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<font face="Verdana">Hi All<br>
<br>
IT for Change had prepared our initial response to the current
ITRs draft, and shared it </font><font face="Verdana">with some
civil society groups</font><font face="Verdana">. Although the
following is written as an email based input to the proposed ITR
discussions at the BestBits civil society meeting, a version of it
was also shared with the Indian government. Thought may be useful
to post it here as well. parminder <br>
<br>
</font><big><font face="Times New Roman, serif">(begins)<br>
<br>
We see four sets of issues that are most important, and they are
as follows:</font></big>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm" lang="en-US"><big><font face="Times
New Roman, serif"><font size="3"><big><i>1. State control over
Internet routing system</i></big></font></font></big></p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm; font-variant: normal; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal" lang="en-US"><big> <font face="Times
New Roman, serif"><font size="3"><big>This is perhaps the
single most controversial issue in the ITR debate, even
more than the ITU-ICANN issue discussed above. It is
rightly feared that ITRs will be used by authoritarian
countries like China and Iran to develop strict state
control over the routing of Internet traffic which today
is globally ordered to a large extent. Earlier inputs of
these countries into the ITR draft were rather more
explicit in this regard. Even though rendered relatively
bare-bone in the current draft, there is significant text
still there that can be used for a tightly controlled
Internet routing system, which if taken to its logical end
can lead to nation-wise balkanisation of the Internet. </big></font></font>
</big></p>
<p><big> <font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3"><big>In
the current draft, it is the text pertaining to section 30
which deals with this issue. Options range from 'states
right to know which routes are used', to 'states
determining which routes are used', to 'imposing any
routing regulation in this regard'. My proposal is to go
with one of the listed options which is to suppress
section 30 altogether; so, no language on this issue at
all.<br>
<br>
</big></font><i>2. ITU and CIRs management</i></font></big></p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm; font-variant: normal; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal" lang="en-US"><big> <font face="Times
New Roman, serif"><font size="3"><big>One of the most
important issues is whether ITU is seeking to, and vide
the ITRs be enabled to, take up the functions being
performed by the distributed CIR management system as it
exists at present. In the current draft, section 31 A is
of crucial import in this regard of ITU's feared
encroachment of</big></font> <font size="3"><big>the
remit</big></font> <font size="3"><big>of the ICANN plus
system . The options in the current draft regarding this
section range from 'naming, numbering, addressing and
identification resources will not be mis-used' and
'assigned resources would only be used for the agreed
purposes' to 'all ITU recommendations will apply to
naming, numbering, addressing and identification
resources' (existing or also future ??) to 'nation states,
if they elect to, can control these resources within their
territories for the sake of international communication'.
</big></font></font> </big></p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm; font-variant: normal; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal" lang="en-US"><big> <font face="Times
New Roman, serif"><font size="3"><big>If ITU recommendations
are made vide the new ITRs to apply to names and numbering
systems, this may tend towards a creeping encroachment on
ICANN's remit. One option in the current draft lists a set
of specific ITU recommendations that will apply (these
need to be studied individually which I havent). Other
options are more open ended, which means future ITU
recommendations may also apply, which, may mean that ITU
can formally enter into doing and/or supervising ICANN's
work. This becomes more problematic when seen along with
dr<span style="background: transparent">aft options that
make ITRs obligatory and not just a set of general
principles. We should speak up against all such efforts
to take over, or even substantially affect, the current
distributed system of CIRs management.</span></big></font></font></big></p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm; font-variant: normal; font-weight:
normal" lang="en-US"><big> <font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font
size="3"><big><i><span style="background: transparent">3.
Definitional issues in the ITRs; telecom or Internet</span></i></big></font></font></big></p>
<p><big><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Resolving this issue
might take a good amount of out time. The issue is really
tricky. Putting Internet under telecom, and thus under ITRs
and ITU has its problems and a completely new kind of global
regulatory system may then be built over it, which would hurt
the way Internet has developed and needs to develop. However,
it is also difficult to just argue that, when we are in times
we are in, Internet traffic will be excluded from telecom
definition, because that would beg the question - what then
remains of telecommunicaiton in the era of increased IP based
convergence. Is then ITU to close down as traditional
telephony disappears. Perhaps more importantly,
correspondingly, does this new definitional approach also mean
that national level telecom regulatory systems like FCC and
TRAI wind up sooner or later. </font> </big></p>
<p><big> <font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3"><big>We
dont think we can afford to be co-opted into the efforts
seeking complete deregulation of the entire communications
systems that, for instance, are at present being made in
the US, which employ definitional logics of a highly
dubious kind (like classifying Internet not as a
telecommunication but as an information service and thus
not subject to common carriage or net neutrality
provisions, and similarly rescuing VoIP services from
universal service obligations.) At the same time, it is
necessary to resist providing constitutional basis to the
ITU which can be used to for control of content and
application layers. This is the dilemma. What would the
implications of putting Internet under telecommunications
in the definitional and other sections? What does adding
'processing' signals to just sending, transporting and
receiving signals does to what happens in the future vis
a vis ITU's role? (These are all existing optional
language in the current draft.)<br>
<br>
</big></font>This is something we really may have to spend a
lot of time on. Our tentative suggestion is that we find a way
whereby the transport / infrastructural layer is included in
the definition of telecommunication (which also is closest to
reality) and thus in ITR's remit. At the same time content and
application layers are explicitly excluded. Contributing the
right language in this respect may be one of the most
important things that we can do. But as I said, this requires
a lot of thinking and discussion among us. <br>
<br>
In trying any such definitional separations, the issue of
'security' would become a sticking point. In fact, 'security'
may be an issue we may have to separately treat in our
submission, becuase there is also a lot of tricky language in
the current draft around this issue. <br>
<br>
<i>4. Net neutrality or an open Internet <br>
<br>
</i>We should certainly speak against the ETNO proposal of a
'sender pays' arrangement. However, we should seek to go
beyond it. Everywhere it is recognised that net neutrality is
a regulatory issue. Net neutrality cannot survive with
regulatory intervention, or at least some kind of normative
soft pressure from regulatory quarters. So if there is an
issue called 'global net neutrality' (CoE's experts report)
then there is perhaps some role for a global regulatory system
- if not of enforceable rules, at least for providing
normative frameworks and general principles. And net
neutrality concerns the transport layer, net neutrality
concerns can be accommodated even while we do the above
mentioned 'definitional separations' about what part of the
Internet is telecom and which not. <br>
<br>
While even US telecoms are opposed to the ETNO proposal (for
reasons one can appreciate) what they themselves propose in
the US is the sender pays principle. Is it possible to use the
ITR text in some way to promote a normative framework for net
neutrality or an open Internet - or even more specific things
like open peering and the such. <br>
<br>
I read in the CDT's document about problems with use of QoS
term which can become the normative indication for violation
of net neutrality and it should be opposed. <br>
<br>
<i>5. Some sundry issues<br>
<br>
</i>Apart the issue of 'security' mentioned above, which may
require separate treatment, I can see two other important
issues. One, whether ITRs should stay as general principles or
they should become mandatory. These is alternative language in
the current draft on these option. I think we should seek that
ITRs stay as general principles. Second, <font size="3"><big>if
the principal parties that are subject to ITRs should
remain 'administrations' or be changed to 'member states
and operating agencies'. I think the telecom environment
has become complex and diverse enough to require the more
flexible term 'operating agencies' to be included.</big></font></font></big></p>
(ends)<br>
<br>
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