[governance] oversight

[ian.peter at ianpeter.com]

Quoting Avri Doria <avri at acm.org>:

> Hi,
>
> While I support advocating audits and appeals mechanisms I would
> prefer not to call them oversight, but proper ICANN governance.
>
> I am dead set against the idea that 'all governments in oversight is
> better then one.'  One is hopefully a temporary thing that might pass
> in time, e.g. with a new US administration and a mature
> multistakeholder ICANN.  'all governments' would, to my mind, be a
> permanent evil.
>
> a.

i'm tending to agree with avri here but the devil really is in the detail and
you have to look at the whole structural proposal before dissecting one little
bit.

what's wrong with simply following IANA/ICANN recommendations as the default
action, (no government involvement needed as the default) with some sort of
appeal/oversight mechanism should the change be in dispute that might then
involve relevant governments or some body on which governments were 
represented
to their satisfaction?


>
> On 11 okt 2005, at 17.13, Milton Mueller wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> Vittorio Bertola <vb at bertola.eu.org> 10/11/2005 1:54 PM >>>
>>>>>
>>> I think that our only possible common objective is to have no
>>>
>> government
>>
>>> in charge of "DNS oversight" (that is, root zone file changes).
>>> Otherwise, we will part into those who say "USG oversight isn't that
>>>
>> bad
>>
>>> in practice" and those who say "USG oversight is unacceptable on a
>>> matter of principle", which are two non-reconcilable views.
>>>
>>
>> I think the only solution lies in one's definition of what is
>> "oversight." The IGP has addressed this months ago in its paper on
>> ICANN. If "oversight" means the kind of undefined, open-ended,
>> arbitrary
>> power the US currently holds, then it's no better, and may be worse,
>> when multiple governments hold it.
>>
>> If "oversight" means what it SHOULD mean, namely a kind of audit and
>> appeal power that prevents ICANN itself from abusing its authority,
>> then
>> of course it should be internationalized.
>>
>> The problem is one of institutional design - creating a limited,
>> lawful, rule-bound oversight procedure/authority that cannot devolve
>> into the kind of arbitrary top-down oversight council that some
>> governments are advocating.
>>
>> That said, if we can't get that, I think that "oversight by all
>> governments" still is much, much better than "oversight by one
>> government". And personally, I don't think that the particular country
>>
>> to which that one government belongs makes too much of a difference:
>> governments have different styles and ranges of censorship and
>> control,
>>
>> but all of them try to exert them.
>>
>> P.S. To Paul:
>>
>>> my employer (ISC, operator of F-root) is located in the United
>>>
>> States,
>>
>>> and yet i can't fathom the law or directive under which USG could
>>> successfuly demand or even ask that the servers responding to
>>> 192.5.5.241 and 2001:500::1035 be reconfigured.  perhaps if martial
>>> law were declared first, or something?
>>>
>>
>> There are plenty of technical parameters that are mandated by law,
>> usually through generic laws that say that devices of the X type have
>> to
>> abide by technical regulations approved by the Y institute, which in
>> turn mandate technicalities. For example, my cell phone is configured
>> to
>> use certain frequencies as per technical regulations ultimately
>> deriving
>> from laws. I don't see why there could not be a law that demands to a
>> given authority (say, ICANN) the authority to determine the root zone
>> that a DNS server must use to be legal.
>>
>> Then, of course, you can change the configuration to use a different
>> root zone, much like you can alter the frequency of a radio
>> transmitter
>>
>> and use a prohibited one... but if they get you, you'll be punished.
>> --
>> vb.             [Vittorio Bertola - v.bertola [a]
>> bertola.eu.org]<-----
>> http://bertola.eu.org/  <- Prima o poi...
>> _______________________________________________
>> governance mailing list
>> governance at lists.cpsr.org
>> https://ssl.cpsr.org/mailman/listinfo/governance
>> _______________________________________________
>> governance mailing list
>> governance at lists.cpsr.org
>> https://ssl.cpsr.org/mailman/listinfo/governance
>>
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> governance mailing list
> governance at lists.cpsr.org
> https://ssl.cpsr.org/mailman/listinfo/governance
>



_______________________________________________
governance mailing list
governance at lists.cpsr.org
https://ssl.cpsr.org/mailman/listinfo/governance