[governance] Re: [IGP-ANNOUNCE] IGP Alert: Reforming ICANN

[Avri Doria]

On 7 Feb 2008, at 18:40, Milton L Mueller wrote:

>
> Avri I think you misunderstand the proposal.

For you to say i misunderstand what you say is fine.  i think that may  
even be a mantra between us.

> And I think your
> misunderstanding is fueled largely by the incredible defensiveness  
> that

for you to say my misunderstanding is fueled by defensiveness is  
offensive
(
     meaning the opposite of defensive,
     and not meaning that you have offended me.
     whenever someone calls another defensive,
     they are on the attack
     what can we say in response?
     - oh no, i am not defensive.
     - gee, that sounds defensive to me
)

>
> seems to have developed around ICANN and the alleged "threat" posed to
> it by internationalization.


As I think you know, i have personally advocated internationalization  
for a long time, though i admit i am adverse to any sort of inter- 
governmentalism.

>
>
> How exactly would a non-binding review and report on ICANN's
> accountability, administered by the IGF, "subordinate" ICANN to the  
> IGF?
> If anything, this proposal could be criticized as being far too soft  
> on
> ICANN.
>

In your letter you argue that ICANN is not ready to be independent.

quote
      IGP, like many other stakeholders,
      does not believe that ICANN is ready to be fully
      independent yet.
end quote

furthermore  you state that it needs to be accountable to someone, a  
point to which i agree.

quote
       The problem is more fundamental and systemic.
       It can be summed
       up in two words: external accountability.
end quote

you go on to define what you mean by External accountability:

quote
     External accountability refers to the ability of members
    the Internet-using public to  effectively sanction the
    organization
unquote

I can even agree with this.  i can even agree that some sort of  
external international oversight is required.  but I argue that anyone  
who can sanction another puts the other into a subordinate position.   
By any definition I understand, oversight, involves a power  
relationship and thus subordinates one entity to the other.

As I understand the IGF, one goal is to do all we can to balance the  
power relationships in IG.  I accept Parminder's arguments that it is  
a 'goody goody' viewpoint to think that the power relationships have  
all been eliminated in the IGF.  But i believe strongly that this is a  
goal - and that while we are under the umbrella of the IGF we must  
strive for parity and equality of participants and organizations. (You  
can call me a naive dreamer and optimist if you like)

I believe that any arrangement that mandates that ICANN report and  
respond to the IGF, puts the IGF in a position that is contrary to its  
intended nature.  So while I agree that ICANN may need to report to  
someone I do not see how the IGF could accept such a responsibility  
and remain the IGF as defined by the TA and its initial meetings.

Before I get criticized for not offering anything other then  
disagreement,  for information sake, i tend to favor a  model that  
includes an independent appeals mechanism, and some form of the no  
confidence vote model.  I have not bothered to write this to NTIA,  
because I don't expect them to care one whit what i may have to say.


> ICANN apparently _wants_ IGF to review it as it played an extremely
> active role in the Rio Forum and invited comment and criticism.

I can't speak for ICANN, or anyone else for that matter, but they do  
seem very open to the opinions and criticism of IGF participants and  
others. I think that this is the soft power that people speak of - the  
soft power of people using reason and being able to help an  
organization see itself from external viewpoints.  i would hope that  
any participant in the IGF, not just ICANN, would be able to improve  
[it, him, her]self based on the multiple perspectives available in the  
the IGF.

>
>
> In terms of becoming a "decision-making body" again I think this is a
> massive overstatement. Parminder has demonstrated conclusively that
> IGF's mandate includes reviewing and assessing the accountability of
> Internet governance insitutions.

I believe Parminder has confounded two separate mandates; the IGF  
mandate and the enhanced cooperation mandate.  I therefore do not find  
his argument convincing.  Though I can easily see how it might be  
compelling to some.  I think the enhanced cooperation formula is much  
more complicated then that.

> But IGF has no binding authority or
> leverage (comparable to ICANN's control of the root zone, for example)
> with which to enforce its recommendations. So in what sense does it
> become decision-making.

I believe that putting it in the position to sanction would involve  
decision making.

>
>
> If IGF is nothing more than a completely non-threatening space where
> people talk, tell me what it does that isn't done better by the  
> complex
> of academic and industry conferences that come along by the dozens  
> each
> year?

Because academic conferences only have an academic scope and industry  
conferences only have a private sector scope, whereas the IGF has a  
global multistakeholder scope.  and because the IGF is the first to  
have a scope that brings together civil society, international  
organizations, the private sector, IGOs, the academy, techies and  
governments into a single non-threatening space.  I see that as  
something precious that should not be overloaded with other functions.


a.

____________________________________________________________
You received this message as a subscriber on the list:
     governance at lists.cpsr.org
To be removed from the list, send any message to:
     governance-unsubscribe at lists.cpsr.org

For all list information and functions, see:
     http://lists.cpsr.org/lists/info/governance