[governance] Maybe a snap shot of this IG debate?
Garth Graham
garth.graham at telus.net
Sun Oct 23 21:33:30 EDT 2005
For personal reasons, in order to gain an understanding of what the
conversation over approx the last 350 - 400 messages has been about,
I have extracted “content statements” from it and synthesized them
under the following headings:
A. General Principles guiding CS engagement with IG issues:
B. The “new model/mechanism of international public policy
cooperation and development” is:
C. How to make ICANN better:
D. Host Country Agreement
E. Political Oversight: Geneva Statement
F. Vittorio Bertola. Possible CS text on forum
G. UN Framework Convention on Internet Governance.
Given the imperfections of the filter (me!), I suspect that the key
contributors to this list (given their closeness to the issues) won’t
find this posting to be a useful contribution. But I also suspect
there may be some people on the list who might find any kind of
summary / overview to be a refuge of sorts in a hurricane of postings.
Garth Graham
Telecommunities Canada
Some personal observations in summary:
· 10% of subscribers to the list are contributing 90% of the
postings (although that’s not an unusual distribution)
· It took me a long time to understand the difference between IG as
an Internet culture issue and IG as a civil society issue. How and
where does the second consensus emerge?
· I am puzzled by the avoidance of an argument on what is
essential about TCP/IP that makes the “Internet” (not and object or
organization, but rules for a non-zero sum game) ungovernable in any
conventional sense of the word. If, as I believe, it’s THE point,
the fact of its being ignored is all the more reason to find a way to
restate it …maybe remind that the primary protocol remains – rough
consensus and run code?
A. General Principles guiding CS engagement with IG issues:
RFC 1591 - Domain Name System Structure and Delegation
3. The Administration of Delegated Domains
3.2 Concerns about "rights" and "ownership" of domains are
inappropriate. It is appropriate to be concerned about
"responsibilities" and "service" to the community.
Vittorio Bertola
Rather than agree to disagree on which is better or worse
· "one government (the US)"
· "all governments".
· "no governments")
We should focus on proposals on:
· how to make ICANN better
· how to make the [mechanism of cooperation] a success.
I think that one likely outcome is that they agree on the forum,
agree to disagree on the rest of section 5, and decide to use the
forum to continue the discussion. Not sure whether that would be
good: it would expose the forum too much and focus it on oversight
rather than on actual issues.
I've noticed that current options seem to disregard the WGIG report.
Perhaps a proposal more strictly modelled on the report (i.e.
actually drawing text from it) might be acceptable to many (apart of
course from the core oversight section).
US Senator Norm Coleman
October 17th, 2005 - Washington, D.C.— - Senator Norm Coleman today
introduced a Sense of the Senate Resolution to protect the U.S.’s
historic role in overseeing the operations of the Internet from an
effort to transfer control over the unprecedented
communications and informational medium to the U.N …
“There is no rational justification for politicizing Internet
governance within a U.N. framework,” said Coleman. “Nor is there a
rational basis for the anti-U.S. resentment driving the proposal.
Privatization, not politicization, is the Internet governance regime
that must be fostered and protected. At the World Summit next month,
the Internet is likely to face a grave threat. If we fail to respond
appropriately, we risk the freedom and enterprise fostered by this
informational marvel, and end up sacrificing access to information,
privacy, and protection of intellectual property we have all depended
on. This is not a risk I am prepared to take, which is why I
initiated action to respond on a Senate level to this danger.”
Adam Peake- Should we take it that the US has now definitely walked
away from its commitment to free ICANN from oversight if conditions
of the MoU were met
Joe Baptista
So we can say that the U.S. of A. controls either directly or
indirectly six of the root servers with J root having instances in 13
locations of which six are in foreign countries - i.e. outside the
U.S. … The remainder of the root server operators have no contracts
with anyone and are completely independent operators.
Why negotiate with people who have no control over root
infrastructure. The WSIS should bypass the institutions and go
directly to the points of control - i.e. the root operators
themselves. … Indeed I think the root operators world wide are ready
to negotiate some contractual provisions. The recent move of F root
server operator Paul Vixie to support an alternative root being the
orsn <www.orsn.org> is indicative they can be approached and
reasoned with.
At this time the Internets root infrastructure - which I remind all
of you IS NOT UNDER CONTRACT - is the point of control. Not the
United States government nor ICANN nor IANA. Deal with the source -
not the secondary issues. …, too much focus on a multitude of side
issues and not enough attention to the meaty issues - like the
question - who runs those root servers anyway?
What the world needs to do if you want to see governance save the day
is agree to a world wide version of RFC 1591. There is no actual
need for governance.
Danny Butt
… as the technical community always say, the people doing the work
should define the structure
….. in the interests of clarifying the scope of the CS docs, and
diplomacy, I prefer a constructive/propositional approach to non-
gov reform, and a critical/responsive approach to proposals
involving governments.
we …park the issue of GAC/governments in our statements, with "we
understand that there are a number of views within CS and the
internet community generally on the role of governments in the
internet governance process - we reiterate that these must be
assessed according to WSIS principles of [multistakeholder/access/
people-centred/ whatever agreed language]." …..we get on with the
other work, especially Jeanette's suggestions of:
· ICANN reform with the goal of multi-stakeholder composition
· Host country agreement
· Independent appeals body
· An auditing function
I'm having difficulty seeing the value of the "roadmap for USG face-
saving" being put into a civil society statement. The issue about
ccTLDs is basically intergovernmental, whereas the issues for civil
society are about equity and control more generally. I see no reason
to dilute the message from the beginning of Milton's statement: "No
single Government should have a pre-eminent role in relation to
international Internet governance." That was a multistakeholder
statement from WGIG, and watering that down to potentially appease a
phantom USG position would not send the kinds of messages that most
of the world outside the developed nations would like to see from
us. …. If we're going to be ignored, at least let it be as a public
conscience to the process, rather than as a weak 'player.' ….I think
that with the huge range of issues to cover in WSIS, our statements
should be a) short as possible and b) focussed around our areas of
responsibility.
Wolfgang Kleinwaechter
… the basic governance principle should be multistakeholderism. …the
majority of the "Internet Governance Issues" are non-ICANN issues and
need governmental involvement or even governmental leadership
(Cybercrime) …. The idea, to create "Civil Society" (and private
sector) Advisory Committees" for issues like Spam, eCommerce or
interconnection rates makes a lot of sense.
With regard to the authorization function, there should be no
governmental involvement. It should be full privatization with a
normal external audit. The conditions here are:
· a stable contractual relationship between ICANN, the TLD managers
and the root server operators
· a full and transparent multistakeholder procedure within ICANN,
· a clear and workable review process which guarantees the stability
and security of the DNS.
Laina Raveendran Greene
… Move away from a for or against ICANN, for or against
governments, for or against USG. Focus on what is needed to ensure a
more universal participation, legitimacy and accountability.
Some agreement on the principles "e.g."shared responsibility"
"transparency" "universal participation or inclusiveness" etc and
then agree to form an interim committee to work how to get this to
work OR agree to continue working on making ICANN include these
principles and manifest a more international inclusive structure.
Does any solution require an Executive agreement between the new body
and the USG, and what are the current forms of creating
"international bodies" in the US or outside for that matter.?
A California 501 (c) corporation, which ICANN is now alone is not
acceptable . … [But,] from the current deadlock, it appears that any
other country other than US will [also] not be acceptable. … Fix it
within ICANN [by creating] a mechanism to make it more independent
and international".
The Internet backbone issue … has more to do with the lack of peering
with people with lesser traffic patterns, and this issue happens not
just with US Internet backbone providers. Peering is unlike the
traditional telco international practice of sharing costs 50:50 and
settling by accounting rates. …[A need to distinguish] between telco
issues and liberalisation, universal access etc to reduce costs, and
the International Internet connectivity issues which involves issues
of national, regional and international peering and pricing
practices. … CS [should] push for overall goal of affordable and
equitable access, and state that it involves national, regional and
International Internet connectivity issues as well as telco
liberalisation and universal access issues as well.
Milton Mueller
If oversight means a sitting Council of govts that can poke its
fingers into ICANN whenever ICANN or other Internet actors do
something the Council members don't like, then I… we don't want it!
… [But] ICANN itself can be captured, can be indifferent to users
and individual rights, can ignore its own stated procedures, etc.
ICANN's "niceness" has been greatly enhanced by the threat of WSIS,
who knows what will happen once that threat is gone and it is cut
loose. So prima facie, there is aneed for ICANN "oversight." … The
concept of "oversight" has to be conceived in a way that makes its
purpose _the protection of the rights of the general population of
Internet users and suppliers_, not simply a matter of giving
governments their pound of flesh qua governments.
Explain to me how you privatize ICANN in any stable and long-term way
without also getting the rest of the world's governments to agree
that that is how things will be? ….. In other words, US-based
privatization does not really avoid the need for international
agreement on the idea.
The danger of ignoring the GAC problem is that US resistance to other
forms of changes in oversight all point toward strengthening the GAC.
Now unless someone can explain to me why governments are bad when
they are called an external "inter-governmental Council" and suddenly
become good when they are an internal "GAC", I don't think that is wise.
Jeanette Hofmann,
We want different layers of horizontal control. Taken together they
are as effective as some form of vertical accountability by an
intergovernmental body would be. The charming feature of our model
would be that it prevents abuse of political power: no single entity
in this structure should have enough authority to enforce policies
that are not based on consensus. So far, we have thought of roughly
three layers or mechanisms of control:
· A constitutional mechanims - implemented in a host country
agreement.
· A regular every day kind of mechanism - implemented in auditing
functions.
· A mechanism for exceptional cases - an *independent*, *multi-
stakeholder* appeals body.
Karen Banks
Many of our developing country colleagues are concerned that the
press is successfully propagating the notion that broad civil society
supports the US goverment in the WSIS - which is neither true, nor
helpful in closing the gaps that have emerged in IG between north and
south
Adam Peake
[Re] Chapter 3. 45 c.) “Civil society has also played an important
role on Internet matters, especially at community level, and should
continue to play such a role;"
In Geneva the EU proposed deleting "especially at community level".
In one of our interventions (ignored by govt.) we asked it be changed
to:
"Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters.
This role has ranged from capacity building at the community level to
the contribution of much of the technological innovation and to the
creation of much of the content that makes the Internet what it is
today. Civil Society should continue to play such a role."
Think we might have more luck supporting the simpler EU suggestion.
I think the question we need to answer is what does ICANN need from a
host country agreement and why? Could the US supply such an agreement
if immunities (from what?) were guaranteed?
[The root servers} are global, so how could a single govt control
their operation. No one controls their operation now. The USG does
have control (potential) over the root zone, etc., but that could be
dealt with by changes to the IANA contract rather than a host
country agreement . … I saw some kind of host country agreement more
as a way to inoculate ICANN from trade-related discrimination from
domestic laws on sanctions, etc.
I'd like to understand what it is we need a "host country agreement"
to free ICANN from, and whether it's actually a host country
agreement in the accepted sense (signed to release diplomats from
parking ticket fines etc :-) or something else. ICANN doesn't need
diplomatic immunity, it needs to be able to conduct is operations
globally without any restriction (potential or real) by US domestic
law.
If the US agrees to make a statement and commitments then the EU and
some others might reasonably drop requests for greater govt
involvement and oversight of the DNS, leaving that discussion until
the establishment of the forum (when nations might be able to speak
for themselves and not under EU consensus. And giving the forum and
issue of importance to kick off with.) It might be enough to say
that progress has been made, everyone reassured and the opportunity
for meaningful further debate exists.
Nothing I am suggesting is intended to be a retreat from our position
regarding the need to end the USG's preeminent role in global
governance of logical infrastructure. As far as I am concerned our
position's pretty much the same as it was when we responded to the
WGIG report <http://www.net-gov.org/files/co55.pdf> (see para 50-63).
The suggestion that the US government make a statement saying it
would not abuse the root zone/take unilateral action is in there (I
know, I suggested it...). Language about a host country agreement is
also in there. What's changed recently is we have tried better
understand what this suggestion about a host country agreement means
and if there are alternatives/improvements, etc.
….. I've no interest in saving the US govt's face -- I want civil
society to have a chance of seeing its positions adopted
Lee W. McKnight
A multistakeholder-led and balanced framework convention on the other
hand, would be a whole new beast. Probably, it would have to be at
least partially outside the state-centric UN system. Even conceding
that point will of course be difficult, but if that is not conceded
then I for one definitely don’t want to go to that party. There
will be interim patches and fixes and upgrades along the way, but
definitely it would be dangerous to rush into a new international
regime for the Internet. … USG acceptance of a new Internet regime
will not come fast, and the rules of the game will continue to
change. And yes Congress will get in on the Act. … So […] a
'lightweight' host country agreement specifying terms , and
negotiated between Commerce/NTIA & ICANN, with the rest of the world
looking over both parties shoulders, is probably still needed.
… Focus focus focus on text CS wants.
McTim
[We should] feel warm and fuzzy knowing that many orgs operate bits
of the infrastructure independent of a central authority but in close
cooperation to accomplish goal of stability.
I think the USG will accept changes as long as it is done inside the
current IG mechanisms and is better than what we have now.
I really liked the Canadian Forum proposal. It totally addressed the
key issue from my
perspective (capacity-building).
Avi Doria
ICANN has shown that is interested in what others have to say and
that it will consider changes if good reasons can be found for
reasonable suggestions. so yes i believe it is possible that ICANN
will consider [WSIS outcomes] as part of a post MOU plan.
Ian Peter
[Make Chapter 3, Sec 53] read:
"We recognise the need for development of further development of public
policies for the root zone system and generic top level domains"
I believe the best future for the authorisation function currently
undertaken by USG is for it to disappear in favour of clear
procedures and policies for changes that governments are prepared to
accept. In other words, the IANA/ICANN process determines changes
with all stakeholders involved. Period.
It looks as if we may have to rely on the forum as a mechanism to
move things forward. WSIS has refined the debate on governance
somewhat but is unlikely to resolve it. This what the bit of the
Chair's paper I liked - resolve the governance issue at the end of a
transition period, not now. ….. That might gain general acceptance
(even from USG) if well worded. I appreciate [the]comments that this
shifts the emphasis of the forum from a range of issues to a narrow
focus on governance, but that doesn't have to be the case.
Danny Younger
ICANN has already reported that they review their jurisdiction on an
annual basis. From the first iteration of the ICANN Strategic Plan:
"ICANN is currently incorporated under Californian lawand has tax-
exempt status as a non-profit, public benefit corporation under U.S.
Internal Revenue Code s 501(c)(3). Under that provision, the tax-
exempt status must be reviewed annually, which also provides the
opportunity to re-examine both ICANN’s corporate structure and the
jurisdiction under which it resides. The June 2004 review concluded
that there was no advantage to changing ICANN’s corporate status at
this time. The review, in conjunction with the review of ICANN’s
revenue sources in preparation for this strategic plan has allowed
for consideration of many alternatives to best prepare a solid future
for ICANN as a global organisation."
"Articulating a vision of the future of the Internet that places
PRIVATIZATION (emphasis
added) over politicization with respect to the Internet" …seems like
an effort to shift the debate away from the "1 nation vs. many
nations" to Internet governance by the private sector as originally
intended in the DOC MOU.
Jim Fleming
Be liberal in what you send and conservative in what you *receive* -
you may spark an idea in an open mind and don't expect to *receive*
any money for it.
B. The “new model/mechanism of international public policy
cooperation and development” is:
- A forum (see, for example, Vittorio Bertola. Possible CS text on
forum. October 20, 2005, below)
- An international government involvement at the level of principles
over [a list of essential tasks]
- A multistakeholder-led and balanced framework / convention
- A document (a mixture between a treaty and a contract) signed by
governments as well as by the private sector and civil society
- A convention that is formally binding, not just an open
declaration of principles (see,for example, Willie Currie. Sense of
the Senate Resolution, October 21, 2005, below)
- An MoU signed both by governmental and non-governmental entities
- A general agreement that involves the entire private sector and
civil society
- Insurance of a more universal participation, legitimacy and
accountability
- IF the move of WSIS is going along the compromise of keeping
stability on resource mangement, and thus working on improving ICANN
for resource management (leaving other issues under the followup and
implementation process) as opposed to create something new, then we
should look a little closer into the concept introduced by the IG
caucus on "host country agreement".
- Suggest a non-WSIS solution. … a forum that US can agree to.
a set of enforceable rules regulating ICANN. And for those rules to
be truly enforceable, a significant number of the world's governments
have to agree on them.
- Not oversight, just RFC 1591 - which means recognizing that once a
label is used it should not be collided with. The only oversight you
need is a means for people and companies to register those names, and
then you leave them alone. … What we need are binding root operator
contracts. Or else a new way of distributing the root zone and
sharing access to it.
- It makes no sense to recoil in horror from intergovernmental
Councils with some kind of oversight role, when there is already an
intergovernmental incubus, [the GAC], right there inside ICANN, one
that is highly likely to be strengthened.
- The Independent Appeals process: Something like a WTO or ICC-like
dispute resolution process might be a model. But then we are back to
intergovernmentalism.
- The GAC is basically attempting to be an intergovernmental
mechanism without the representativeness or resource support that
proper intergovernmental organisations have to ensure e.g. developing
country participation. So it's really a worst of both worlds.
- The other" big question: how to establish a reasonably
representative multistakeholder executive group which, to say the
least, is not perpetual? We are talking about 240+ nations (or at
least TLDs...), dozens of constituencies ….
- The relation of ISOC/IETF and ITU is not one of competition. There
are regular contacts between both orgs, in an effort to coordinate
the development of new standards
C. How to make ICANN better:
- Contracts related to the management of the root zone
- A host country agreement (HCA) to prevent the country where it has
its seat from controlling the global root servers and other Internet
resources, and to should prevent that country from discriminating
access to those global resources and to their administration
move the legal seat of the corporation or change its legal form
- Independent appeals body
- An external auditing function
- Full privatization
- Define exactly what “oversight” means
- GAC should clarifyits status and procedures (including membership)
and re-arrange its relationship with the ICANN Board , depending on
where the borderline between "the level of principle" and the "day to
day operation" is.
- A clear and workable review process which guarantees the stability
and security of the DNS
- Suggest text at WSIS on what the US should do to make ICANN an
"international body"
- Ask for something to be done when the new ICANN MOU is being
negotiated.
- The GAC reform would include that the GAC constitutes an own legal
basis, outside of the ICANN bylaws but linked to ICANN via a MoU,
which could be part of the ICANN bylaws.
- Political Oversight: Geneva Statement on behalf of the Civil
Society Internet Governance Caucus, 29.09.05 (see in full below)
- The US government make a "formal and explicit commitment that it
will take no action to unilaterally remove a ccTLD from the root,
alter ccTLD root zone files, or contradict or veto root zone file
alterations approved by independent and legitimate ICANN processes."
- Get USG out of the root and I believe we have a good system
government by checks and balances in a transformed ICANN).
- One option for a facility to house an alternate distribution
masterwould be having an organization other than ICANN operate it,
therebyproviding organizational diversity for the operation of the
zone-distribution function. This diversity would ensure that the
function of a distribution master would be available not only in the
event of a technical failure of the primary systems, but also in the
event of an organizational failure of ICANN itself.
- The most recent IANA functions purchase contract was tendered as a
matter of sole-source provisioning. …propose that the USG
engage in a open bidding process on a $0 contract with respect to
the IANA functions when the current contract expires.
D. Host Country Agreement
"We recommend that ICANN is shielded from unilateral interference by
the government of the country who hosts it, through appropriate
international law instruments such as a "host country agreement".
Such agreement should ensure that decisions taken by ICANN cannot be
overturned by the local government, and that all countries and
stakeholders have the opportunity to access the resources managed by
ICANN and to participate in its Internet Governance processes,
without being affected by the policies of the local government."
Vittorio Bertola
How about:
"Appropriate commitments by a host government should provide
privileges and immunities to ICANN to ensure that it is able to
provide global service in accordance with its bylaws and mission.
Such binding commitments should ensure that:
* decisions taken by ICANN cannot be overturned by any single
government;
* all countries and stakeholders have the opportunity to access the
resources managed by ICANN and its related entities;
* ICANN is able to enter into commercial and other agreements in
keeping with requirements of its bylaws and mission, enabling it to
provide and receive DNS services globally, and
* all stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in ICANN's
Internet governance processes, without being affected by the policies
of any single government." Adam Peake
E. Political Oversight: Geneva Statement on behalf of the Civil
Society Internet Governance Caucus, 29.09.05
We recognize that the time has come for a change in the political
oversight of the logical Internet infrastructure. We do not recommend
the creation of a new inter-governmental oversight organization for
domain names and IP addresses. However, we do recommend the
following changes with regard to ICANN be implemented within a
reasonable time frame:
1. The US Government recommits to handing over its pre-eminent role
of stewardship in relation to ICANN and the DNS root.
2. ICANN must ensure full and equal multi-stakeholder participation
on its Board, and throughout its organizational structures of the
community of Internet users, national governments, civil society, the
technical community, business associations, non profit
organizations and non-business organizations. Particular attention
should be paid to developing country's participation.
3. ICANN must ensure that it establishes clear, transparent rules
and procedures commensurate with international norms and principles
for fair administrative decision-making to provide for predictable
policy outcomes.
4. There should be a process for extraordinary appeal of ICANN'S
decisions in the form of an independent multi-stakeholder review
commission invoked on a case-by-case basis.
Note: Just to be clear, we are not calling for an inter-governmental
oversight structure, and we don't see an independent review process
as a path towards that direction.
5. ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to
replace its California Incorporation, being careful to retain those
aspects of its California Incorporation that enhance its
accountability to the global Internet user community.
6. ICANN's decisions, and any host country agreement, must be
required to comply with public policy requirements negotiated
through international treaties in regard to, inter alia, human
rights treaties, privacy rights, gender agreements and trade rules.
7. Governments, individuals, and international organizations,
including NGOs, would have the right and responsibility of bringing
violations of these requirements to the attention of ICANN and if
satisfactory resolution cannot be reached using ICANN internal
processes, should have the right to invoke a binding appeals process.
8. Once all of the above conditions are met, the US Government shall
transfer the IANA function to ICANN.
9. It is expected that the International multi-stakeholder community
will take part in the process through participation in the ICANN
process. It is also expected that the multi-stakeholder community
will observe and comment on the progress made in this process
through the proposed Forum.
F. Vittorio Bertola. Possible CS text on forum. October 20, 2005
1. We recognize the lack of a global multi-stakeholder forum to
address Internet-related public policy issues. Thus we commit to the
creation of such a space for dialogue among all stakeholders
(hereafter referred to as “the forum”). [WGIG para 40]
2. Such forum should allow for the participation of all stakeholders
from developing and developed countries on an equal footing, and
foster full participation in Internet governance arrangements by
developing countries. Balance and diversity of participation as
regards, inter alia, geography, language, culture, gender,
professional background, should be ensured. [WGIG para 41-43]
3. Such forum should be open to all stakeholders from all
countries; any stakeholder could bring up any Internet governance
issue. It could assume, inter alia, the following functions:
· Interface with intergovernmental bodies and other institutions on
matters under their purview which are relevant to Internet
governance, such as IPR, e-commerce, trade in services and
· Internet/telecommunications convergence.
· Identify emerging issues and bring them to the attention of the
appropriate bodies and make recommendations.
· Address issues that are not being dealt with elsewhere and make
proposals for action, as appropriate.
· Connect different bodies involved in Internet management where
necessary.
· Contribute to capacity-building for Internet governance for
developing countries, drawing fully on local sources of knowledge
and expertise.
· Promote and assess on an ongoing basis the embodiment of WSIS
principles in Internet governance processes. It should start its work
by also addressing the issues and recommendations identified by the
WGIG in its report. [WGIG para 45]
4. Such forum should operate through public consultations open to
all stakeholders, similar to the open consultations of the WGIG
process, and make extensive use of online instruments for remote
participation. It should be supported by a very lightweight
Secretariat and coordinated by a multi-stakeholder Executive Group,
whose members would serve as peers in individual capacity. Overlap or
duplication with existing institutions should be avoided and the best
possible use should be made of research and work carried out by
others. [WGIG para 46 revised]
5. We ask to the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint
an initial Secretariat and Executive Group so that the forum can be
convened in 2006. [WGIG para 44 turned into practice]
Izumi Aizu
I see some need for some mechanism that sets up and operates this
forum. … It may be more helpful to think it as a process, similar to
WGIG's formation:
First, a "light" secretariat will start to coordinate, making open
consultation rounds for a while, say 3 or 4 months, propose draft
charter or blue-print of the mission, working methods and composition
of this Forum, including financial and other logistics.
Second, another round of open consultation about this draft plan,
listen and then make final recommendation to UN SG (or any
alternative). Another 3 or 4 months, at least, perhaps.
Then according to the consensus made through this consultation
process, the Forum will start its work.
In other words, until it starts, no one group owns it, the process is
open and the secretariat makes sure it is open, and they do not make
decisions by themselves. … It is a kind of "self-organizing" process.
Vittorio Bertola
I[ am ] afraid of a process that does *not* have a clearly defined
executive group, with guarantees of inclusiveness and
"multistakeholderness". …This group should not be imposed top-down,
should not restrain free participation and self-determination of
agenda and consensus, etc. .. But, at the same time, there needs to
be some clear and fair decision making structure - otherwise
decisions (even practical ones: rules of procedure, for example) will
be made in unclear and unfair ways.
Jeanette Hofmann
We have rarely done things without closely cooperating with others
[for example] on this list. An executive committee would
fundamentally change the dynamics of this list space. It would push
people on a backseat who actively contribute when they feel they have
something to say.
G. UN Framework Convention on Internet Governance.
This may be a good time to revisit the issue of a UN Framework
Convention on Internet Governance. Willie Currie. Sense of the
Senate Resolution, October 21, 2005
Building on the Internet Governance Project's concept paper: A
Framework Convention: An Institutional Option for Internet Governance
and the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, a
Convention on Internet Governance could contain:
1. A definition of the Internet, the governance problem and its
boundaries.
2. The norms that should be applied to Internet governance, such as
freedom of expression, unimpeded access, right to privacy, control of
spam, universal Internet access on a single root, principles for
equitable distribution of interconnection costs, capacity building etc.
3. Agreements on when negotiations should take place, which could
lead to additional legal agreements in the form of protocols to the
Convention.
4. Explicit empowerment of the meetings of the States party to the
Convention to provide oversight over a limited set of Internet-
related issues that are deemed appropriate for governance. This could
include the question of ICANN's position, roles and responsibilities.
5. Explicit mandatory guidelines on public participation in decision-
making regarding policy-making on the Internet with respect to
global, regional and national institutions, which would include the
participation of civil society and the private sector.
6. Explicit mandatory guidelines for administrative decisions made by
any global, regional and national institution responsible for
Internet governance to be subject to judicial review at the instance
of any person affected by the decision. This would guarantee access
to administrative justice regarding the governance of the Internet.
Why raise this now? It is unlikely that any agreement on oversight
will be reached in Tunis. The forum has already been seen (by the
Economist) as a convenient parking space for neutralising any real
change with respect to Internet Governance. So it may time to take
the process beyond WSIS.
……………… end …………………..
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