Earlier this year, I had met one of our subscribers in Washington D.C who is an activist from a country mentioned in the Report, a former Minister who was responsible for Telecommunications and was persecuted within this own country. He is now part of an organisation that lobbies to speak out against issues affecting ordinary  citizens. The creation of elite armies to hunt down dissidents is a reality. He escaped by the skin of his teeth to lobby in Washington DC. <div>
<br></div><div>This activist also flew to Geneva and wanted to raise these with several organisations, the ITU included.</div><div><br></div><div>On a separate note, I remember in a meeting with Ambassador Verveer and Deputy Assistant Secretary Loi at the State Department where were discussing Pacific issues in Washington, I recall seeing a tent outside the State Department comprising of Iranian activists in yellow tshirts giving out fliers.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Whilst countries have their own motivations for dishing out targeted sanctions, I must say that credit should be given to the US in this instance for stepping up.</div><div><br></div><div>Countries have the sovereign right to determine how they at the end of the day will relate to other countries. For instance if India really can't stand the US, it can for instance impose sanctions such as refusing to engage in receiving the "outsourcing" of the bulk of "customer care" work or "call center work" or for other countries other than the US it receives increasingly the bulk of "publishing houses" work. The reality is different because at the end of the day bottom line much of this is based on economics.</div>
<div><br></div><div>What I like about the quote from Clausewitz is that "war is diplomacy carried out by other means". As for extraterritorial in this instance, the rules in justifying humanitarian intervention are quite clear and in my view do not apply in the case of Syria, Iran etc. Of course, I hold a different view over what happened in Grenada in the past.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Kind Regards,</div><div>Sala</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><div><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 6:11 AM, Louis Pouzin (well) <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:pouzin@well.com" target="_blank">pouzin@well.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
The USG, very much like a sorcerer apprentice, is escalating threats around the world.<br>As history has taught many times the end result is quite predictable.<br>Louis<br>- - -<div><div><br><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Aug 26, 2012 at 3:41 PM, parminder <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:parminder@itforchange.net" target="_blank">parminder@itforchange.net</a>></span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">

  
    
  
  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <font face="Verdana"><br>
      Sanctions against other countries as a coercive measure was bad
      enough, but still country to country sanction have been around for
      long, and can be understood. What is called as 'smart sanctions'
      below is a very problematic category - whereby US state is able to
      exercise coercive power on specific individuals and groups within
      another country. Till now use of coercive power within the
      territory of a state was a (defining) sovereign right of the
      concerned national governments. This new development potentially
      re-writes the political scape of our world.<br>
      <br>
      Expectedly, Internet as a cross-border artefact of communication
      and control, with US's hegemonic position vis a vis the global
      Internet, is a key instrument of such selective 'smart sanctions',
      which is and will be the new basis of extra-territorial political
      control by the US. (BTW, the most unacceptable 'drone attack's by
      the US inside Pakistan's territory is another case of such
      targeted 'smart sanctions' as against conventional country to
      country wars.)<br>
      <br>
      It will be interesting to know the details of how the US based
      Internet behemoths like google, facebook, microsoft etc actually
      collaborate with the US state for such 'smart sanctions' which
      will form the basis of US's global control. The stuff we have been
      reading about the US state forming close operating relationships
      with these global Internet companies is lot about such 'smart
      sanctions'. And there is such a cloak of secrecy over these
      arrangements (for ex  </font>
    
    <p><a href="http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/03/doj-asks-court-to-keep-secret-any-partnership-between-google-nsa.html" target="_blank">http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/03/doj-asks-court-to-keep-secret-any-partnership-between-google-nsa.html </a>
    </p>
    
    
    <font face="Verdana"><br>
      There are very dangerous forerunners to a new US hegemonic global
      regime with selective co-optation of groups and classes from
      different countries. Manuel Castell's famous network theory gives
      a very good analysis of the proclivities of the network for such
      centralised control with selective co-optation. It is chillingly
      alarming how true to the theory is the phenomenon playing out.<br>
      <br>
      For those who wonder why the ICANN model under US control which
      largely deals with not very consequential issues (and I agree to
      this more than most people here) is such a red rag to so many of
      us. It is so becuase the US control over the ICANN model, and its
      support among so many despite its patently undemocratic nature,
      represents the new paradigm of use of Internet for some very
      serious and unprecedented hegemonic control over the world by the
      US and its allied groups. <br><span><font color="#888888">
      <br>
      parminder  <br>
      <br>
    </font></span></font><div><div>On Friday 24 August 2012 11:17 AM, Salanieta T.
    Tamanikaiwaimaro wrote:<br>
    <blockquote type="cite">Dear All,
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>It was not all that long ago when we were alerted to the
        trials and difficulties that colleagues in Syria and Iran were
        going through. The creation of elite armies to hunt down
        dissidents and the restrictive supply of bandwidth to cause a
        lack of access have been challenging for civil society activists
        and civilians.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Kind Regards,</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>
        <div class="gmail_quote">
          <div>
            <table align="center" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="700">
              <tbody>
                <tr>
                  <td>
                    <div style="margin-bottom:2em">
                      <div style="font-weight:bold;font-size:120%;margin:0 0 0.3em;padding:0"><a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/196875.htm" target="_blank"> Smart Sanctions: Confronting
                          Security Threats with Economic Statecraft</a></div>
                      <div style="font-size:90%;margin:0 0 0.3em;padding:0;color:#666666;font-style:italic">08/23/2012
                        03:04 PM EDT</div>
                      <br>
                      <div style="margin:0 0 0.3em;padding:0">
                        <div>
                          <h2><span>Smart Sanctions: Confronting
                              Security Threats with Economic Statecraft</span></h2>
                        </div>
                        <br>
                        <span>Remarks</span>
                        <div><span></span>
                          <div><span>Jose W. Fernandez</span><br>
                            <span>Assistant Secretary</span><span>, Bureau
                              of Economic and Business Affairs</span><span></span></div>
                        </div>
                        <div><span>San Francisco, CA<br>
                          </span>
                        </div>
                        <div>July 25, 2012</div>
                        <br>
                        <hr>
                        <p> </p>
                        <div>
                          <p><b>Introduction</b></p>
                          <p>Good evening. Thank you for the
                            introduction. I’m delighted to be in San
                            Francisco and at the World Affairs Council.</p>
                          <p>I am here to talk about sanctions. Now, I
                            didn’t come into the State Department to get
                            involved in sanctions. I came to support
                            development, promoting American values, and
                            helping U.S. business to compete abroad and
                            create jobs here. But if Clausewitz wrote
                            that “war is diplomacy carried out by other
                            means,” my time at that State Department has
                            taught me that sanctions too are a form of
                            diplomacy. And this is nothing new.</p>
                          <p>Throughout world history, effective
                            diplomacy and statecraft more often than
                            not, required a nation to use its commercial
                            and economic leverage to achieve political
                            and strategic goals. Within this narrow
                            focus, the use of sanctions to exploit that
                            leverage is virtually as old as diplomacy
                            itself. Indeed one of the earliest recorded
                            uses of economic sanctions was by ancient
                            Athens. Pericles ordered all trade between
                            Athens and Megra banned in retaliation for
                            Megra’s support of Sparta. In more recent
                            decades, sanctions were used against a
                            number of countries, such as South Africa
                            for apartheid and Serbia for its actions
                            during the break-up of Yugoslavia. The fact
                            of the matter is that, while there are many
                            carrots that can be offered to countries –
                            development assistance or increased access
                            to markets – economic sanctions is one of
                            the few sticks…short of war.</p>
                          <p>For the United States, the sticks we use
                            today have evolved from the historic
                            policies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that
                            shut out Castro’s Cuba from the global
                            economy, and halted Iranian Oil in 1979
                            after the takeover of the American Embassy
                            in Tehran. These days, our approach is more
                            calibrated. Instead of imposing only
                            wholesale embargos on all of a nation’s
                            trade, our deeper understanding of the many
                            complex relationships, transactions and
                            interactions that make up a nation’s economy
                            enables us to craft sanctions regimes that
                            can focus on certain sectors and actors,
                            which more effectively achieve our goal
                            while avoiding collateral damage. Those
                            targeted measures are what we call “smart
                            sanctions,” and that’s what I would like to
                            talk about: how smart sanctions can be an
                            effective foreign policy tool, and how smart
                            implementation of sanctions promotes
                            American economic prosperity and national
                            security.</p>
                          <p>We start with the reality that there are
                            many foreign policy priorities that will
                            compete with sanctions: negotiating new
                            trade agreements with Korea and Colombia,
                            managing relationships with strategic allies
                            such as Pakistan and Russia, and supporting
                            the transitions in North Africa. So where do
                            sanctions fit within our priorities?</p>
                          <p><b>Smart Sanctions</b></p>
                          <p>When we discuss smart sanctions, the first
                            question is: “What is our goal?” What are we
                            trying to achieve? Sanctions are generally
                            invoked for one of three purposes: 1) to
                            change a government’s or private actor’s
                            unacceptable behavior; 2) to constrain such
                            behavior going forward; and/or 3) to expose
                            behavior through censure. The goal is to
                            raise the economic cost of unacceptable
                            behavior and denying the resources that make
                            it possible.</p>
                          <p>Given these goals, what are our available
                            tools? Well, as we ratchet up pressure,
                            sanctions increase and change. At the most
                            basic level, we withhold U.S. government
                            cooperation, such as by prohibiting
                            development assistance. But, this only gets
                            us so far, because most of the bad actors in
                            this world don’t get a lot of assistance. As
                            we move to a higher level, we look to freeze
                            the assets of individuals and governments
                            and restrict their access to the U.S. market
                            or prevent them from receiving visas.
                            Finally, we might also ban exports or
                            imports from countries for certain
                            activities, as in the case of Iran for
                            refusing to address the international
                            community’s concerns about its nuclear
                            program.</p>
                          <p>An even more aggressive approach involves
                            the use of “secondary sanctions.” These
                            measures act against companies in third
                            countries who do business with a
                            U.S.-sanctioned target, thereby indirectly
                            supporting the behavior of the bad actor.
                            Ultimately, making that institution choose
                            between doing business with a rogue country
                            or operating in the United States.</p>
                          <p>But at the same time that we consider the
                            optimum sanctions for a given objective, an
                            important element for consideration is how
                            to ensure that sanctions are structured to
                            achieve the desired outcome, while
                            minimizing collateral damage to U.S. and
                            other interests.</p>
                          <p>This unwanted collateral damage includes
                            investments, economic and trade relations
                            that we want to maintain, and protecting
                            innocent citizens in the targeted country.
                            For example, in Iran, the door is still open
                            for the sale of agriculture products and
                            medicine. <span style="background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Approval
                              was given for NGOs working to empower
                              Iranian women</span>, support heart
                            surgery for children, <span style="background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">for
                              consultants on a telecom fiber optic ring</span>,
                            for a lawyer’s association providing legal
                            training, and for a media company that
                            filmed an Iranian election. So our smart
                            sanctions are targeted.</p>
                          <p>Effective diplomatic leadership is also
                            crucial to effective sanctions. Sanctions
                            are more likely to have an impact when many
                            countries participate. The more global
                            leaders are on board in imposing sanctions,
                            the more powerful the message that certain
                            behavior is unacceptable in today’s world.</p>
                          <p>So, let’s look at a few recent cases –
                            Iran, Syria, Burma, and Libya – and review
                            our sanctions policy.</p>
                          <p><b>1) </b><b>Iran</b></p>
                          <p>Iran’s destabilizing actions speak for
                            themselves: refusal to address international
                            concerns about its nuclear program; defiance
                            of UN Security Council resolutions; support
                            for terrorism, and efforts to stir regional
                            unrest, all present a grave threat to
                            international peace and security. Iran
                            remains one of our top foreign policy and
                            international security priorities.</p>
                          <p>Smart sanctions have played a prominent
                            role in the success of the Administration’s
                            dual-track policy of pressure and engagement
                            to compel Tehran to address the concerns of
                            the international community over its nuclear
                            program. In fact, senior Iranian officials,
                            including President Ahmadinejad have
                            acknowledged the negative impact of
                            sanctions. The macroeconomic indicators tell
                            the story: the Iranian rial has lost nearly
                            half of its value in nine months, oil
                            exports and revenues are down significantly,
                            and inflation is rampant throughout the
                            economy.</p>
                          <p>The Administration’s recent actions on
                            sanctions include:</p>
                          <ul>
                            <li> An Executive Order targeting
                              development of Iran’s upstream oil and gas
                              industry and petrochemical sector. This
                              order expands existing sanctions by
                              authorizing asset freezes on persons who
                              knowingly support Iran’s ability to
                              develop its petroleum and petrochemical
                              sector, which is one of Iran’s primary
                              sources of funding for public projects
                              like uranium enrichment.</li>
                            <li> President Obama also enacted
                              legislation targeting the Central Bank and
                              Iran’s oil revenues. Section 1245 of the
                              2012 National Defense Authorization Act
                              (NDAA) places sanctions on foreign
                              financial institutions for significant
                              transactions related to the Central Bank
                              of Iran (CBI) and designated Iranian
                              financial institutions. As a measure of
                              the successful implementation of the
                              legislation, some 20 countries have
                              qualified for banking exceptions under the
                              NDAA because they significantly reduced
                              their purchase of Iranian crude oil.</li>
                          </ul>
                          <p>In addition, the 27-member European Union
                            implemented a full embargo on Iranian crude
                            oil effective July 1.</p>
                          <p>The possibility of sanctions has persuaded
                            many firms to discontinue their business
                            with Iran - Total, Shell, Statoil (Norway),
                            Edison International (Italy), and many, many
                            others. In fact, an Iranian official
                            recently admitted that sanctions have led,
                            according to their estimates, to a 20-30
                            percent reduction in sales of Iranian crude
                            oil. This translates into almost $8 billion
                            in lost revenue every quarter.</p>
                          <p>Our efforts aren’t limited to oil: as a
                            result of U.S. and multilateral sanctions,
                            major shipping lines have ceased servicing
                            Iranian ports. The Islamic Republic of Iran
                            Shipping Lines (IRISL), Iran’s major
                            shipping line, and the National Iranian
                            Tanker Company, Iran’s tanker fleet, have
                            had increasing difficulty in receiving
                            flagging, insurance, and other shipping
                            services from reputable providers. This
                            further decreases Iran’s ability to gain
                            revenue.</p>
                          <p>As we continue to seek progress on the
                            negotiating front, we will maintain
                            unrelenting pressure on Tehran. We know the
                            pressure we are bringing to bear has been
                            vital to getting Iran to the negotiating
                            table. We all have a stake in resolving the
                            international community’s concerns about
                            Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy if
                            we can, and so we will continue our work
                            with countries around the world to keep
                            pressure on Tehran.</p>
                          <p><b>2) </b><b>Syria</b></p>
                          <p>Although Iran sanctions continue to produce
                            results, Syria requires a different
                            approach. Indeed, as the death toll rises
                            above 17,000, the Syria crisis becomes
                            graver every minute. There are food
                            shortages. There is a lack of safe access to
                            adequate medical services. Syrian families
                            are fleeing the country and registering in
                            refugee camps in neighboring countries. It
                            is a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian
                            crisis.</p>
                          <p>Our goal in Syria is to support a
                            democratic transition that reflects the
                            legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.
                            The United States looks to its sanctions
                            toolbox to isolate Asad and deprive him of
                            financial resources that allow him to
                            continue attacking the Syrian people.</p>
                          <p>Even before the current outbreak of
                            violence in February 2011, the United States
                            had several sanctions programs against Syria
                            as a result of Syrian support for terrorism.
                            <span style="background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">More
                              recently, we applied U.S. sanctions
                              through a series of Executive Orders,
                              issued by President Obama, targeting
                              individuals who use information technology
                              to commit human rights abuses, senior
                              officials of the Syrian government, and
                              supporters of the regime such as some
                              Syrian businessmen.</span></p>
                          <p>The United States joined with likeminded
                            countries in a multilateral group known as
                            the “Friends of the Syrian People.” Through
                            this group, we work with other countries to
                            harmonize implementation of national
                            sanctions regimes and coordinate efforts for
                            implementing a multi-lateral sanctions
                            regime. The work of this group is especially
                            important given some countries have
                            effectively blocked a UN Security Council
                            resolution calling for international
                            sanctions.</p>
                          <p>In the group, we synchronize the
                            individuals and entities targeted by the
                            sanctions, and discuss ways to strengthen
                            sanctions by identifying measures that will
                            impact the Assad regime while permitting
                            legitimate trade to continue to flow.</p>
                          <p>So far, U.S. and international sanctions
                            have had a significant effect on Assad’s
                            reserves, and are making it difficult for
                            the regime to finance its brutality.</p>
                          <p>But what happens when sanctions are
                            successful? How quickly do you unwind?</p>
                          <p><b>3) </b><b>Burma</b></p>
                          <p>Recent positive developments in Burma, that
                            were unimaginable just last year, led the
                            Administration to implement an innovative
                            approach that eases certain sanctions and
                            incentivizes further political and economic
                            reform. Within the past year, over 500
                            political prisoners have been released, and
                            the government and several armed ethnic
                            groups (some of whom have been fighting
                            against the government since 1948) have
                            reached preliminary ceasefire agreements.
                            Pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi
                            re-registered her party and stood for office
                            in recent parliamentary by-elections. She,
                            along with 42 other candidates from her
                            party, was elected to Parliament in early
                            April.</p>
                          <p>The Burmese parliament has also taken
                            several steps towards reform, including
                            passing new legislation to protect the
                            freedom of assembly and the right of workers
                            to form labor unions. The government is also
                            taking steps to bring increased transparency
                            to the national budget.</p>
                          <p>Burma became subject to U.S. sanctions in
                            the 1990s. Those sanctions were not
                            universally emulated by many of our
                            traditional allies. But, our sanctions are
                            credited with helping to persuade Burma’s
                            leadership to reconsider its long-term
                            interests and move toward democratic reform.
                            And now the country is becoming a case study
                            in how difficult it is to be “smart” about
                            easing sanctions. Our sanctions were
                            initially developed before we gave serious
                            consideration to the structure of sanctions
                            and they were not built with an exit
                            strategy in mind. That’s made it more
                            difficult to address the developments of the
                            last year, and it’s been a valuable lesson
                            for crafting future sanctions regimes.</p>
                          <p>With regard to Burma, even though many of
                            our international partners moved to fully
                            suspend their sanctions, we opted for a
                            different route: We are easing our
                            sanctions, but in a calibrated manner. Even
                            after our most recent easing, we remain
                            vigilant about the protection of human
                            rights, corruption, and the role of the
                            military in the Burmese economy. Our
                            approach aims to support democratic reform
                            while aiding in the development of an
                            economic and business environment that
                            provides benefits to all of Burma’s people.</p>
                          <p>In forming our easing policy, we were also
                            mindful of the desire for American companies
                            to contribute to improved human rights,
                            worker rights, environmental protection, and
                            transparency in Burma, including the need to
                            improve the transparency of the Myanma Oil
                            and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Burma’s
                            state-owned oil company. We sought to do so
                            while working for a broad easing across
                            sectors. And we did something that hadn’t
                            been done before in a license context: we
                            integrated novel reporting requirements into
                            the new investment license. These
                            requirements, which will have a public
                            transparency component, cover issues such as
                            due diligence in protecting human rights and
                            worker rights, and transparency in land
                            acquisition and payments to the Burmese
                            government, including state-owned
                            enterprises. In addition, companies working
                            with MOGE must report their investment
                            within 60 days. The purpose of the public
                            reporting is to promote greater transparency
                            and encourage civil society to partner with
                            our companies toward responsible investment.
                            We want American companies to take advantage
                            of the new opportunities. We think that by
                            allowing them to invest in Burma provides an
                            opportunity to share American values,
                            transparency, and model corporate governance
                            in the country.</p>
                          <p>Another key element of this policy can be
                            found in the general license. While
                            permitting new investment and financial
                            services, we do not authorize new investment
                            with the Burmese Ministry of Defense, state
                            or non-state armed groups (which includes
                            the military), or entities owned by them.
                            U.S. persons are also still prohibited from
                            dealing with blocked persons, including
                            listed Specially Designated Nationals
                            (SDNs), as well as any entities 50 percent
                            or more owned by an SDN. It’s also important
                            to keep in mind that the core authorities
                            underlying our sanctions remain in place.
                            They weren’t terminated, just suspended.
                            This means that back sliding by the Burmese
                            government, or other potential spoilers, on
                            democracy, human rights, etc., can be
                            countered with the appropriate measures.</p>
                          <p>We took the suspension route because while
                            we are encouraged by the positive steps that
                            President Thein Sein and his government have
                            taken toward a more civilian led and
                            democratic government, concerns still
                            remain. These concerns include the continued
                            detention of hundreds of political
                            prisoners, ongoing conflict in ethnic areas,
                            and Burma’s military relationship with North
                            Korea. Going forward, we hope our calibrated
                            approach results in increased democratic
                            values and economic opportunities, and
                            diminish human rights abuses. But, again, we
                            have also maintained flexibility to further
                            ease, or re-impose, restrictions as
                            necessary. So stay tuned on Burma. We are.</p>
                          <p>So, let’s look at one of our recent
                            successes?</p>
                          <p><b>4) </b><b>Libya</b></p>
                          <p>After suffering from more than four decades
                            of erratic and abusive rule by Muammar
                            Qadhafi, the people of Libya rose up on
                            early 2011. As the Libyan grassroots
                            opposition grew in strength, Qadhafi
                            recognized that his grip on power was
                            threatened. He responded by unleashing the
                            Libyan military on his own citizens.</p>
                          <p>Working closely with our allies around the
                            world, the United States moved rapidly to
                            support the Libyan people. Our efforts
                            included launching a major economic
                            sanctions program specifically geared to
                            target Qadhafi and his cronies. The program
                            sought to deprive Qadhafi of the resources
                            necessary to sustain his assault, to
                            preserve Libya’s wealth for its people, and
                            to signal to Qadhafi and his allies that
                            they were isolated and their days were
                            numbered. These efforts were on both
                            domestic and multilateral fronts.</p>
                          <p>Domestically, the U.S. government reached
                            out to U.S. financial institutions to
                            identify assets controlled by the Libyan
                            government, Qadhafi, his family, and their
                            cronies, in anticipation of a new sanctions
                            program, and here we have a pleasant
                            surprise: freezing Libyan assets had a far
                            greater impact than first expected. For
                            example, just one financial institution held
                            assets of over $29 billion; another held
                            almost $500 million in a single portfolio.
                            Freezing these assets substantially
                            constrained Qadhafi’s campaign.</p>
                          <p>But we do not act alone: just as the United
                            States reacted with unprecedented speed, so
                            too did the international community. The day
                            after President Obama signed the Executive
                            Order to freeze over $30 billion in Libyan
                            assets, the UN Security Council imposed
                            sanctions targeting the individuals most
                            responsible for the violence. As the
                            conflict intensified, the Security Council
                            expanded its approach, imposing further
                            sanctions on key financial and economic
                            institutions, such as the Libyan Central
                            Bank, the National Oil Corporation, and a
                            number of Libyan sovereign wealth funds.</p>
                          <p>Unilateral and multilateral sanctions,
                            reinforced with intense diplomatic and
                            military efforts, hastened the demise of the
                            Qadhafi regime. Targeted sanctions appeared
                            to motivate Libyan leaders to defect, like
                            the Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa. Broad
                            private sector support in implementing
                            sanctions removed the resources Qadhafi
                            needed to supply his military and pay his
                            mercenaries, and safeguarded the wealth of
                            the Libyan people from Qadhafi and his
                            cronies. Ultimately, this allowed Libya’s
                            people to courageously liberate themselves
                            and begin a new, democratic era. Our goal
                            then became to lead a rapid transition to
                            ease sanctions and help Libya re-open for
                            business.</p>
                          <p>Last April, I traveled with representatives
                            from twenty U. S. companies to Tripoli. We
                            followed up on U.S. commitments to deepen
                            economic and commercial relations with Libya
                            in the aftermath of Qadhafi. While there, I
                            was met with overwhelming goodwill for the
                            U.S. and appreciation for U.S. leadership in
                            the international operation to protect
                            Libyan civilians against Qadhafi’s regime,
                            and in following through with ensuring the
                            new Libya was on a path to rebound.</p>
                          <p><b>Conclusion</b></p>
                          <p>Iran, Syria, Burma, and Libya remind us
                            there is no one-size-fits-all sanctions
                            strategy. Sanctions tools have to be
                            flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing
                            conditions. From each application of
                            sanctions, we learn a new lesson. What we
                            learned from unwinding the Libya sanctions,
                            we applied to Burma, and will help us as
                            events unfold in Syria.</p>
                          <p>We’ve seen success in Libya, changes in
                            Burma, and acknowledgement of an impact in
                            Iran. While the results may take months or
                            years to be apparent, we know economic
                            sanctions work. They can be a powerful tool
                            in diplomacy – a stick whose use we are
                            constantly evaluating and working to
                            improve, and to keep smart.</p>
                          <p>Thank you.</p>
                        </div>
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                              of Public Affairs, manages this site as a
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        -- <br>
        <div>Salanieta Tamanikaiwaimaro aka Sala</div>
        <div>P.O. Box 17862</div>
        <div>Suva</div>
        <div>Fiji</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Twitter: @SalanietaT</div>
        <div>Skype:Salanieta.Tamanikaiwaimaro</div>
        <div>Fiji Cell: <a href="tel:%2B679%20998%202851" value="+6799982851" target="_blank">+679 998 2851</a></div><br>
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