<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Despite of having a different background and an opposite understanding of international (and Internet) politics than that of Milton Mueller, I believe his 2007 "Property and Commons in Internet Governance" is a good starting point from an analytical perspective on this issue:</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><div id="abstractTitle" style="padding-left:74px;padding-right:70px;padding-top:10px;text-align:center;font-weight:700;font-size:18px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Trebuchet,Tahoma,'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif">
<h1 style="font-size:18px;font-family:'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif">Property and Commons in Internet Governance</h1></div><center style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Trebuchet,Tahoma,'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11px">
<font face="Myriad Roman, Arial, Helvetica, Sans-serif;"><br><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=140619" class="" target="_blank" title="View other papers by this author" style="color:rgb(102,102,102);font-size:14px;font-weight:bold"><h2 style="font-size:14px;font-family:'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;margin:0px;display:inline">
Milton Mueller </h2></a><br>Syracuse University - School of Information Studies<br></font><br><font face="Myriad Roman, Arial, Helvetica, Sans-serif;">October 1, 2007</font><br><br></center><br style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Trebuchet,Tahoma,'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11px">
<strong style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Trebuchet,Tahoma,'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11px"><font face="Myriad Roman, Arial, Helvetica, Sans-serif;">Abstract: </font></strong><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Trebuchet,Tahoma,'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11px"> </span><br style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Trebuchet,Tahoma,'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11px">
<font style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Trebuchet,Tahoma,'Myriad Roman',Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif"><div id="abstract">This paper re-examines the property-commons dichotomy as it applies to Internet governance. Its main point is that commons and property are not mutually exclusive, totalizing principles for economic organization, but merely different methods of organizing access to resources. These two methods can and often do co-exist, and are often interdependent and mutually reinforcing. As an extension of this approach, the paper pays careful attention to the specific political economy factors that sustain or advance commons-like arrangements in telecommunications and Internet governance. Using four case studies, it finds that "the commons" as an institutional option is rarely implemented as the product of communitarian compacts or a sharing ethic. It is more likely to be an outcome of interest group contention. A commons is a way for an alliance of non-dominant actors to "neutralize" a strategic resource that is, or might be, controlled by a dominant actor.<br>
<br>The paper begins with a conceptual discussion of commons and exclusive property in informational and network goods. Next, the paper examines four case studies involving the interaction of commons and private property. The first case is about equal access arrangements in long distance telephony in the U.S.; the next is about the Internet protocols and the end-to-end principle; the third is about network neutrality; the last is about domain names and IP address governance. Three of these four case studies were selected because they cover the three fundamental areas where policy issues related to exclusive rights might arise in Internet governance.</div>
</font></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1828102">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1828102</a></font><br>
</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 5:30 PM, Garth Graham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:garth.graham@telus.net" target="_blank">garth.graham@telus.net</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="">On 2014-04-04, at 12:46 PM, Karl Auerbach wrote:<br>
<br>
> You mentioned measuring the benefits in advance of action. I don't see how that can work, particularly on the internet where it is difficult to foresee benefits and malafits (that's a word I made up to mean the opposite of a benefit).<br>
<br>
</div>Not quite. I mentioned that explanation before the fact … allows for an action to define in advance its own standard by which it's effectiveness and fairness can be measured after the fact.<br>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
GG<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir="ltr"><div><b><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">Diego R. Canabarro</font></b><br></div><div><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><span style="vertical-align:top;text-align:left"><a href="http://lattes.cnpq.br/4980585945314597" target="_blank">http://lattes.cnpq.br/4980585945314597</a></span> <br>
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