[governance] Re: [IGP-ANNOUNCE] IGP Alert: Reforming ICANN

[Parminder]

Avri

> Before I get criticized for not offering anything other then
> disagreement,  for information sake, i tend to favor a  model that
> includes an independent appeals mechanism, and some form of the no
> confidence vote model.


Since we seem to agree that political accountability and oversight is
necessary, lets try and explore where the difference really lies, going
beyond Tunis Mandate's vocabulary and such superficial arguments.

Fine, I am ready to agree with an independent appeals mechanism. Names don't
mater. What would in your opinion be its composition. Will it again be
elected by the ICANN noncom or a similar body with all its structural
defects. Or would this body include a boarder political spectrum reflecting
all the interests and groups that are implicated. If that is to happen than
would it be much different from the IGF. More structured perhaps, but in
that case we can try and compare it with the only structured body in the
IGF, the MAG (as its composition is supposed to be and not as it is).

Will such a body not also be paralyzed by the same kind of political
divisiveness about which we often have heard long lectures in IGF
consultations which keep warning us against moving an inch towards trying to
fulfill any of its mandate that may involve the least of structured activity
- like the recs part, for instance. 

So proposing a different name will not solve the problem, unless in the
solution a different expertise-based non-political (whatever it means)
approach to accountability is hidden, which of course is not acceptable to
those who seek broader political accountability.   

In fact ,going back to IGP's proposal, I think even IGP proposal addresses
only one part of the oversight problem (perhaps deliberately so, since it
may be useful to go in small steps). Political oversight should be able to
enforce accountability but it should also be able to provide policy. These
two tasks are related but also very different. A good accountability system
will itself go in the direction of ensuring that the implicated body keeps
its policies on some kind of a right track. However, there are times when
clearer and specific policy making is required, and an accountability
mechanism itself cannot ensure that. Any mature democratic set up tends
towards a greater institutional specialization for this purpose.

So, while the ICANN outreach systems can have an accountability extracting
function (which we think outreach to narrow political constituencies of
choice and mutual comfort, and therefore is not wholly legitimate) as can an
IGF based system (while is politically more diverse and better represents
all implicated interests, and therefore recommended), neither is able to do
clear policy making function as and when required in the areas of ICANN
working. That, along with global Internet policy making in other areas,
remains a requirement whose solutions are still to be sought.   

Given that requirements of an appropriate institutional mechanism for global
Internet policy making are very complex, it is better if we are more open to
out-of-box thinking, and mutually seeking new or innovative solutions.

So you are partly right when you say in another email, in context of my
quoting of para 71 calling for performance reports by ICANN and others that 

> I believe Parminder has confounded two separate mandates; the IGF
> mandate and the enhanced cooperation mandate.  I therefore do not find
> his argument convincing.  Though I can easily see how it might be
> compelling to some.  I think the enhanced cooperation formula is much
> more complicated then that.


Para 71 is about enhanced coop (EC) but the choice of watertight separation
of EC parts from IGF parts of TA is itself an interpretation that some
people has made because it suits them politically. Both suggestions come in
relation to the felt need of a complex public policy institutional ecology
at the global level for the Internet. And we know that both the
understanding and level of consensus were inadequate at the time when WSIS
had to be quickly closed which is the cause of the ambiguities of Tunis
text. And where we go from here in further interpretations is a matter of
our political preferences, whereby the implication of your statement 'Though
I can easily see how it might be > compelling to some' is right on the dot. 

So, as a first step we before we negotiate our political differences it is
important to examine and acknowledge our political positions and
preferences. This will help the cause all around.

For CS there have been two main agendas for IG. To prevent governments from
calling the shots, and to get progressive policies in IG area to address
issues of rights, equity, social justice etc. There is a clear trade-of
here. If we just ensure that no clear policy system is allowed to shape up
because it brings with it the possibility to allowing governments to go
closer to levers of controls over the Internet, the objective 1 above is
met. (that's what most active CS actors have done.) Even if this means that
by default polices are getting made and 'enforced', and such polices almost
always favor already dominant sections. Other people may be more eager, as a
new IS institutional ecology shapes up, to ensure urgent progressive policy
interventions that ensure the above values. This may however come with the
danger that governments are able to find some ways of being in better
position of exercising some authority on matters Internet. 

How different players are responding to the situation here is underwritten
by their political preferences. And it is good to occasionally examine and
discuss these. Both sets of objectives may be important to all CS people/
groups, but to some one is more important, and to others, the other. So they
are ready for different trade-offs.  

In this context, when I say the performance reporting spoken of in para 71
can be done to IGF, I don't see why it cant be even if it under the EC
framework. EC framework as you say is very complex, the issue is what are be
doing to engage or not engage with that complexity. And Why? EC framework
will involve policy making parts, will involve monitoring and performance
reporting parts, policy deliberation part etc.... and it can have close
contacts and overlaps with IGF, preserving a good amount of useful
specializations, why not When Wolfgang and McTim happily claim that whats
happening at IGF itself is EC why it is more acceptable to those who
otherwise protest strongly to keep EC and IGF separate. 


So, the real issue is not how separate they are, but how the proposed
institutional systems play against our political preferences. I make bold to
propose that those who today may proffer the (implied) view that performance
reporting meant in paras 71 should not be done to IGF, but to someone else
in the EC framework, say this only because we know there is no EC framework
(which we all know would be more inter-governmental than IGF). Were there
actually such a system in place, and in that context if a discussion was to
happen whether ICANN, in pursuance of requirements of para 71, should report
to a EC system (whatever it means) all those opposed the present IGP
proposal may actually be heard arguing well, have we considered the
possibility that such reporting can be done to IGF because it is more open,
has more stakeholders, is more appropriate for a wider and more informed and
less biased inputs etc etc. 

Goes back to how are arguments in this present discussion just come from
what we are really trying to achieve here... almost exclusively only to keep
govs at bay, and within that primary and over-ridding objectives its fine if
some small gains can come by, or, on the other hand, whether one has a
belief in the necessity of legitimate political system that alone can
safeguard the interests of disadvantaged people/ groups. And if we have to
mutually negotiate in-between political positions lets do that, rather than
keep arguing on the 'inherent correctness' and logicality of one proposal or
the other, with a smug assumption that the basic 'rightful concerns' are the
same for all (Avri, I am not saying that you are doing so. This is just the
rhetorical tail of a braider argument.)

Going back to your email

> I see that as
> something precious that should not be overloaded with other functions.


It all depends on what is more precious to whom, the existing forum
functions/ outputs (many have great amount of misgiving if any such species
does exist - or whether the IGF has not just come to represent a co-opted
body which gives the impression of participation/ legitimacy without doing
it, and therefore probably doing more harm than good to this cause) or some
other possible (mandated) functions which you opine will be an unnecessary
overload.

Parminder 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Avri Doria [mailto:avri at psg.com]
> Sent: Friday, February 08, 2008 2:20 AM
> To: Governance Caucus
> Subject: Re: [governance] Re: [IGP-ANNOUNCE] IGP Alert: Reforming ICANN
> 
> 
> On 7 Feb 2008, at 18:40, Milton L Mueller wrote:
> 
> >
> > Avri I think you misunderstand the proposal.
> 
> For you to say i misunderstand what you say is fine.  i think that may
> even be a mantra between us.
> 
> > And I think your
> > misunderstanding is fueled largely by the incredible defensiveness
> > that
> 
> for you to say my misunderstanding is fueled by defensiveness is
> offensive
> (
>      meaning the opposite of defensive,
>      and not meaning that you have offended me.
>      whenever someone calls another defensive,
>      they are on the attack
>      what can we say in response?
>      - oh no, i am not defensive.
>      - gee, that sounds defensive to me
> )
> 
> >
> > seems to have developed around ICANN and the alleged "threat" posed to
> > it by internationalization.
> 
> 
> As I think you know, i have personally advocated internationalization
> for a long time, though i admit i am adverse to any sort of inter-
> governmentalism.
> 
> >
> >
> > How exactly would a non-binding review and report on ICANN's
> > accountability, administered by the IGF, "subordinate" ICANN to the
> > IGF?
> > If anything, this proposal could be criticized as being far too soft
> > on
> > ICANN.
> >
> 
> In your letter you argue that ICANN is not ready to be independent.
> 
> quote
>       IGP, like many other stakeholders,
>       does not believe that ICANN is ready to be fully
>       independent yet.
> end quote
> 
> furthermore  you state that it needs to be accountable to someone, a
> point to which i agree.
> 
> quote
>        The problem is more fundamental and systemic.
>        It can be summed
>        up in two words: external accountability.
> end quote
> 
> you go on to define what you mean by External accountability:
> 
> quote
>      External accountability refers to the ability of members
>     the Internet-using public to  effectively sanction the
>     organization
> unquote
> 
> I can even agree with this.  i can even agree that some sort of
> external international oversight is required.  but I argue that anyone
> who can sanction another puts the other into a subordinate position.
> By any definition I understand, oversight, involves a power
> relationship and thus subordinates one entity to the other.
> 
> As I understand the IGF, one goal is to do all we can to balance the
> power relationships in IG.  I accept Parminder's arguments that it is
> a 'goody goody' viewpoint to think that the power relationships have
> all been eliminated in the IGF.  But i believe strongly that this is a
> goal - and that while we are under the umbrella of the IGF we must
> strive for parity and equality of participants and organizations. (You
> can call me a naive dreamer and optimist if you like)
> 
> I believe that any arrangement that mandates that ICANN report and
> respond to the IGF, puts the IGF in a position that is contrary to its
> intended nature.  So while I agree that ICANN may need to report to
> someone I do not see how the IGF could accept such a responsibility
> and remain the IGF as defined by the TA and its initial meetings.
> 
> Before I get criticized for not offering anything other then
> disagreement,  for information sake, i tend to favor a  model that
> includes an independent appeals mechanism, and some form of the no
> confidence vote model.  I have not bothered to write this to NTIA,
> because I don't expect them to care one whit what i may have to say.
> 
> 
> > ICANN apparently _wants_ IGF to review it as it played an extremely
> > active role in the Rio Forum and invited comment and criticism.
> 
> I can't speak for ICANN, or anyone else for that matter, but they do
> seem very open to the opinions and criticism of IGF participants and
> others. I think that this is the soft power that people speak of - the
> soft power of people using reason and being able to help an
> organization see itself from external viewpoints.  i would hope that
> any participant in the IGF, not just ICANN, would be able to improve
> [it, him, her]self based on the multiple perspectives available in the
> the IGF.
> 
> >
> >
> > In terms of becoming a "decision-making body" again I think this is a
> > massive overstatement. Parminder has demonstrated conclusively that
> > IGF's mandate includes reviewing and assessing the accountability of
> > Internet governance insitutions.
> 
> I believe Parminder has confounded two separate mandates; the IGF
> mandate and the enhanced cooperation mandate.  I therefore do not find
> his argument convincing.  Though I can easily see how it might be
> compelling to some.  I think the enhanced cooperation formula is much
> more complicated then that.
> 
> > But IGF has no binding authority or
> > leverage (comparable to ICANN's control of the root zone, for example)
> > with which to enforce its recommendations. So in what sense does it
> > become decision-making.
> 
> I believe that putting it in the position to sanction would involve
> decision making.
> 
> >
> >
> > If IGF is nothing more than a completely non-threatening space where
> > people talk, tell me what it does that isn't done better by the
> > complex
> > of academic and industry conferences that come along by the dozens
> > each
> > year?
> 
> Because academic conferences only have an academic scope and industry
> conferences only have a private sector scope, whereas the IGF has a
> global multistakeholder scope.  and because the IGF is the first to
> have a scope that brings together civil society, international
> organizations, the private sector, IGOs, the academy, techies and
> governments into a single non-threatening space.  I see that as
> something precious that should not be overloaded with other functions.
> 
> 
> a.
> 
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