[bestbits] ICANN and Jurisdiction

Wed Jun 29 07:57:47 EDT 2016

Hi Pranesh, although I am no lawyer, I am *very* interested in this.
Will read your piece ASAP and get back with some ideas.

frt rgds

--c.a.

On 29-06-16 12:12, Pranesh Prakash wrote:
> Dear all,
> I'd posted about the need for civil society to raise the issue of
> jurisdiction (as civil society actors did in the 2000s) earlier on this
> list, but it didn't get many responses.  I've written a longer piece
> about this to explain why I feel it is important.  I believe this topic
> merits a longer discussion within civil society.
> 
> My piece can be accessed here:
> http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann
> 
> 
> Regards,
> Pranesh
> 
> 
> 
> Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN
> ======================================
> 
> In March 2014, the [US government announced] that they were going to end
> the contract they have with ICANN to run the [Internet Assigned Numbers
> Authority] (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder
> community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come
> through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the
> global Internet community”.
> 
> Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?
> ------------------------------------------------------
> 
> The main reason for the U.S. government’s action is that it will get rid
> of a political thorn in the U.S. government’s side: keeping the contract
> allows them to be called out as having a special role in Internet
> governance (with the Affirmation of Commitments between the U.S.
> Department of Commerce and ICANN, the IANA contract, and the cooperative
> agreement with Verisign), and engaging in unilateralism with regard to
> the operation of the root servers of the Internet naming system, while
> repeatedly declaring that they support a multistakeholder model of
> Internet governance.
> 
> This contradiction is what they are hoping to address. Doing away with
> the NTIA contract will also increase — ever so marginally — ICANN’s
> global legitimacy: this is something that world governments, civil
> society organizations, and some American academics have been asking for
> nearly since ICANN’s inception in 1998. For instance, here are some
> demands made [in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance
> Caucus at WSIS, in 2005]:
> 
>> “ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace
>> its California Incorporation, being careful to retain those aspects of
>> its California Incorporation that enhance its accountability to the
>> global Internet user community.”ICANN’s decisions, and any host
>> country agreement, must be required to comply with public policy
>> requirements negotiated through international treaties in regard to,
>> inter alia, human rights treaties, privacy rights, gender agreements
>> and trade rules. … “It is also expected that the multi-stakeholder
>> community will observe and comment on the progress made in this
>> process through the proposed \[Internet Governance\] Forum.”
> 
> In short: the objective of the transition is political, [not technical].
> In an ideal world, we *should* aim at reducing U.S. state control over
> the core of the Internet’s domain name system.[^1]
> 
> It is our contention that **U.S. state control over the core of the
> Internet’s domain name system is *not* being removed** by the transition
> that is currently underway.
> 
> Why is the Transition Happening Now?
> ------------------------------------
> 
> Despite the U.S. government having given commitments in the past that
> were going to finish the IANA transition by “September 30, 2000”, (the
> [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses] states: “The
> U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete before the
> year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is established and
> operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is intended to be, and remains,
> an ‘outside’ date.”) and later by “fall of 2006”,[^2] those turned out
> to be empty promises. However, this time, the transition seems to be
> going through, unless the U.S. Congress manages to halt it.
> 
> However, in order to answer the question of “why now?” fully, one has to
> look a bit at the past.
> 
> In 1998, through the [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and
> Addresses] the U.S. government [asserted it’s control over the root],
> and asserted — some would say arrogated to itself — the power to put out
> contracts for both the IANA functions as well as the ‘A’ Root (i.e., the
> Root Zone Maintainer function that Network Solutions Inc. then
> performed, and continues to perform to date in its current avatar as
> Verisign). The IANA functions contract — a periodically renewable
> contract — was awarded to ICANN, a California-based non-profit
> corporation that was set up exclusively for this purpose, but which
> evolved around the existing IANA (to placate the Internet Society).
> 
> Meanwhile, of course, there were criticisms of ICANN from multiple
> foreign governments and civil society organizations. Further, despite it
> being a California-based non-profit on contract with the government,
> domestically within the U.S., there was pushback from constituencies
> that felt that more direct U.S. control of the DNS was important.
> 
> As Goldsmith and Wu summarize:
> 
>> “Milton Mueller and others have shown that ICANN’s spirit of
>> “self-regulation” was an appealing label for a process that could be
>> more accurately described as the U.S. government brokering a
>> behind-the-scenes deal that best suited its policy preferences … the
>> United States wanted to ensure the stability of the Internet, to fend
>> off the regulatory efforts of foreign governments and international
>> organizations, and to maintain ultimate control. The easiest way to do
>> that was to maintain formal control while turning over day-to-day
>> control of the root to ICANN and the Internet Society, which had close
>> ties to the regulation-shy American technology industry.” \[footnotes
>> omitted\]
> 
> And that brings us to the first reason that the NTIA announced the
> transition in 2014, rather than earlier.
> 
> ### ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough
> 
> The NTIA now sees ICANN as being mature enough: the final transition was
> announced 16 years after ICANN’s creation, and complaints about ICANN
> and its legitimacy had largely died down in the international arena in
> that while. Nowadays, governments across the world send their
> representatives to ICANN, thus legitimizing ICANN. States have largely
> been satisfied by participating in the Government Advisory Council,
> which, as its name suggests, only has advisory powers. Further, unlike
> in the early days, there is [no serious push for states assuming control
> of ICANN]. Of course they grumble about the ICANN Board not following
> their advice, but no government, as far as I am aware, has walked out or
> refused to participate.
> 
> ### L’affaire Snowden
> 
> Many within the United States, and some without, believe that the United
> States not only plays an exceptional role to play in the running of the
> Internet — by dint of historical development and dominance of American
> companies — but that *it ought to* have an exceptional role because it
> is the best country to exercise ‘oversight’ over ‘the Internet’ (often
> coming from [clueless commentators]), and from dinosaurs of the Internet
> era, like [American IP lawyers] and [American ‘homeland’ security
> hawks], Jones Day, who are ICANN’s lawyers, and other [jingoists] and
> those policymakers who are controlled by these narrow-minded interests.
> 
> The Snowden revelations were, in that way, a godsend for the NTIA, as it
> allowed them a fig-leaf of [international][] [criticism][] [with which]
> to counter these domestic critics and carry on with a transition that
> they have been seeking to put into motion for a while. The Snowden
> revelations led Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, to state in
> September 2013, at the 68th U.N. General Assembly, that Brazil would
> “present proposals for the establishment of a [civilian multilateral
> framework for the governance and use of the Internet]”, and as [Diego
> Canabarro] points out this catalysed the U.S. government and the
> technical community into taking action.
> 
> Given this context, a few months after the Snowden revelations, the
> so-called [I\* organizations] met — seemingly with the blessing of the
> U.S. government[^3] — in Montevideo, and put out a [‘Statement on the
> Future of Internet Governance’] that sought to link the Snowden
> revelations on pervasive surveillance with the need to urgently
> transition the IANA stewardship role away from the U.S. government. Of
> course, the signatories to that statement knew fully well, as did most
> of the readers of that statement, that there is no linkage between the
> Snowden revelations about pervasive surveillance and the operations of
> the DNS root, but still they, and others, linked them together.
> Specifically, the I\* organizations called for “accelerating the
> globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in
> which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an
> equal footing.”
> 
> One could posit the existence of two other contributing factors as well.
> 
> Given political realities in the United States, a transition of this
> sort is probably best done before an ultra-jingoistic President steps
> into office.
> 
> Lastly, the ten-yearly review of the World Summit on Information Society
> was currently underway. At the original WSIS (as seen from the civil
> society quoted above) the issue of US control over the root was a major
> issue of contention. At that point (and during where the 2006 date for
> globalization of ICANN was emphasized by the US government).
> 
> Why Jurisdiction is Important
> -----------------------------
> 
> Jurisdiction has a great many aspects. *Inter alia*, these are:
> 
> -   Legal sanctions applicable to changes in the root zone (for
> instance, what happens if a country under US sanctions requests a change
> to the root zone file?)
> -   Law applicable to resolution of contractual disputes with
> registries, registrars, etc.
> -   Law applicable to labour disputes.
> -   Law applicable to competition / antitrust law that applies to ICANN
> policies and regulations.
> -   Law applicable to disputes regarding ICANN decisions, such as
> allocation of gTLDs, or non-renewal of a contract.
> -   Law applicable to consumer protection concerns.
> -   Law applicable to financial transparency of the organization.
> -   Law applicable to corporate condition of the organization, including
> membership rights.
> -   Law applicable to data protection-related policies & regulations.
> -   Law applicable to trademark and other speech-related policies &
> regulations.
> -   Law applicable to legal sanctions imposed by a country against another.
> 
> Some of these, but not all, depend on where bodies like ICANN (the
> policy-making body), the IANA functions operator (the proposed
> “Post-Transition IANA”, insofar as the names function is concerned), and
> the root zone maintainer are incorporated or maintain their primary
> office, while others depend on the location of the office \[for
> instance, Turkish labour law applies for the ICANN office in Istanbul\],
> while yet others depend on what’s decided by ICANN in contracts (for
> instance, the resolution of contractual disputes with ICANN, filing of
> suits with regard to disputes over new generic TLDs, etc.).
> 
> However, an issue like sanctions, for instance, depends on where
> ICANN/PTI/RMZ are incorporated and maintain their primary office.
> 
> As [Milton Mueller notes], the current IANA contract “requires ICANN to
> be incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA
> functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides
> America with greater political influence over ICANN.”
> 
> He further notes that:
> 
>> While it is common to assert that the U.S. has never abused its
>> authority and has always taken the role of a neutral steward, this is
>> not quite true. During the controversy over the .xxx domain, the Bush
>> administration caved in to domestic political pressure and threatened
>> to block entry of the domain into the root if ICANN approved it
>> (Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, 2010). It took five
>> years, an independent review challenge and the threat of litigation
>> from a businessman willing to spend millions to get the .xxx domain
>> into the root.
> 
> Thus it is clear that even if the NTIA’s role in the IANA contract goes
> away, jurisdiction remains an important issue.
> 
> U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction
> --------------------------------
> 
> In March 2014, when NTIA finally announced that they would hand over the
> reins to “the global multistakeholder community”. They’ve laid down two
> procedural condition: that it be developed by stakeholders across the
> global Internet community and have broad community consensus, and they
> have proposed 5 substantive conditions that any proposal must meet:
> 
> -   Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
> -   Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;
> -   Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners
> of the IANA services; and,
> -   Maintain the openness of the Internet.
> -   Must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is
> government-led or an inter-governmental organization.
> 
> In that announcement there is no explicit restriction on the
> jurisdiction of ICANN (whether it relate to its incorporation, the
> resolution of contractual disputes, resolution of labour disputes,
> antitrust/competition law, tort law, consumer protection law, privacy
> law, or speech law, and more, all of which impact ICANN and many, but
> not all, of which are predicated on the jurisdiction of ICANN’s
> incorporation), the jurisdiction(s) of the IANA Functions Operator(s)
> (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to
> obey), and the jurisdiction of the Root Zone Maintainer (i.e., which
> executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey).
> 
> However, Mr. Larry Strickling, the head of the NTIA, in his [testimony
> before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology],
> made it clear that,
> 
>> “Frankly, if \[shifting ICANN or IANA jurisdiction\] were being
>> proposed, I don’t think that such a proposal would satisfy our
>> criteria, specifically the one that requires that security and
>> stability be maintained.”
> 
> Possibly, that argument made sense in 1998, due to the significant
> concentration of DNS expertise in the United States. However, in 2015,
> that argument is hardly convincing, and is frankly laughable.[^4]
> 
> Targetting that remark, in ICANN 54 at Dublin, we asked Mr. Strickling:
> 
>> “So as we understand it, the technical stability of the DNS doesn’t
>> necessarily depend on ICANN’s jurisdiction being in the United States.
>> So I wanted to ask would the US Congress support a multistakeholder
>> and continuing in the event that it’s shifting jurisdiction.”
> 
> Mr. Strickling’s response was:
> 
>> “No. I think Congress has made it very clear and at every hearing they
>> have extracted from Fadi a commitment that ICANN will remain
>> incorporated in the United States. Now the jurisdictional question
>> though, as I understand it having been raised from some other
>> countries, is not so much jurisdiction in terms of where ICANN is
>> located. It’s much more jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes.
>>
>> “And that I think is an open issue, and that’s an appropriate one to
>> be discussed. And it’s one I think where ICANN has made some movement
>> over time anyway.
>>
>> “So I think you have to … when people use the word jurisdiction, we
>> need to be very precise about over what issues because where disputes
>> are resolved and under what law they’re resolved, those are separate
>> questions from where the corporation may have a physical headquarters.”
> 
> As we have shown above, jurisdiction is not only about the jurisdiction
> of “resolution of disputes”, but also, as Mueller reminds us, about the
> requirement that ICANN (and now, the PTI) be “incorporated in, maintain
> a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This
> makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater
> political influence over ICANN.”
> 
> In essence, the U.S. government has essentially said that they would
> veto the transition if the jurisdiction of ICANN or PTI’s incorporation
> were to move out of the U.S., and they can prevent that from happening
> *after* the transition, since as things stand ICANN and PTI will still
> come within the U.S. Congress’s jurisdiction.
> 
> Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?
> ------------------------------------------------
> 
> Will the ICG proposal or the proposed new ICANN by-laws reduce existing
> U.S. control? No, they won’t. (In fact, as we will argue below, the
> proposed new ICANN by-laws make this problem even worse.) The proposal
> by the names community (“the CWG proposal”) still has a requirement (in
> Annex S) that the Post-Transition IANA (PTI) be incorporated in the
> United States, and a similar suggestion hidden away as a footnote.
> Further, the proposed by-laws for ICANN include the requirement that PTI
> be a California corporation. There was no discussion specifically on
> this issue, nor any documented community agreement on the specific issue
> of jurisdiction of PTI’s incorporation.
> 
> Why wasn’t there greater discussion and consideration of this issue?
> Because of two reasons: First, there were many that argued that the
> transition would be vetoed by the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress
> if ICANN and PTI were not to remain in the U.S. Secondly, the
> ICANN-formed ICG saw the US government’s actions very narrowly, as
> though the government were acting in isolation, ignoring the rich
> dialogue and debate that’s gone on earlier about the transition since
> the incorporation of ICANN itself.
> 
> While it would be no one’s case that political considerations should be
> given greater weightage than technical considerations such as security,
> stability, and resilience of the domain name system, it is shocking that
> political considerations have been completely absent in the discussions
> in the number and protocol parameters communities, and have been
> extremely limited in the discussions in the names community. This is
> even more shocking considering that the main reason for this transition
> is, as has been argued above, political.
> 
> It can be also argued that the certain IANA functions such as Root Zone
> Management function have a considerable political implication. It is
> imperative that the political nature of the function is duly
> acknowledged and dealt with, in accordance with the wishes of the global
> community. In the current process the political aspects of the IANA
> function has been completely overlooked and sidelined. It is important
> to note that this transition has not been a necessitated by any
> technical considerations. It is primarily motivated by political and
> legal considerations. However, the questions that the ICG asked the
> customer communities to consider were solely technical. Indeed, the
> communities could have chosen to overlook that, but they did not choose
> to do so. For instance, while the IANA customer community proposals
> reflected on existing jurisdictional arrangements, they did not reflect
> on how the jurisdictional arrangements should be post-transition , while
> this is one of the questions at the heart of the entire transition.
> There were no discussions and decisions as to the jurisdiction of the
> Post-Transition IANA: the Accountability CCWG’s lawyers, Sidley Austin,
> recommended that the PTI ought to be a California non-profit
> corporation, and this finds mention in a footnote without even having
> been debated by the “global multistakeholder community”, and
> subsequently in the proposed new by-laws for ICANN.
> 
> Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why “Work Stream 2” Can’t Address
> Most Jurisdiction Issues
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> The by-laws could have chosen to simply stayed silent on the matter of
> what law PTI would be incorporated under, but instead the by-law make
> the requirement of PTI being a California non-profit public benefit
> corporation part of the *fundamental by-laws*, which are close to
> impossible to amend.
> 
> While “Work Stream 2” (the post-transition work related to improving
> ICANN’s accountability) has jurisdiction as a topic of consideration,
> the scope of that must necessarily discount any consideration of
> shifting the jurisdiction of incorporation of ICANN, since all of the
> work done as part of CCWG Accountability’s “Work Stream 1”, which are
> now reflected in the proposed new by-laws, assume Californian
> jurisdiction (including the legal model of the “Empowered Community”).
> Is ICANN prepared to re-do all the work done in WS1 in WS2 as well? If
> the answer is yes, then the issue of jurisdiction can actually be
> addressed in WS2. If the answer is no — and realistically it is — then,
> the issue of jurisdiction can only be very partially addressed in WS2.
> 
> Keeping this in mind, we recommended specific changes in the by-laws,
> all of which were rejected by CCWG’s lawyers.
> 
> The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement
> --------------------------------------------------
> 
> The [NETmundial Multistakeholder Document], which was an outcome of the
> NETmundial process, states:
> 
>> In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US
>> Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of
>> IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the
>> transparency and accountability of those functions after the US
>> Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with
>> the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN
>> community
>>
>> \[…\]
>>
>> It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up
>> leading to a truly international and global organization serving the
>> public interest with clearly implementable and verifiable
>> accountability and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements
>> from both internal stakeholders and the global community.
>>
>> The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN structure
>> from all regions is a key issue in the process of a successful
>> globalization.
> 
> As our past analysis has shown, the IANA transition process and the
> discussions on the mailing lists that shaped it [were neither global nor
> multistakeholder]. The DNS industry represented in ICANN is largely
> US-based. 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America,
> whereas less than 1% of ICANN-registered registrars are from Africa.
> Two-thirds of the Business Constituency in ICANN is from the USA. While
> ICANN-the-corporation has sought to become more global, the ICANN
> community has remained insular, and this will not change until the
> commercial interests involved in ICANN can become more diverse,
> reflecting the diversity of users of the Internet, and a TLD like .COM
> can be owned by a non-American corporation and the PTI can be a
> non-American entity.
> 
> What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience
> ---------------------------------------
> 
> It is no one’s case that the United States is less fit than any other
> country as a base for ICANN, PTI, or the Root Zone Maintainer, or even
> as the headquarters for 9 of the world’s 12 root zone operators
> (Verisign runs both the A and J root servers). However, just as having
> multiplicity of root servers is important for ensuring technical
> resilience of the DNS system (and this is shown in the uptake of Anycast
> by root server operators), it is equally important to have immunity of
> core DNS functioning from political pressures of the country or
> countries where core DNS infrastructure is legally situated and to
> ensure that we have diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction.
> 
> Towards this end, we at CIS have pushed for the concept of
> “jurisdictional resilience”, encompassing three crucial points:
> 
> -   Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions
> (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from
> the state in which they are legally situated.
> -   Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions
> -   Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical
> implementation functions
> 
> Of these, the most important is the limited legal immunity (akin to a
> greatly limited form of the immunity that UN organizations get from the
> laws of their host countries). This kind of immunity could be provided
> through a variety of different means: a host-country agreement; a law
> passed by the legislature; a U.N. General Assembly Resolution; a
> U.N.-backed treaty; and other such options exist. We are currently
> investigating which of these options would be the best option.
> 
> And apart from limited legal immunity, distribution of jurisdictional
> control is also valuable. As we noted in our submission to the ICG in
> September 2015:
> 
>> Following the above precepts would, for instance, mean that the entity
>> that performs the role of the Root Zone Maintainer should not be
>> situated in the same legal jurisdiction as the entity that functions
>> as the policymaking venue. This would in turn mean that either the
>> Root Zone Maintainer function be taken up Netnod
>> (Sweden-headquartered) or the WIDE Project (Japan-headquartered) \[or
>> RIPE-NCC, headquartered in the Netherlands\], or that if the IANA
>> Functions Operator(s) is to be merged with the RZM, then the IFO be
>> relocated to a jurisdiction other than those of ISOC and ICANN. This,
>> as has been stated earlier, has been a demand of the Civil Society
>> Internet Governance Caucus. Further, it would also mean that root zone
>> servers operators be spread across multiple jurisdictions (which the
>> creation of mirror servers in multiple jurisdictions will not address).
> 
> However, the issue of jurisdiction seems to be dead-on-arrival, having
> been killed by the United States government.
> 
> Unfortunately, despite the primary motivation for demands for the IANA
> transition being those of removing the power the U.S. government
> exercises over the core of the Internet’s operations in the form of the
> DNS, what has ended up happening through the IANA transition is that
> these powers have not only not been removed, but in some ways they have
> been entrenched further! While earlier, the U.S. had to specify that the
> IANA functions operator had to be located in the U.S., now ICANN’s
> by-laws themselves will state that the post-transition IANA will be a
> California corporation. Notably, while the Montevideo Declaration speaks
> of “globalization” of ICANN and of the IANA functions, as does the
> NETmundial statement, the NTIA announcement on their acceptance of the
> transition proposals speaks of “privatization” of ICANN, and not
> “globalization”.
> 
> All in all, the “independence” that IANA is gaining from the U.S. is
> akin to the “independence” that Brazil gained from Portugal in 1822. Dom
> Pedro of Brazil was then ruling Brazil as the Prince Regent since his
> father Dom João VI, the King of United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and
> the Algarves had returned to Portugal. In 1822, Brazil declared
> independence from Portugal (which was formally recognized through a
> treaty in 1825). Even after this “independence”, Dom Pedro continued to
> rule Portugal just as he had before indepedence, and Dom João VI was
> provided the title of “Emperor of Brazil”, aside from being King of the
> United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves. The “indepedence” didn’t
> make a whit of a difference to the self-sufficiency of Brazil: Portugal
> continued to be its largest trading partner. The “independence” didn’t
> change anything for the nearly 1 million slaves in Brazil, or to the lot
> of the indigenous peoples of Brazil, none of whom were recognized as
> “free”. It had very little consequence not just in terms of ground
> conditions of day-to-day living, but even in political terms.
> 
> Such is the case with the IANA Transition: U.S. power over the core
> functioning of the Domain Name System do not stand diminished after the
> transition, and they can even arguably be said to have become even more
> entrenched. Meet the new boss: same as the old boss.
> 
> [^1]: It is an allied but logically distinct issue that U.S. businesses
> — registries and registrars — dominate the global DNS industry, and as a
> result hold the reins at ICANN.
> 
> [^2]: As Goldsmith & Wu note in their book *Who Controls the Internet*:
> “Back in 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce promised to relinquish
> root authority by the fall of 2006, but in June 2005, the United States
> reversed course. “The United States Government intends to preserve the
> security and stability of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing
> System (DNS),” announced Michael D. Gallagher, a Department of Commerce
> official. “The United States” he announced, will “maintain its historic
> role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root
> zone file.”
> 
> [^3]: Mr. Fadi Chehadé revealed in an interaction with Indian
> participants at ICANN 54 that he had a meeting “at the White House”
> about the U.S. plans for transition of the IANA contract before he spoke
> about that when [he visited India in October 2013] making the timing of
> his White House visit around the time of the Montevideo Statement.
> 
> [^4]: As an example, [NSD], software that is used on multiple root
> servers, is funded by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch corporation, and
> written mostly by European coders.
> 
>   [US government announced]:
> https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions
> 
>   [Internet Assigned Numbers Authority]: https://www.iana.org/
>   [in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at
> WSIS, in 2005]:
> https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/sca/hbf-29.doc
>   [not technical]:
>   [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses]:
> https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-25-en
>   [asserted it’s control over the root]:
> http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/mueller_icann_and_internet_governance.pdf
>   [no serious push for states assuming control of ICANN]:
> http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/05/24/threat-analysis-of-itus-wcit-part-1-historical-context/
> 
>   [clueless commentators]:
> http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303563304579447362610955656
>   [American IP lawyers]:
> http://www.circleid.com/posts/20140316_if_the_stakeholders_already_control_the_internet_netmundial_iana/
> 
>   [American ‘homeland’ security hawks]:
> http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/who-controls-the-internet-address-book-icann-ntia-and-iana/
> 
>   [jingoists]:
> http://homepages.wmich.edu/~cooneys/poems/cummings.nextto.html
>   [international]:
> http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4529516c-c713-11e3-889e-00144feabdc0.html
>   [criticism]:
> https://www.rt.com/usa/nsa-fallout-relinquish-internet-oversight-002/
>   [with which]: https://twitter.com/carolinegreer/status/454253411576598528
>   [civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the
> Internet]:
> https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf
>   [Diego Canabarro]: https://icannwiki.com/Diego_Canabarro
>   [I\* organizations]: https://www.apnic.net/community/ecosystem/i*orgs
>   [‘Statement on the Future of Internet Governance’]:
> https://www.apnic.net/publications/news/2013/montevideo-statement-on-future-of-internet-cooperation
> 
>   [Milton Mueller notes]:
> http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96
> 
>   [testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and
> Technology]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v-yWye5I0w&feature=youtu.be
>   [NETmundial Multistakeholder Document]:
> http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf
> 
>   [were neither global nor multistakeholder]:
> cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder
> 
>   [he visited India in October 2013]:
> http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-22/news/43288531_1_icann-internet-corporation-us-centric-internet
> 
>   [NSD]: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/
> 
> 

-- 

Carlos A. Afonso
[emails são pessoais exceto quando explicitamente indicado em contrário]
[emails are personal unless explicitly indicated otherwise]

Instituto Nupef - https://nupef.org.br
CGI.br - http://cgi.br
ISOC-BR - https://isoc.org.br

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