<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=iso-8859-1"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;"><div><div><div><blockquote type="cite">On Dec 1, 2013, at 5:45 AM, McTim <<a href="mailto:dogwallah@gmail.com">dogwallah@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">..... Then the question comes; (a) should the role then be
exercised directly and finally by ICANN itself, or (b) another body
to undertake this role (and just this role and nothing else) is
needed. </blockquote></blockquote></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div>Actually the question that must precede the above is: "Does this auth role need to be filled". In other words, can we trust IANA to do their job according to their own processes (which is what NTIA looks at).</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Personally speaking (as always), I believe that oversight is important. While I have no fears of the current IANA staff running off the rails, it is important to remember that in the past when there was less focus on what IANA did, it did run off the rails. One of the roles I believe NTIA performs is to ensure the mistakes of the past aren't repeated. It is worth noting that in the case of the protocol parameter stuff, this has been taken care of/augmented by the establishment of contractual SLAs between the IETF and ICANN regarding IANA performance (see the IANA section of <a href="http://iaoc.ietf.org/contracts.html">http://iaoc.ietf.org/contracts.html</a>). </div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">
<div><blockquote type="cite">A lot of people - including i* group - are of the opinion that (a)
above is the best option. Some others think that every significant
decision pertaining to a crucial global infrastructure should be
subject to a second opinion or confirmation, as a normal prudence,
by a body different from the executive authority (ICANN Board).</blockquote></div><div>These "decisions" are mainly minor administtrivia. Changing the IP address of a ccTLDs nameserver for example. </div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>In most cases, yes, the decisions are minor administrivia, but I personally believe even administrivia needs to be constrained to mutually agreed service level commitments. It is also worth noting that there is a fraction of cases, namely redelegations, that most decidedly are not administrivia.<br><br><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div>When it comes to deciding what can go in the root, that is clearly now the role of the GAC (see GAC Communnique's from Beijing, Durban). </div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>Oversimplification. The GAC provides input; they are not the sole determiner of what can go in the root.</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">One
way would be to have some kind of international oversight board (not
necessarily inter-gov) undertaking the same role as undertaken by
US-NTIA today. Another way is to allow ICANN to make root changes
but all such decisions are post facto reviewed and confirmed by such
an international oversight board. ( Whether with a pre facto or post
facto role, such an oversight board will exercise its role within
clearly set our parameters and rules.) A third way is to only have
an appellate board which reviews root change decisions only if an
appeal is made to it through a due process. <br></blockquote></blockquote><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"></div></div></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex; position: static; z-index: auto;"></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>My personal impression has always been that one of the sources of ... irritation was the involvement (however minor) of US Dept. of Commerce, NTIA in decisions that were held to be questions of national sovereignty. Specifically, in the case of modifications to ccTLDs (be they name server changes or full redelegations), my impression was that much of the concern was the imposition of a third party in what some folks felt to be a national internal decision. I'm unclear how moving the role of NTIA (which as far as I could tell was merely making sure ICANN followed documented processes) to an "international oversight board" is going to significantly improve matters for the requesters -- won't that just change who is causing the irritation from the US government to the "international oversight board" (regardless of what that board would be in the process)?</div><div><br></div><div>(note that I'm ignoring the potential bureaucratic red tape implications of an "international oversight board" -- people already complain that TLD changes going through IANA take too long: it would be interesting to see how a multi-party board would improve that situation)</div></div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>-drc</div><div><br></div></body></html>