[bestbits] substantive proposals for Brazil summit - IG governance

[Andrew Puddephatt]

Thanks Marilia

I’m back online now and picking up on my 430 e-mails so apologies to those who are waiting for a response from me.

There are good reflections – my sense from them is that you have questions about a distributed governance model in that to may not be clear/purposeful enough to address the weaknesses in the current arrangements – is that a fair summary of what you’re saying?  Or am I over interpreting?

I think we shared your view that existing multi-stakeholderism has not provided corrections to imbalances of power – the real question is whether the move to a more state based system of governance would provide such a corrective or whether it would simply accelerate making the internet a geo-political battlefield (personally I suspect we are already there).  In looking for a more dispersed governance model we were looking for a way of facilitating the input of a range of public interest views to counter the growing voices calling for state sovereignty over the internet.  But I’d be the first to say that there are no perfect solutions in our current climate.

I’ve given the 6th as the deadline for final comments and I’l try and process them after that and get back to people after that

Andrew

From: Marilia Maciel <mariliamaciel at gmail.com<mailto:mariliamaciel at gmail.com>>
Date: Wednesday, 22 January 2014 22:18
To: andrew Puddephatt <andrew at gp-digital.org<mailto:andrew at gp-digital.org>>
Cc: "<bestbits at lists. net>" <bestbits at lists.bestbits.net<mailto:bestbits at lists.bestbits.net>>
Subject: Re: [bestbits] substantive proposals for Brazil summit - IG governance

Hi Andrew and all,

After reading the document I was willing to send a more carefully written comment, but I believe it is better to share thoughts informally now than to hold back ideas. Sorry for the chaotic message.

First of all, this is a very good and useful document. You managed to give the summary a good flow and you provide both an overview of inputs from respondents and conclusions from the group who analyzed them (which are also useful btw). Some remarks I would initially have are the following.

- It is interesting that almost all respondents mentioned imbalances of power, insufficient diversity of voices and other similar things as "cases for governance reform". I think that one conclusion from that is that although we support the idea of multistakeholder participation, the way it has been "lived" and implemented is not what we wished for. This is important to emphasize, because some analysis that have been produced recently argue that non-gov actors were all univocally united around MS all along.  In fact, I think many actors in CS have been pointing out to these imbalances for a long time, so in order to improve multistaholderism, these demands for inclusion should be the main ones guiding the process of reform.

- It is not clear to me if MIPOC would produce outputs or just identify the more adequate spaces to deal with issues. I will assume the first option is correct...

- I think that some of the proposals of "distributed governance" that you mapped overlook some important points. If MIPC or MIPOC  produce recommendations and send them to other organizations:
a) would they be obliged to take this issue on their agenda?;
b) If they do take it, what is the weight of MIPC/MIPOC's advice? If there is no weight, would we be giving an additional incentive to, for instance, WIPO, to negotiate text about the Internet, in a context that the MS opinion on the subject would  not count in WIPO? What is the use of that, and how does this differentiate governance of the internet to traditional international regimes?
c)  Is there a procedure to make other organizations reply back to MIPC/MIPOC to avoid at least that issues fall on def ears?
d) the distributed proposals are all based on a precondition: improving the IGF. That seems a frail model to me, if we dont know if there will be a renewal of the mandate or interest to continue the forum (let's not forget the drama before Bali).
e) Even if the IGF continues, the IGF needs resources. There is little chance to produce good, focused policy-oriented outcomes without a very, very boosted and dedicated staff and people who understand of methodologies to deal with large groups. Those who were also in the IGF improvements WG heard, like I did, that the IGF will not receive additional resources from the UN. The UN did not want to pay more and the business and the technical community were alligned against UN public funding, taking the issue out of the table. Are basing our model of improved governance on the existence of enough voluntary funding to the IGF?
f) The option to harbor the coordinating committee in CSTD was not sufficiently discussed in the document imo. Given the frailty of the IGF and the fact that outcomes from the coordinating body under CSTD could move up to ECOSOC and GA, I would look into that more carefully

- I don't understand why power grabs were a concern on the UN Committee model, but not so much on distributed models. Less clear processes are very prone to power grabs, even to more opaque (and harder to identify and fight) ones. With that in mind, I particularly emphasize the importance of your argument that self-forming MS processes are likely to disadvantage those without power and resources.

- The idea of a UN committee model does not seem to exclude the possibility to create ad-hoc MS working groups as necessary, so maybe the argument that it would not have expertise to deal with the diversity of internet issues could be more carefully explained.

That is all for a start. Just sharing some initial thoughts and hoping we can continue the discussions.
Thanks again for the good start
Marília







On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 6:25 AM, Andrew Puddephatt <Andrew at gp-digital.org<mailto:Andrew at gp-digital.org>> wrote:
Hi everyone

From: Marianne Franklin <m.i.franklin at gold.ac.uk<mailto:m.i.franklin at gold.ac.uk>>
Date: Thursday, 16 January 2014 15:57
To: andrew Puddephatt <andrew at gp-digital.org<mailto:andrew at gp-digital.org>>, "parminder at itforchange.net<mailto:parminder at itforchange.net>" <parminder at itforchange.net<mailto:parminder at itforchange.net>>, "<bestbits at lists. net>" <bestbits at lists.bestbits.net<mailto:bestbits at lists.bestbits.net>>

Subject: Re: [bestbits] substantive proposals for Brazil summit - IG governance

Dear Andrew and all

I’m heading offline for a week now and have had little substantive response to the document below. If there are any comments could you send them through to me by February 6th – after that we’ll consult about turning this into a submission in time for the deadline of March 1st.

Andrew Puddephatt| GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL
Executive Director
Development House, 56–64 Leonard Street, London EC2A 4LT
T: +44 (0)20 7549 0336<tel:%2B44%20%280%2920%207549%200336> | M: +44 (0)771 339 9597<tel:%2B44%20%280%29771%20339%209597> | Skype: andrewpuddephatt
gp-digital.org<http://gp-digital.org>


Shortly before Xmas Global Partners Digital and Article 19 met to look at the responses to the survey monkey I sent out in November.  Taking advantage of the presence of other groups in Geneva earlier the same week, we managed to bring in representatives from CDT, CTS/FGV, Access, and Internet Democracy Project.  The results of our conversation are set out below and in a word attachment.  Drawing upon the responses to the survey and other reading (listed at the end of the document) we looked at:


·         The case for reform

·         Possible criteria for reforming IG governance

·         An evaluation of the different proposals for reform

·         Preliminary conclusions.

Our main preliminary conclusion was, after considering the criteria we set out for an IG system, that a dispersed system of governance has more benefits and fewer risks than a centralised system of governance.  We go on to conclude in favour of maintaining a distributed governance regime, but that it should be strengthened through improving the IGF, introducing a new coordinating function and a process for ad hoc issue-specific multistakeholder working groups to deal with new issues. We also agreed that reforms were needed in order to globalise oversight at ICANN, but more research is needed about the options and risks here.

It is going to be a complex process to try and co-ordinate a response from then list.   To simplify things I suggest that people submit three categories of comments.

1. There will be those who fundamentally disagree with the approach put forward.  I suggest that they develop their own approach find their own collaborators and work on their own ideas.  May a hundred flowers bloom.
2. Those who broadly agree but who have substantive comments to make which require further discussion.  I will then collect these put together an online conference call or some other mechanism to discuss then in a structured fashion.
3.  Those who broadly agree but have preferences for different phrasing etc. but who can live with the differences.  These I will collect and try and resolve through e-mail conversation.

We’ve spent a lot of energy on the question of representation so it would be good to focus on what it is we would say if we were represented.  And although we should aim to submit something to Brazil by March 1st, this position is one we can develop and utilise in other forums.  If you have other suggestins on how to pull together different comments, do let me know.

Andrew Puddephatt


Internet Governance: proposals for reform
***Contributors: Access, Article 19, CDT, CTS/FGV, GPD, Internet Democracy Project***
In an effort to work towards a joint civil society proposal for internet governance reform - with the aim of feeding into the upcoming Brazilian Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance and other relevant forums – Global Partners Digital and Article 19 coordinated a small group of civil society organisations.
In order to brainstorm and report back as clearly as possible, the group worked through four stages in considering both the Best Bits survey responses and the most prominent civil society proposals for reforming the IG institutional framework that the contributors were aware of:

1.       What is the case for reform of IG and do we have a common understanding of what the problems with the existing arrangements are?

2.       If there is a case for reform what are the criteria for a reformed system of IG that should be applied, assuming we have a basic commitment to human rights and social justice?

3.       How do the various proposals for reform stack up against these criteria – what are their strengths and weaknesses and what potential risks and benefits.

4.       What are the crucial elements of a reformed IG system and what are those which we desire but would be willing to compromise around. Considering the previous questions, is there a rough consensus among the group present that we could share with the wider BB community to enrich the approach?
The below draft represents a summary of the group analysis and discussion.

1) Case for reform
Reviewing and building on the survey responses, the group identified the following criticisms of the current IG arrangements:

·         There is an imbalance of power with many people and groups, particularly from the global south, feeling marginalised.

·         There is insufficient diversity of voices, including gender and language.

·         Development issues, as set out in the original Tunis Agenda, have not been adequately tackled.

·         The IGF has not satisfactorily delivered on all elements of its mandate.

·         Multistakeholderism remains poorly defined which creates difficulty in its implementation and evaluation. The term is seen to be increasingly used as a cover by those resisting change.

·         There are jurisdictional issues which remain unresolved. This also often leaves powerful ICT companies to take important human rights/public interest decisions.

·         There is an absence of forums where jurisdictional issues or global public policies relating to the internet can be thrashed out. This means governments are falling back on different national laws and technical responses which encroach on the global and distributed functioning of the internet.

·         Furthermore because of the issues with the current regime, many governments are pursuing/establishing separate international initiatives to tackle important issues (such as cybersecurity) which are not sufficiently transparent, open, multi-stakeholder or global.

·         Some governments are increasingly asserting a doctrine of “state sovereignty” on the global internet.

·         There is a lack of clarity about how or where decisions are made – there is a plurality of forums with unclear relationships between them.

·         The internet is unusual as a communication tool, it has developed from the beginning as an international medium, and its international character and the benefits of free expression and access to information that it brings need to be preserved.

·         There is a unique property to the internet that requires global cooperation and coordination to make it effective.


2) Criteria for Internet Governance
NB - The group recognised that there was an overlap with the BB second Workstream looking at high level principles. The current suggested baseline for Workstream 2 are the Brazilian CGI.br principles. Depending on the outcome of Workstream 2, there could be potential to unite around a core set of principles.
After some discussion, the group set out criteria that they felt were an essential element of any democratic international governance system. The aim was to find criteria that could apply to any system of international governance rather than looking for criteria that only applied to the internet – in order to avoid the pitfalls of “internet exceptionalism”. Rather, in a globalised world, where there are generally very weak lines of accountability between a government's positions on the international stage and its electorate back at home, open international spaces with broad-based participation can be important opportunities for bringing international decisions much closer to citizens across the world. In this context, the group found that the international IG regime, if developed appropriately, could have implications for wider international governance systems (beyond the Internet). The group recognised that these criteria are aspirational and that any proposed reform would probably not meet all the criteria. Nonetheless it was found that they provide a useful framework for assessing any proposed changes.
The following mutually-supporting criteria were found necessary for the governance of complex global phenomena:
a)Processes

·         Transparent and comprehensible: it should be possible for anyone to understand how it works and how things happen/decisions are made;

·         Accountable: internal and external accountability process should exist, including a way of challenging decisions;

·         Effective: in that it can deliver whatever it is meant to deliver

·         Adaptable: so that it can take account of new innovations and developments in the field.

b) Participation

·         Inclusive and open: not be a small exclusive club, but open to many.

·         All necessary points of view are included in order to arrive at good decisions/agreements

·         Possessing the necessary expertise to make informed decisions

·         Meaningful participation: anybody affected by decision should be able to impact upon decision-making processes. The group recognised that this would likely involve mechanisms for consensus based decision making. But where consensus was not possible there may need to be alternative supplementary frameworks, such as decision-making by majority vote.

c) Underlying Values

·         Human rights values should be at the core of any governance process and outcomes.

·         Driven by global public interest (motivated by an understanding of the internet as a global public good).


3) Evaluating Proposals for Reform
The next stage was to look at various suggested reforms to the current system, drawn from the survey and other sources. The list of models analysed below is not exhaustive.  Please forgive the brevity and crudeness of the model titles and their descriptions - they are indicative only. More details about the proposals can be found in the sources listed at the end of the document.

UN Committee Model
Model proposed by the Indian government for a new UN Committee made up of 50 member states, with four advisory committees made up of different stakeholder groups. The Committee would have mandate over global internet-related public policy issues, and oversight of the technical bodies. IT for Change has also promoted this model with the exception that oversight of the technical bodies would reside in a separate Technical Oversight and Advisory Board formed of technical experts nominated by governments.


Multi-stakeholder Internet Policy Council (as proposed by Jeremy Malcolm)

A new multi-stakeholder internet policy council (MIPC) under the auspices of the IGF. MIPC would be made up of equal numbers from civil society, private sector, government and technical/academic communities, and observers from international organisations). The MIPC would take up issues forwarded to it by rough consensus in IGF plenaries. The MIPC would attempt to agree, by rough consensus, an IGF recommendation on that issue. The recommendations would be non-binding, but could call for the development of binding rules by other institutions where appropriate, which would generally be at the national level.



Multi-stakeholder Internet Policy Council (as proposed by Wolfgang Kleinwachter)

A new multi-stakeholder internet policy council (MIPOC) attached to the IGF. MIPOC could be composed similarly to the WG on Enhanced Cooperation. The MIPOC would be a coordinating body – identifying issues raised at the IGF and recommending an appropriate mechanism to address those issues, either a pre-existing mechanism (e.g. an intergovernmental organisation, a technical organisation, a combination) or a new one. New mechanisms could be ad hoc multistakeholder working groups with mandates to address specific issues by rough consensus.



Distributed Multi-stakeholder Processes Model (as proposed by Internet Democracy Project)

This model also envisions a coordinating body on the lines of the MIPOC model above, however the coordinating body would be housed in the CSTD instead of the IGF. The function of the IGF would in this model be one of a clearing house only. In addition, this model suggests that, where possible, the WSIS action lines should be taken as a guideline for deciding which pre-existing institution has a mandate covering a specific internet issue. Once an appropriate institution is identified, this institution would then be responsible for developing an appropriate multi-stakeholder process to respond to that issue.



Self-forming multi-stakeholder issue processes (as demonstrated by Internet & Jurisdiction Project)

Processes can self-create to develop voluntary solutions to specific internet issues. Similarly to the model for adoption of technical standards: the better a solution the more likely it is to be adopted. For higher likelihood of voluntary adoption, these processes should involve experts and powerful players, such as key governments. However, the Internet & Jurisdiction Project’s model appears to be more of a ‘proof of concept’ that could feasibly be institutionalized within one of the models outlined above.



Looking at the UN Committee model and applying the criteria above, the model has real strengths in the clarity of process and therefore enabling anyone to understand how it works and how things happen/decisions are made. It could also meet the effectiveness criteria in terms of coming up with detailed policy recommendations. On the other hand, its proposed mandate seemed very broad and more clarification is needed about potential clashes with existing mandates, such as that of the ITU or UNESCO. As a UN Committee with a central role for governments, and based on experience of similar bodies, there is a real risk it would be dominated by geo-political interests. As a single body with oversight – potentially – of all public policy issues related to the internet, the group felt there was a risk that the body would not have the requisite expertise to make informed decisions across all issues. While it could draw upon the work of advisory groups, it was unclear how they would be composed and whether any fixed group of people would have the capability to tackle a wide range of policy issues. The advisory nature of the stakeholder groups would also create risks that those impacted by decisions would not necessarily be able to help shape them. Furthermore there was a question over the feasibility (time-wise) of a single group responding to all issues, particularly as it is envisaged meeting just a few times per year.
Other proposals for reform, while varied in their level of centralisation, suggest a greater role for non-governmental stakeholder groups. All of these models seem to envision the IGF playing a more or less central role as a clearing house for identifying issues which need tackling and for each issue process to inform, engage and be accountable to a wider Internet community. One advantage of these models was seen to be the possibility for enabling pathways from the national through regional to global level discussion and back down by tying all processes to a wider discussion at the IGFs. Another advantage was seen to be that building on the strengths of the IGF could foster openness, inclusivity and accountability to the wider internet community.  There were, however, concerns given that the IGF hasn’t satisfactorily delivered on all elements of its mandate.  For example, should the MIPC/MIPOC models derive their mandate and agenda from IGF discussions – this would require a more output-oriented IGF. Thus, improving the IGF was seen as critical to instituting these models.
A key feature of most of the above models, which the group strongly supported, was the introduction of a new coordinating function in the current internet governance regime. The multi-stakeholder makeup of the coordinating body was also strongly supported by the group.  The advantage of these models was seen to be the fact that they would provide greater clarity (compared to the current situation) about how public policy issues are addressed.
In looking at these models, they also all maintain a distributed approach where many institutions are involved in different aspects of internet-related public policy. The group specifically supported the concept of maintaining/instituting separate processes for separate issues for several reasons. Distributing power was seen as protection against power-grabs, which many saw as the main concern with the more centralised approach in the UN Committee model – and to a lesser extent Jeremy’s MIPC model.
A distributed model was seen as having the advantage of drawing in expertise as necessary based on the issue at hand, and of being more dynamic and adaptable given the fast-changing internet environment. However, a degree of institutionalisation of any distributed model was seen to be essential to counteract power imbalances. For example, self-forming multi-stakeholder processes are likely to disadvantage those without power and resources.
There were, however, questions about the effectiveness of the distributed models as they retain some of the challenges of the current regime. The UN Committee model was more similar to existing governance frameworks making it easier to understand. The other models involve new and innovative ways of working. The group felt that the Internet & Jurisdiction project may be a useful test bed for the modalities of such an approach.

4) Existing Institutions
The group looked at a strand of suggestions around sustaining the current structures, particularly the IGF and ICANN, but reforming them to an extent that would allow issues with the current system to be sufficiently addressed. NB these reforms could happen alongside the ideas above considering the overall governance regime.

IGF
The group looked at proposals for improving the IGF (see list of sources below). There were a number of areas where necessary reforms were identified:

·         Providing stronger leadership;

·         A better funded and supported secretariat;

·         Stronger links between the IGF (and discussions at the IGF) and all spaces involved in the dispersed internet governance system;

·         Clearing house function;

·         More output-orientated;

·         Connecting the global annual IGF to a more structured series of national and regional IGFs to ensure that this is a clear path for issues of concern raised at a national and regional level finding their way to global consideration and back down to the regional and national levels;

·         Widening participation (esp. unrepresented e.g. global south governments and civil society, high level policy-makers, staff of all institutions involved in internet-related policy making, small to medium businesses);

·         Reforming the Multistakeholder Advisory Group.

ICANN
In the case of ICANN, the group felt that globalising ICANN (including removing the privilege of the US which was seen as  important though largely symbolic) remains an issue to be resolved as it might involve both location and structure.  However, the group felt that it was necessary to examine closely the different options - and timeframes - for doing so in order to determine their potential risks and suggest appropriate solutions. Article 19 agreed to co-ordinate further work on this issue.

5) Preliminary conclusions