a very economical
solution".
But we don't hear debates about whether that would be a good or bad
thing (either technically or politically), nor do we hear arguments
raging about the Dutch Government handing data siphoned off from RIPE
NCC's root server to less friendly governments.
Many users are more worried about spam than surveillance, and the
mythical flow through the root servers would be a good place to install
filters for that. But we aren't exposed to debates about what anti-spam
rules to install in Netnod's root server.
So something's not quite right with the model (that all the traffic
flows through 13 hot-spots), and putting that right is an important bit
of "human capacity building" before discussions about other aspects can
take place in a sensible fashion.
ps. Another misconception I've heard is that all emails are sent to
every user in the world, and when you set up your email client with your
particular email address the job it does is ignore all the emails apart
from the ones addressed to you. And hence spam is mainly a result of
that filtering process breaking in some way - so you get lots of emails
that weren't really intended for you.
Lots wrong with that picture too, of course. Although it's not that far
off the way ethernet works on a local segment, so perhaps that's how the
misconception arose in that person's mind.
>
>When do we set our concerns straight?
Who is "we"? Anyone can start immediately if they wish.
--
Roland Perry
-------------- next part --------------
____________________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list:
governance at lists.igcaucus.org
To be removed from the list, visit:
http://www.igcaucus.org/unsubscribing
For all other list information and functions, see:
http://lists.igcaucus.org/info/governance
To edit your profile and to find the IGC's charter, see:
http://www.igcaucus.org/
Translate this email: http://translate.google.com/translate_t
More information about the Governance
mailing list