[bestbits] substantive proposals for Brazil summit - IG

Sat Feb 8 00:11:40 EST 2014

Good question Anne and let me give a somewhat lengthy reply to cover your
question and several of the others

My starting proposition is that we (lets for the moment accept that we
here are a stand-in for a broad-based and inclusive civil society
representation) insist on, as a minimum measure, full transparency and
accountability of all multistakeholder processes in the Internet
Governance sphere and in the absence of this full transparency and
accountability it is assumed that the MS process in question is illegitimate
and to be rejected out of hand with the burden of demonstrating transparency
and accountability being on the advocates/proponents of that MS process.

By insisting on this as a minimum we are at least providing the basis for a
scrutiny/challenge of the possibility of capture and while most certainly
not foreclosing on the possibility of capture/subversion some tools for
making an effective challenge/sunlighting  of these potentials for
capture/subversion would at least be available.

Someone asked for a practical/detailed example
 (I worked as an auditor for
several years (for the UN and the Canadian Government so forgive me for
putting the below in somewhat of an audit format

Lets take 1Net as a MS space/process for an example
.

1.       Where did 1Net come from?  Did it arise spontaneously one day from
Adiels brow or was there background discussion, review, confirmation? If so
who was involved in those discussions? Is there a trail of any sort linking
1Net to earlier discussions, authorizations, decision making processes.
(Here one wouldnt necessarily expect a formal process but an indication of
the informal process and who was involved in that process would provide
something of an audit trail.)

2.       When 1Net selected certain groupings to act as its surrogate in
identifying candidates for various positions including its Steering
Committee who determined which organizations were selected, what criteria
were used, what other organizations were selected and discarded and again
what criteria were used for discarding these?  Who were parties to these
decisions and on what basis were these parties selected to be involved in
these decisions?  What formal processes for doing this authorization were
followed. Is the documentation concerning this part of the public record? If
not why not? (Again there might not necessarily be a formal process but
again transparency and accountability would require some form of
response to these questions.

3.       Concerning the Summaries of the discussions presented by 1Net.
Who prepared these summaries? Who paid for these summaries to be prepared?
Who developed the terms of reference guiding these summaries? If contracts
were involved who authorized the contracts and under what budgetary
authority? Who supervised the work of preparing this Summary? Who signed off
on the Summary before it was distributed? Under what authority were those
who did the sign-off operating? (Note that the response by Adiel to the
first of these questions which was to side-step and stonewall i.e. to give
no response, would to me as an auditor begin fiercely ringing bells and I
would then begin to look for whatever leverage I had to insist on an answer.
(In this instance there was an expenditure of resources, certainly time but
very likely money so some documentation should be available and if not that
is a red flag in itself.

4.       Concerning the creation of the forums website and overall
conceptual and web based formats and architecture. .  Who prepared this
format and designed and developed the web site? Who paid for this to be
designed and developed? Who developed the terms of reference guiding this
design? If contracts were involved who authorized the contracts and under
what budgetary authority? Who supervised the work of preparing this site?
Who signed off on the site before it was made public? Under what authority
were those who did the sign-off operating? 

(Note that the audit process is one that uses (imposed if necessary)
transparency to ensure accountability.  Without making any suggestion
concerning the nature of the 1Net processes or their background and funding
the questions that Ive posed above are rather basic ones that any auditor
for a public authority would ask in this context.) 

So why does this matter?

Given the potential current and long term significance of the processes with
which these activities and 1Net are engaged achieving this minimum level of
transparency is surely necessary and warranted.  And before anyone suggests
that these matters/activities are trivial and that what is important is the
outcomes I would simply point in the direction of this

The way in which we frame an issue largely determines how that issue will be
understood and acted upon (Dr. Birjana Scott as quoted on the Diplo website
<http://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/general/framing-argument> )

and the very extensive documentation of this process of controlling an
argument (or discussion) by controlling the framing of that argument
<http://www.csun.edu/~rk33883/Framing%20Theory%20Lecture%20Ubertopic.htm>
by Prof. George Lakoff and others. 

1Net has been in the business of framing the Internet Governance
discussion at each point in the processits arrival on the scene and its
interposing itself as the space for multistakeholder discussion in the
Internet Governance area, its selection of who it will allow into the
discussion and who will be excluded, its provision of a summary of the
discussion, and of course its framing of the discussion through the
establishment of a set of pre-structured forums.

This process of framing of the Internet Governance discussion by 1Net and
whoever is paying for/directing 1Nets activities has been done with no
oversight, no transparency and no accountability but is now taken as the
accepted practice for civil society (and other?) participation in the Brazil
meeting (and beyond?).  

Im not at this stage attributing any motives to this framing process
 We
dont have enough information to attribute motives or intentions but what we
have in front of us is I believe sufficient to insist on a full accounting
and full transparency at which time a judgment could be made.

I see no reason why the information requested above could not and should not
be made more or less immediately available?  If these are public processes
operating in the public interest as is being indicated, then they should
be expected to be as accountable and transparent as any other public
processes.

In the audit biz it is only when information is not made available that the
red flags start going up and the suspicions are aroused.

Mike

From: Anne Jellema [mailto:anne at webfoundation.org] 
Sent: Friday, February 07, 2014 5:29 PM
To: michael gurstein
Cc: Anja Kovacs; governance at lists.igcaucus.org; Mike Godwin;
genekimmelman at gmail.com; jeremy at ciroap.org; bestbits at lists.bestbits.net
Subject: Re: [bestbits] substantive proposals for Brazil summit - IG

A salutary reminder Michael. Personally, I'd have to be the first to admit
charges of naïveté, although neither Andrew nor Anja strike me as especially
tarrable with that brush. Nevertheless it's always useful for aspirations to
be informed by a hard-edged analysis of realpolitik. And vice versa. So:
what's your starting proposition for a defensive strategy? And: what do you
think we should be defending?

Best

Anne

On Friday, February 7, 2014, michael gurstein <gurstein at gmail.com> wrote:

As Im reading the various messages and suggestions concerning Brazil and
following the discussion on this list and others Im struck by one
overwhelming observation

Folks here seem to be assuming that whatever develops with respect to
Internet Governance (and their own interventions) are taking place in a
world of benign and selfless actors (stakeholders) whose only interest is in
the public good and the well-being of the Internet.  

Thus proposals for this type of decentralized governance structure and
that proposal for the management of decision making through MSism all are
making the completely unwarranted and dare I say, naïve and even dangerous
assumption that there are not significant, well-funded, very smart and quite
likely unscrupulous forces looking to insert positions that serve and ensure
the dominance of their own corporate/national/institutional interests into
whatever emerges from whatever process.

It really is hard to take any of this discussion very  seriously unless
there is an attendant discussion on what measures can/will be taken to
ensure that these forces do not prevail
 that these processes are not
captured and subverted
 i.e. what are the defensive strategies and
institutional mechanisms that we (CS) are advocating as part of whatever
package we are promoting.

Is no one in these CS discussions taking into consideration the overwhelming
resources of wealth and power that will be impacted by whatever might emerge
from these discussions and the similarly overwhelming temptation (even in
some cases the responsibility) to do whatever it takes to twist the result
to support ones own narrow (corporate/national/institutional ) interests
and what the significance of this observation has to be for these
discussions and their outputs.

This isnt paranoia or USA or whatever bashing.  This is simple common
sense.

Has no one here heard of Mr. Snowden and what he has been telling us?

M

From: bestbits-request at lists.bestbits.net
[mailto:bestbits-request at lists.bestbits.net] On Behalf Of Anja Kovacs
Sent: Thursday, February 06, 2014 6:43 AM
To: Anne Jellema
Cc: Mike Godwin (mgodwin at INTERNEWS.ORG); genekimmelman at gmail.com;
jeremy at ciroap.org; bestbits at lists.bestbits.net
Subject: Re: [bestbits] substantive proposals for Brazil summit - IG
governance

Dear all,

I've been following this conversation with great interest. A few comments
below:

On 6 February 2014 03:10, Anne Jellema <anne at webfoundation.org> wrote:

/SNIP/ 

If we can figure out what goals we agree on and that seem to require some
kind of global public action, then in the spirit of form following function,
maybe the rather daunting discussion on the best institutional model(s) will
become easier to have. For example, once we clarify the goals, we can think
harder about viable routes for an international body or forum to make an
impact on them, which might be different for different goals. Purely through
cultivating consensus and setting norms? Through negotiated agreement on
globally applicable but ultimately non-binding regulatory models (a la ITU)
or legal principles (a la UN Convenant on ESC Rights)? Through some kind of
WTO-style treaty body that wields an enforcement mechanism and sanctions?
Through control of key internet standards and resources (a la ICANN)? Some
combination of the above? Or none of the above?!

One of the reasons the Internet Democracy Project suggested a decentralised
model of Internet governance is precisely because it allows such a constant
and ongoing mapping of processes on goals (see our proposal outlined here:
http://internetdemocracy.in/reports/a-third-way-proposal-for-a-decentralised
-democratic-internet-governance-involving-all-stakeholders/).  It is
unlikely that one and the same process can adequately address all issues,
and some issues might even require a variety of organisations/institutions
to lead a process together if that issue is to be resolved adequately. Such
an approach also has the advantage of making it possible to already move on
issues for which there is wide agreement on the process, without needing to
wait for agreement on the one-and-only-process that is supposed to take care
of all issues for all time to come. 

Importantly, and addressing some of the concerns that Marilia and Ian
expressed earlier, it would also allow to shape processes in each case in
such a way that the shifting and changing power relations among different
groups can be taken into account and whatever process is decided on provides
as level a playing field as possible for the different groups that have a
stake in that particular issue. 

Also just still following up on a question Marilia asked earlier, and that I
think wasn't answered yet: most of us present in the meeting that this
document reports on thought that the MPIC or MIPOC or CSTD WG should not be
making any substantive decisions or produce any concrete outcomes beyond
agreeing on what the most appropriate process to handle a particular issue
would be. If the MPIC/MIPOC/CSTD WG suggests that a particular institution
takes the lead on setting a process to resolve an issue into motion, it is
of course still up to that institution to accept or reject that request.
This is the case even in the current UN architecture: the GA can only
request other UN bodies to take up a matter.

Best,
Anja

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Marilia Maciel <mariliamaciel at gmail.com>
Date: 23 January 2014 03:48
Subject: Re: [bestbits] substantive proposals for Brazil summit - IG
governance
To: Andrew Puddephatt <Andrew at gp-digital.org>
Cc: "bestbits at lists.bestbits.net" <bestbits at lists.bestbits.net>

Hi Andrew and all,

After reading the document I was willing to send a more carefully written
comment, but I believe it is better to share thoughts informally now than to
hold back ideas. Sorry for the chaotic message.

First of all, this is a very good and useful document. You managed to give
the summary a good flow and you provide both an overview of inputs from
respondents and conclusions from the group who analyzed them (which are also
useful btw). Some remarks I would initially have are the following. 

- It is interesting that almost all respondents mentioned imbalances of
power, insufficient diversity of voices and other similar things as "cases
for governance reform". I think that one conclusion from that is that
although we support the idea of multistakeholder participation, the way it
has been "lived" and implemented is not what we wished for. This is
important to emphasize, because some analysis that have been produced
recently argue that non-gov actors were all univocally united around MS all
along.  In fact, I think many actors in CS have been pointing out to these
imbalances for a long time, so in order to improve multistaholderism, these
demands for inclusion should be the main ones guiding the process of reform.

- It is not clear to me if MIPOC would produce outputs or just identify the
more adequate spaces to deal with issues. I will assume the first option is
correct...

- I think that some of the proposals of "distributed governance" that you
mapped overlook some important points. If MIPC or MIPOC  produce
recommendations and send them to other organizations: 

a) would they be obliged to take this issue on their agenda?; 

b) If they do take it, what is the weight of MIPC/MIPOC's advice? If there
is no weight, would we be giving an additional incentive to, for instance,
WIPO, to negotiate text about the Internet, in a context that the MS opinion
on the subject would  not count in WIPO? What is the use of that, and how
does this differentiate governance of the internet to traditional
international regimes? 

c)  Is there a procedure to make other organizations reply back to
MIPC/MIPOC to avoid at least that issues fall on def ears? 

d) the distributed proposals are all based on a precondition: improving the
IGF. That seems a frail model to me, if we dont know if there will be a
renewal of the mandate or interest to continue the forum (let's not forget
the drama before Bali). 

e) Even if the IGF continues, the IGF needs resources. There is little
chance to produce good, focused policy-oriented outcomes without a very,
very boosted and dedicated staff and people who understand of methodologies
to deal with large groups. Those who were also in the IGF improvements WG
heard, like I did, that the IGF will not receive additional resources from
the UN. The UN did not want to pay more and the business and the technical
community were alligned against UN public funding, taking the issue out of
the table. Are basing our model of improved governance on the existence of
enough voluntary funding to the IGF?

f) The option to harbor the coordinating committee in CSTD was not
sufficiently discussed in the document imo. Given the frailty of the IGF and
the fact that outcomes from the coordinating body under CSTD could move up
to ECOSOC and GA, I would look into that more carefully

- I don't understand why power grabs were a concern on the UN Committee
model, but not so much on distributed models. Less clear processes are very
prone to power grabs, even to more opaque (and harder to identify and fight)
ones. With that in mind, I particularly emphasize the importance of your
argument that self-forming MS processes are likely to disadvantage those
without power and resources. 

- The idea of a UN committee model does not seem to exclude the possibility
to create ad-hoc MS working groups as necessary, so maybe the argument that
it would not have expertise to deal with the diversity of internet issues
could be more carefully explained.

That is all for a start. Just sharing some initial thoughts and hoping we
can continue the discussions.

Thanks again for the good start

Marília

Cheers

Anne

On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Mike Godwin (mgodwin at INTERNEWS.ORG)
<mgodwin at internews.org> wrote:

I strongly agree with Gene and Andrew about the need to have a clear,
targeted, and (ideally) short substantive civil-society agenda going forward
to Brazil. Frankly, I almost dont care what what the specifics of that
substantive agenda are, but the timeline is excruciatingly short, the window
of opportunity is limited, and if want to take away something substantive
from Brazil we have to commit to a substantive agenda now. 

Im not terribly troubled if someone later says the agenda should be, or
should have been different. Brazil is a unique opportunity, and it will be
shame if it goes to waste because civil society focused more on process and
consensus than on extracting substantive value from the opportunity Brazil
represents.

Mike

-- 

Mike Godwin | Senior Legal Advisor, Global Internet Policy Project

mgodwin at internews.org | Mobile 415-793-4446

Skype mnemonic1026

-- 
Dr. Anja Kovacs
The Internet Democracy Project

+91 9899028053 | @anjakovacs
www.internetdemocracy.in <http://www.internetdemocracy.in/> 

-- 

Anne Jellema

Chief Executive Officer

Cape Town, RSA
mob (ZA) +27 61 036 9352 

tel (ZA) +27 21 788 4585 

tel (US) +1 202 684 6885

Skype anne.jellema

@afjellema  

World Wide Web Foundation | 1889 F Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, USA |
<http://www.webfoundation.org/> www.webfoundation.org | Twitter:
@webfoundation

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