[governance] ICANN and INTELSAT (1971)

Wed Nov 9 03:33:31 EST 2005

For an international treaty to work in the case of Internet it would have
to be radically different from INTELSAT type of treaty that has been
presented here. This kind of treaty gives effective authority to a second-
or third-level government bureaucrat to decide on crucial Internet
matters. Concrete case related to this very INTELSAT treaty I was
personally involved with: In early 1990's, my institute had Iran's only
connection to Internet via a 9.6 Kb leased line to Vienna. After
negotiations with the University of Vienna, paperwork was done for upgrade
to 128 Kb via an INTELSAT satellite which had the best coverage of both
destinations. In the last minute the Signatory (Iranian PTT) balked.
Finally after more than two years of useless wrangling we gave up and
resorted to a much more costly private operator with transponder space on
EUTELSAT(which did not then have a treaty with any governmental agency
here).
Siavash Shahshahani
*************************************************
IPM/IRNIC
P.O.Box 19395-1795, Shahid Bahonar Sq.
Tehran 19548, Iran
Phone: (+98 21) 22 29 18 12, 22 29 03 06
Cell: (+98 912)104 2501
Fax: (+98 21) 22 29 57 00
Email: shahshah at irnic.ir, shahshah at nic.ir, shahshah at iranet.ir
*************************************************
 [reformatted]
>
> Most of us on this list are probably not that familiar with international
> treaties.
>
> To see a real example of such a treaty, I read through the INTELSAT
> Agreement of 1971:
> 	http://www.islandone.org/Treaties/BH585.html
> It is an example of an operative international agreement on global
> communications.
>
> What is perhaps most germane to our discussions here is the Agreement's
> hierarchy of authority.  There are four levels of authority:
>
> (i) The Assembly of Parties
> The Assembly of Parties is where governments predominate.  It is the
> highest level organ.  It focuses on those aspects
> of INTELSAT related to sovereignty. It only meets every 2 years.
>
> (ii) The Meeting of Signatories;
> The Meeting of Signatories is more operational body of governmental
> reps.  As I understand the treaty, its members include telecom operating
> entities (state agencies).
> It is a general oversight body. It reviews annual reports, financial
> statements, and rates.
> It meets once per year.
>
> (iii) The Board of Governors
> This is an operating board that oversees the managers. It is similar to
> the
> ICANN board.
> Its responsibilities include: procurement, policies, establishment of
> rates, loans, appointment and review of staff, etc.
> It has about 20 members. It meets quarterly.
> Membership is weighted (according to the capital investment of the
> country.)
>
> (iv) Management/Staff ("executive organ")
> There is a chief executive and staff, selected for integrity, competency,
> and efficiency. They run the organization.
>
>
> Other interesting aspects of the Agreement:
>
> Headquarters Agreement ("Host Country Agreement"): main focus is that
> employees don't pay income taxes. (The full agreement is a separate
> document.)
>
>
> Amendments to Agreement: must be approved by 2/3 of the signatory states.
> (i.e. a fairly high threshold.)
>
> Dispute Settlement: Disputes are decided by arbitral tribunals composed of
> 3 experts.  Each signatory state provides the name of up to two
> experts.  This creates a total pool of people to serve on tribunals.
>
>
>
>
> COMMENTS
> =========
>
> Separating Sovereignty from Operations
> The hierarchical structure separates sovereignty from operational issues.
>
> This approach can be used with ICANN.  Putting ICANN under international
> oversight does not mean that governments have free reign to meddle.
>
> At its lower operational levels ICANN could continued to employ
> multi-stakeholder processes.  Only at a higher level would there be a
> governmental oversight body.  The responsibilities of the different levels
> could be specified.
>
> Defense Against Capture
> Any agreement for ICANN would have to be robust.  If agreements are easily
> amended, they can be re-written to favor the more powerful
> participants.  (ICANN suffered badly from this.) Roles and
> responsibilities
> need to be clearly specified and robustly implemented.  An international
> agreement with a high threshold for amendments is a much more robust
> framework than the current ICANN, with its more fluid bylaws.
>
> Review/Disputes
> The hierarchical structure facilitates oversight.  Higher levels monitor
> lower levels.
> The dispute resolution mechanisms is based on experts.
> Since they are backed by the power of governments, experts' decisions are
> more likely to be respected.
>
> Weighted Representation
> INTELSAT has formal rules for giving more representation to countries that
> contribute more.  I don't believe this issue has come up in ICANN; it may
> be that ICANN"s representation by "expertise" achieves similar
> weighting.  This merits review and explicit discussion, i.e. is the
> weighting just, etc.
>
>
> Conclusion
> ==========
> Putting ICANN under international government control would give it the
> appropriate public authority for its regulatory activities.
>
> Internationalization would also lessen the threat of one country imposing
> its national interest on a global medium.
>
> Good institutional design could minimize politicization and
> bureaucratization.  By keeping political oversight distant (higher up in
> the hierarchy) and constrained (by a detailed agreement that is not easily
> amended), political meddling is minimized.  ICANN's current bureaucracy
> need not substantially grow under internationalization.
>
> ICANN's internal procedures would still need to fixed: the 2002
> elimination
> of balanced representation would have to itself be undone.  This is
> extremely important and probably merits more attention at WSIS.
>
> Perhaps the most important point is that government oversight is pretty
> mundane.  We all have it in our home countries (e.g. the NTIA in the US),
> and there are numerous examples of it in the international arena.  Despite
> all the hype and expressions of alarm, we are dealing with well-known
> policy issues.
>
> HK
>
>
>
> =========================================================
>    Hans K. Klein
>    Associate Professor                                Tel: 404-894-2258
>    School of Public Policy, MC:0345            Fax: 404-894-0535
>    Georgia Institute of
> Technology               hans.klein at pubpolicy.gatech.edu
>    Atlanta, GA 30332-0345
>    http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~hk28/
>
>    Director, Internet and Public Policy Project (IP3) of Georgia Tech
>    http://www.ip3.gatech.edu/
>
>    Partner, Internet Governance Project
>    http://www.InternetGoverannce.org
>
> =========================================================
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