[governance] Vixie supports another root administration

[McTim]

On 10/10/05, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer at internatif.org> wrote:

> > Wolfgang's "doomsday" scenario (or was it nuclear?) was that the USG
> > could (in theory) pull a ccTLD from the rootzone.  This is one thing
> > that makes governments unhappy.  This is so unlikely, we can
> > consider it an impossibility.
>
> If it is impossible, if it is a purely theoretical power, then, it
> should not be a problem to withdraw the root zone management from the
> hands of the USG.

it shouldn't be, but it is.  That's the Layer 9 reality. The USG has
said that it will be happy to give it up if there is smt better to
replace their "stewardship".

There isn't at the moment.

If this government does not want to relinquish
> control, this is probably because people in Washington do not believe
> it is an impossibility...

more probable that they have a duty to protect stability of the network.

>
> > The USG does not have direct control of the file. It only approves
> > changes as shown on:
>
> I heard every day (in the WSIS process or in similar places) people
> who tell diplomatic tales like this one. On a civil society list, I
> would prefer people to be more plain and to stop using propaganda

One person's truth is an others propaganda.  Do you really think
someone in DOC could/would call VeriSign and they would edit the root
zone on a whim?  There is a process for that. It should be followed. 
No one has yet shown me a case where it has not been followed.

> this one. Can anyone really believe that IANA would even consider
> doing something without being sure of USG future approbation?

Why would IANA care? The IANA is simply the registry. They are
currently under the admin umbrella of ICANN, but it's not like the USG
is going to "disband" IANA as punishment.

ICANN might come under political pressure, but they would fight tooth
and nail to prevent political pressure from actually "forcing" a
change in cctld delegation.  IMO, ICANN would be motivated more by the
desire to avoid being sued (again) as opposed to the desire to please
the DOC.

>
> > Any other speculation that the US would take unilateral action and
> > somehow "force" the IANA to change the rootzone is just
> > scaremongering IMO.
>
> OK, I repeat my challenge: if the US government does not intend to
> exercice its power, then why not officially dropping it?

It intended to, at the end of the current MoU.  Then WSIS cam along
and now the USG is "protecting it's baby".

> > He has written a briefing and faq that answers many questions about
> > rootserver operations:
> >
> > http://www.isoc.org/briefings/020/
>
> Yes, very good text, specially the answer to "Q: The majority of the
> root name server operators are based in the United States of
> America. Couldn't the US government force them to make any changes it
> wants?" where he says exactly the opposite of what you said.


I think we said the same thing:

DFK: In principle I suppose the US government could do that. It is
difficult to argue with one's government if the government is
determined about something. However I consider this a highly unlikely
scenario for several reasons of which I will just give the ones I find
most convincing

McTim: This is so unlikely, we can consider it an impossibility.

We both even use the word "unlikely"

>
> > You are correct, it would be nice to have more transparency around
> > the root server system. The website (http://root-servers.org/) run
> > by the root server operators could be more informative.
>
> Do note that, since there was no selection of the root name servers
> operators, there is a big diversity in transparency. F (ISC) and K
> (RIPE-NCC) are probably the most open. As Paul Vixie noticed in this
> thread, every root name server operator can disclose what he wants on
> its operations and noone can force it to publish anything on
> www.root-servers.org.

I wouldn't dream of forcing them, but they are reasonable folk, who
would probably not deal with this controversy.  Perhaps a lot of it
could have been avoided if they all were as open about their ops as F
and K.  A little education could still go a long way.

For instance, some of the rootops have virtual domains under root-servers.org.

http://d.root-servers.org/
http://e.root-servers.org/
http://f.root-servers.org/ (an alias)
http://h.root-servers.org/
etc.
Some are more informative than others, k.root-servers.org/ seems to be
most informative, and they have a cool clickable map..

--
Cheers,

McTim
nic-hdl:      TMCG

_______________________________________________
governance mailing list
governance at lists.cpsr.org
https://ssl.cpsr.org/mailman/listinfo/governance