[bestbits] Surveillance: not just a US issue

Tue Oct 8 06:17:08 EDT 2013

Thanks Pranesh - these are fascinating pieces. I have been wondering for
awhile if there is a widespread pattern of govts using hotly contested
license negotiations or spectrum auctions to secure access to data. It only
makes sense that they would try, I guess. Does anyone have similar
intelligence from other countries?
best
Anne

On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:25 AM, Pranesh Prakash <pranesh at cis-india.org>wrote:

> A two-part piece I wrote in the NYT India blog on surveillance in India.
>
> Part 1: How Surveillance Works in India
> http://goo.gl/ahjDy4
>
> Part 2: Can India Trust Its Government on Privacy?
> http://goo.gl/ih4PLW
>
> ~ Pranesh
>
> Anne Jellema [2013-10-04 09:21]:
> > Hi all
> >
> > Yet more evidence (this time from South Africa) that governments beyond
> the
> > US are using technology to escalate surveillance of civilians, and for
> > their own dubious reasons as well as to cooperate with the Americans.
> >
> > Full disclosure: the author is my partner.
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> > Anne
> >
> >
> http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/10/04/surveillance-may-turn-many-of-us-into-enemies
> > Surveillance may turn many of us into ‘enemies’
> > BY ANTHONY BUTLER<
> http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/staffprofiles/2012/08/10/anthony-butler-profile
> >,
> > 04 OCTOBER 2013, 05:51
> >
> > SOUTH Africa’s intelligence operatives often appear hopelessly inept. But
> > new technologies are empowering even the most incompetent spooks.
> > Revelations by the WikiLeaks "Spy Files" project and whistle-blower
> Edward
> > Snowden point to a large escalation in citizen surveillance.
> >
> > In South Africa, crime intelligence and private investigators routinely
> > circumvent the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act to access
> > individual citizens’ e-mails and phone calls. Targets can simply be added
> > to legitimate surveillance projects. Even more concerning is the
> likelihood
> > that there is already systematic blanket surveillance by the state.
> >
> > The Citizen Lab at Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs recently
> > revealed that FinSpy software is hosted by one or more South African
> > computers, almost certainly within the government. FinSpy inserts
> "trojans"
> > onto target computers and cellphones, allowing remote surveillance of
> > keystrokes, passwords, text messages, e-mails and voice data. It can even
> > turn a cellphone into a microphone to eavesdrop on private conversations
> > (which explains some politicians’ unnerving habit of removing the
> batteries
> > from their phones).
> >
> > Huawei Technologies, the world’s second-biggest telecommunications
> company,
> > is a recent investor in South Africa. According to one assessment in
> > Foreign Affairs magazine, Huawei is a Chinese intelligence agency
> > "masquerading as a tech business". Using software developed for domestic
> > repression, it could allegedly supply passive surveillance capability to
> a
> > friendly ruling party.
> >
> > A much smaller local company, VASTech, has been a focus of WikiLeaks’
> > attention. The Wall Street Journal revealed in 2011 that the
> > Stellenbosch-based firm’s systems helped the Gadaffi regime monitor
> > millions of mobile and landline calls. This technology was also
> reportedly
> > sold to the Mubarak state.
> >
> > WikiLeaks-hosted company documents show that VASTech’s Zebra system can
> > monitor 20-million voice channels simultaneously. Such blanket
> interception
> > is complemented by archiving power that allows agents to "backtrack and
> > retrieve all the communications of suspects prior to an incident".
> Network
> > analysis permits the identification of "key relationships between
> > stakeholders" and lays bare "the structure and operation of syndicate
> > networks".
> >
> > Even anonymous cellphones are no defence against Zebra: it uses "speaker
> > identification" technology to "reveal unknown numbers and new mobile
> > devices used by targets".
> >
> > VASTech describes surveillance targets as "criminals and enemies of the
> > public". But it is officials in state agencies, and not software
> suppliers,
> > who decide how technology is used. Given that the state’s national
> > interception centre probably possesses such instruments, can citizens be
> > confident that intrastate oversight mechanisms are effective?
> >
> > Drug-smuggling, xenophobia, illicit commerce, and human trafficking,
> among
> > many other matters, are routinely touted as "threats to national
> security".
> > This could license the surveillance of a vast swathe of commercial
> entities
> > and citizens.
> >
> > Surveillance systems are excellent instruments for the mapping of
> internal
> > political party factions. It is possible to take a player in national,
> > provincial or local politics, reconstruct his "collaboration networks",
> and
> > eavesdrop on his archived conversations. There is nothing to prevent such
> > technology being used against recalcitrant trade unionists — especially
> > when, as State Security Minister Siyabonga Cwele has observed, so much
> > industrial action is "illegal".
> >
> > The KwaZulu-Natal police’s Lt-Gen Solomon Makgale made the insightful
> > observation this week that service delivery protesters are also
> criminals.
> > A protest, he noted, "stops being a protest when a crime is committed …
> if
> > you are impeding the flow of traffic, then obviously you’ll be in
> conflict
> > with the law".
> >
> > South Africa is experiencing a rapid expansion in the reach and potential
> > power of state surveillance. It is unclear how to prevent what may become
> > an equally rapid rise in the number of citizens defined by state agencies
> > as "enemies of the public".
> >
> > • *Butler teaches politics at the University of Cape Town.*
> >
>
> --
> Pranesh Prakash
> Policy Director
> Centre for Internet and Society
> T: +91 80 40926283 | W: http://cis-india.org
> PGP ID: 0x1D5C5F07 | Twitter: @pranesh_prakash
> -------------------+
> Postgraduate Associate & Access to Knowledge Fellow
> Information Society Project, Yale Law School
> T: +1 520 314 7147 | W: http://yaleisp.org
>
>

-- 
Anne Jellema
Chief Executive Officer
Cape Town, RSA
mob (ZA) +27 61 036 9652
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tel (US) +1 202 684 6885
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