[governance] Russia - US relations #trade #TPP #ITRs/ was TPP is worse than SOPA
Salanieta T. Tamanikaiwaimaro
salanieta.tamanikaiwaimaro at gmail.com
Fri Sep 21 22:22:30 EDT 2012
Dear All,
I must say that I was shocked to hear US Aid being booted out of Russia of
late. particularly in light of the recent MoU it signed with the US on
permanent trade relations it reminds of paper mache and don't ask me why.
It appears that the US strategy is to shift key aspects highlighted in the
proposals on revision of ITRs to enveloping them first via the TPP and
positioning the debate in the WTO. See Assistant Secretary Phillip Gordon
remarks below at the Center for European Analysis:
Press Gaggle Following Remarks at the Center for European Policy Analysis
Remarks
Philip H. Gordon
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Center for European Policy Analysis
Washington, DC
September 20, 2012
------------------------------
*QUESTION:* I just wanted to follow up, Assistant Secretary, about USAID
and Russia. You mentioned that the United States is not going to back away
from supporting civil organizations in Russia, but what kind of symbol do
you think this sends that Russia has booted USAID out of the country? What
does it mean for the country and the government?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* I think a lot of those who support democracy
and human rights around the world see this as Russia backing away from
commitments for a democratic society that allows for free expression and
it’s not just the ending of the USAID mission. There’s a pattern going on
over recent months in terms of treatment of NGOs, and deeming them foreign
agents, and raising fines on protestors and other interventions in the
media that lead people to the conclusion that Russia is somehow resisting
the trend towards democracy, free expression and human rights. The United
States has been consistent, will continue to support democracy, free
expression and human rights. So it sends a negative signal, but not in
isolation -- combined with other measures that the Russian government has
taken.
*QUESTION:* Did the U.S. see this coming?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* There’s been talk for some time about the
Russian government desire to end the USAID mission specifically and more
generally to end this sort of activity which again, as I say, is consistent
with their other measures on NGOs.
*QUESTION:* Do you see that in any way this may affect the reset in the
Russian-American relations?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* We’ve been clear about the reset from the
start. It was never naively assuming that we wouldn’t have our differences,
and we’ve had differences over democracy and human rights from the start.
We’ve been clear about those. The President and Secretary Clinton have
raised it consistently in their meetings with Russian government officials.
So it doesn’t mean that we’re not going to continue to try to work together
in areas where we have common interests like non-proliferation, security,
global challenges, nuclear issues, economic relations, we still welcome
Russia’s joining of the WTO and want to boost U.S. investment in Russia. So
it doesn’t change anything about the approach that we have taken to Russia.
*QUESTION:* Mr. Secretary, in Poland there is growing fear that Poland
would be left over; Poland and the region during transformation of American
foreign policy when the stress is more on Asia than on the European effort.
Are these fears justified?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* I think we’ve been very clear about what the
renewed focus on Asia and the greater Middle East means, and means for
Europe. It’s in no way walking away from the longstanding commitments we
have to our partnership with Europe. In some ways, as I’ve made clear, the
partnership for Europe is even more important to us because we face these
great challenges in Asia and the Middle East -- that’s why we’re increasing
our partnering with European countries. Nor is it in any way a diminishment
of our rock solid support for all NATO allies, and I’ve described here and
elsewhere how we’ve continued to maintain the viability of Article 5, by
taking steps to enhance deterrence in Europe and Poland in particular -- we
have the aviation detachment that we have established at a Polish air base;
we’re moving forward with plans for missile defense that will involve the
deployment of land-based interceptors in Poland with American military
personnel involved with that.
We will continue even after the restructuring of our global forces to have
more troops in Europe deployed permanently than anywhere else in the world.
We’re going to rotate in American personnel so that we continue to partner
with European forces. I think objectively there’s no way to see this
evolution as, in any way, a diminishment of our strong and continued
commitment to Poland and other allies in the region.
I wanted to come back to one more thing on the USAID point. You asked
whether we saw it coming and what it means.
The Russian government -- and what it means for democracy and human rights
-- the Russian government has described this as a reflection of its new
degree of economic development, and it’s not, they have said, a walking
away from their support for these activities, but that Russia doesn’t need
this anymore. We hope that they will follow up and provide support for the
types of things that USAID has been supporting over the years. If they want
to act on the basis of being a G8 country and an advanced economy and
believe that they can support these goals without the United States, given
that we support those goals, that’s what we’d like to see them do.
*QUESTION:* How would you describe the chances of their doing that?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* That remains to be seen.
*QUESTION:* Two very quick questions on the Caucasus, if I may. You
mentioned in the discussion the Safarov case with Azerbaijan and Hungary. I
know that the U.S. has reached out to both to follow up. I wanted to ask
you, what have their responses been? And has the U.S. been satisfied with
those responses?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* I think you’ve seen the public remarks of
both in explaining what they did, and we continue to express our dismay and
disappointment. We’re not satisfied with what has happened here. In our
view this is someone who should have continued to serve out his sentence
and certainly we were appalled by the glorification that we heard in some
corridors of somebody who was convicted of murder, and so no, we’re not
satisfied with the responses.
*QUESTION:* A second quick question from the Caucasus. In Georgia there was
this huge scandal that erupted in the past few days about the prison abuse
videos. I’m wondering what the State Department’s, what has been the extent
of the State Department’s contact with Georgia on this issue, and the
reaction to it?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* As you know it’s evolving as we speak,
especially yesterday more news came out so we are following it closely.
We’re in touch with the Georgians, but we’re gathering information.
*QUESTION:* A very quick question on Libya. There was a report this morning
on NPR about extremist groups setting up camps in Libya and especially in
the city where the horrible tragedy happened. Is the administration
concerned about this situation? And whether, is it going to take any
measures?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* We’re taking measures all around the world as
we speak. Of course we’re very, we’re concerned first and foremost with the
security of our people everywhere around the world in the wake of the
protests and violence that we’ve seen -- obviously particularly in Libya
given the tragedy last Tuesday. So yes, we are doing everything we can to
make sure that we’re prepared to deal with any contingency that might
emerge.
*QUESTION:* In terms of the development of democracy in Libya, this may be
very concerning --
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* Of course it’s concerning, but I would say no
one should take this setback as an indication that it’s not possible to
continue on the positive, forward path in Libya. This was a tragic
incident; it was a horrible incident; it’s a sign that there are bad actors
in Libya and that there’s not going to be a smooth and direct path to a
stable democracy, but we knew that before –- and it would be wrong to
extrapolate that because some individuals or groups are seeking to
undermine the democracy.
We’ve been very encouraged by both the words and actions of the Libyan
government in denouncing this violence, in trying to help us deal with the
perpetrators -- don’t forget that part of the firefight that took place
around our facility was Libyan security forces against these armed groups,
so there are still a lot of Libyans who value what the United States is
doing, what others are doing, and who want to see a democracy in Libya and
we’re not going to let these bad actors interfere with that goal.
*QUESTION:* Mr. Secretary, talking about unfinished business in this part
of Europe, especially Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova. How do you evaluate the
role which was played by the new NATO members towards let’s say exporting
democracy to this region? And how would you see the role of those countries
in bringing democracy to, for example, Belarus?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* These countries are new partners in
supporting democracy throughout Europe. They are no longer the objects of
efforts to support democracy because they are democracies themselves, and
in many ways they’ve been leaders in this effort. As I say, the Eastern
Partnership was in some ways a Central European idea, and that’s not
surprising because they have an even greater stake than we do -- they live
next to the Ukraines and Belaruses of Europe -- so we’re partners in this
common effort and we value what they’re doing.
*QUESTION:* Yesterday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee I believe
supported a resolution to institute perhaps visa bans on people involved in
the alleged mistreatment of Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine. Would that be
possible, do you think? And do you think it would be an effective way to
get some movement on the issue?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* We share the concerns expressed by both
Houses of Congress about the upcoming elections in Ukraine and about
selective prosecutions. I think we’ve been very clear ourselves, directly
and privately with Ukrainian leaders and in public about our concerns about
selective prosecutions, and the need for free and fair elections.
It is already the policy of the United States to deny visas to people who
commit serious violations of human rights. It is not our policy at present
to cut off ties with the Ukrainian government as part of an effort to get
them to do the right thing on elections or prosecutions -- we don’t believe
that that would be effective. We want to continue to engage and make clear
that there are other consequences to failure to act in these areas and I
think they know what those consequences are, they’re already in effect. Our
bilateral relationship can’t be what we would like it to be so long as
they’re doing this. I think they’re going to struggle to get support from
IMF members for the economic assistance they need, so long as they haven’t
dealt with this. The European Union has made clear that the Association
Agreement, a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, won’t move
forward. So there are other pressures the Ukrainians are feeling -- and
that’s what we’re going to continue to pursue.
*QUESTION:* On the Magnitsky list, do you see any situation in which the
administration might support the efforts in the Congress to adopt the
Magnitsky list?
*ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON:* Well, it depends on what you mean by the
Magnitsky list. As you know, we strongly support Permanent Normal Trade
Relations with Russia because now that Russia’s going to join the WTO it’s
in American firms’ interest to have PNTR extended to Russia -- we’ve just
been very clear that that should happen as a core American economic
interest.
Congress in both houses has attached legislation to the PNTR measure that
would have implications for democracy and human rights in Russia, including
what you’re referring to in the case of those responsible for the
imprisonment and death of Sergei Magnitsky.
We completely share Congress’ intent in making sure that those who were
responsible for this crime are punished. But as I noted before, it’s
already our policy to deny visas to anyone who would be implicated in such
a crime, and we’ve already done so. We’ve been clear that there are people
who will not get a visa to the United States because of this.
So in that sense, there are still some differences between the two Houses
on what exactly -- that’s why it’s impossible to say do we support that
legislation because there are still different versions that they have to
work out. We certainly share Congress’ view that there should be
consequences for those involved in suppression of democracy, grave human
rights violations -- but we’re also absolutely clear that PNTR should move
ahead -- it’s in America’s interest to do so; it’s not a gift to Russia;
it’s something that’s in our own interest to do.
*QUESTION:* Thank you so much.
On Sun, Sep 9, 2012 at 8:54 AM, Salanieta T. Tamanikaiwaimaro <
salanieta.tamanikaiwaimaro at gmail.com> wrote:
> The TPP will be worse than the SOPA. See the analysis by EFF:
>
> -
> https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/tpp-creates-liabilities-isps-and-put-your-rights-risk
>
>
>
> There have been other reports, see:
>
>
> -
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/27/pacific-free-trade-deal
> -
> http://www.alternet.org/story/156059/trans-pacific_partnership%3A_under_cover_of_darkness%2C_a_corporate_coup_is_underway
>
>
> Pay particular attention to the "NAFTA" on steroids bit. What is also
> interesting is the news that Russia has just signed an MoU with the US
> strengthening greater partnership, notwithstanding the support that it got
> from the US in joining the WTO, You can imagine that if Russia is persuaded
> to join the TPP then the likelihood that they will receive the relevant
> traction to widen the circle of the TPP Party/Parade will definitely cause
> the concerns that was raised by the EFF to be a reality in the not too
> distant future. This means ISP liabilities amongst a host of other things.
>
>
> For developing countries, the concept of "free trade" may sound lucrative
> but the reality is that it only disadvantages one (the loser).
>
>
> I find the US position on this to be schizophrenic because on one end they
> are proclaiming an open and free internet and taking extraordinary measures
> to criticise threats to an open internet yet are going to extraordinary
> lengths to go around the world by sending their highest political officer
> to gain momentum for the TPP.
>
>
> It brings to mind that nations at the end of the day are about interests
> and "as long as it suits them". I will also hasten to add that there are
> many citizens in the US who are also wanting greater transparency around
> the TPP negotiations as it is likely to impact the architecture of the
> Internet and the rules of the game.
>
>
> Kind Regards,
>
> Sala
>
>
>
--
Salanieta Tamanikaiwaimaro aka Sala
P.O. Box 17862
Suva
Fiji
Twitter: @SalanietaT
Skype:Salanieta.Tamanikaiwaimaro
Fiji Cell: +679 998 2851
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