The USG, very much like a sorcerer apprentice, is escalating threats around the world.<br>As history has taught many times the end result is quite predictable.<br>Louis<br>- - -<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Aug 26, 2012 at 3:41 PM, parminder <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:parminder@itforchange.net" target="_blank">parminder@itforchange.net</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<font face="Verdana"><br>
Sanctions against other countries as a coercive measure was bad
enough, but still country to country sanction have been around for
long, and can be understood. What is called as 'smart sanctions'
below is a very problematic category - whereby US state is able to
exercise coercive power on specific individuals and groups within
another country. Till now use of coercive power within the
territory of a state was a (defining) sovereign right of the
concerned national governments. This new development potentially
re-writes the political scape of our world.<br>
<br>
Expectedly, Internet as a cross-border artefact of communication
and control, with US's hegemonic position vis a vis the global
Internet, is a key instrument of such selective 'smart sanctions',
which is and will be the new basis of extra-territorial political
control by the US. (BTW, the most unacceptable 'drone attack's by
the US inside Pakistan's territory is another case of such
targeted 'smart sanctions' as against conventional country to
country wars.)<br>
<br>
It will be interesting to know the details of how the US based
Internet behemoths like google, facebook, microsoft etc actually
collaborate with the US state for such 'smart sanctions' which
will form the basis of US's global control. The stuff we have been
reading about the US state forming close operating relationships
with these global Internet companies is lot about such 'smart
sanctions'. And there is such a cloak of secrecy over these
arrangements (for ex </font>
<p><a href="http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/03/doj-asks-court-to-keep-secret-any-partnership-between-google-nsa.html" target="_blank">http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/03/doj-asks-court-to-keep-secret-any-partnership-between-google-nsa.html </a>
</p>
<font face="Verdana"><br>
There are very dangerous forerunners to a new US hegemonic global
regime with selective co-optation of groups and classes from
different countries. Manuel Castell's famous network theory gives
a very good analysis of the proclivities of the network for such
centralised control with selective co-optation. It is chillingly
alarming how true to the theory is the phenomenon playing out.<br>
<br>
For those who wonder why the ICANN model under US control which
largely deals with not very consequential issues (and I agree to
this more than most people here) is such a red rag to so many of
us. It is so becuase the US control over the ICANN model, and its
support among so many despite its patently undemocratic nature,
represents the new paradigm of use of Internet for some very
serious and unprecedented hegemonic control over the world by the
US and its allied groups. <br><span><font color="#888888">
<br>
parminder <br>
<br>
</font></span></font><div><div>On Friday 24 August 2012 11:17 AM, Salanieta T.
Tamanikaiwaimaro wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Dear All,
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It was not all that long ago when we were alerted to the
trials and difficulties that colleagues in Syria and Iran were
going through. The creation of elite armies to hunt down
dissidents and the restrictive supply of bandwidth to cause a
lack of access have been challenging for civil society activists
and civilians.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Kind Regards,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div>
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<div style="font-weight:bold;font-size:120%;margin:0 0 0.3em;padding:0"><a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/196875.htm" target="_blank"> Smart Sanctions: Confronting
Security Threats with Economic Statecraft</a></div>
<div style="font-size:90%;margin:0 0 0.3em;padding:0;color:#666666;font-style:italic">08/23/2012
03:04 PM EDT</div>
<br>
<div style="margin:0 0 0.3em;padding:0">
<div>
<h2><span>Smart Sanctions: Confronting
Security Threats with Economic Statecraft</span></h2>
</div>
<br>
<span>Remarks</span>
<div><span></span>
<div><span>Jose W. Fernandez</span><br>
<span>Assistant Secretary</span><span>, Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs</span><span></span></div>
</div>
<div><span>San Francisco, CA<br>
</span>
</div>
<div>July 25, 2012</div>
<br>
<hr>
<p> </p>
<div>
<p><b>Introduction</b></p>
<p>Good evening. Thank you for the
introduction. I’m delighted to be in San
Francisco and at the World Affairs Council.</p>
<p>I am here to talk about sanctions. Now, I
didn’t come into the State Department to get
involved in sanctions. I came to support
development, promoting American values, and
helping U.S. business to compete abroad and
create jobs here. But if Clausewitz wrote
that “war is diplomacy carried out by other
means,” my time at that State Department has
taught me that sanctions too are a form of
diplomacy. And this is nothing new.</p>
<p>Throughout world history, effective
diplomacy and statecraft more often than
not, required a nation to use its commercial
and economic leverage to achieve political
and strategic goals. Within this narrow
focus, the use of sanctions to exploit that
leverage is virtually as old as diplomacy
itself. Indeed one of the earliest recorded
uses of economic sanctions was by ancient
Athens. Pericles ordered all trade between
Athens and Megra banned in retaliation for
Megra’s support of Sparta. In more recent
decades, sanctions were used against a
number of countries, such as South Africa
for apartheid and Serbia for its actions
during the break-up of Yugoslavia. The fact
of the matter is that, while there are many
carrots that can be offered to countries –
development assistance or increased access
to markets – economic sanctions is one of
the few sticks…short of war.</p>
<p>For the United States, the sticks we use
today have evolved from the historic
policies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that
shut out Castro’s Cuba from the global
economy, and halted Iranian Oil in 1979
after the takeover of the American Embassy
in Tehran. These days, our approach is more
calibrated. Instead of imposing only
wholesale embargos on all of a nation’s
trade, our deeper understanding of the many
complex relationships, transactions and
interactions that make up a nation’s economy
enables us to craft sanctions regimes that
can focus on certain sectors and actors,
which more effectively achieve our goal
while avoiding collateral damage. Those
targeted measures are what we call “smart
sanctions,” and that’s what I would like to
talk about: how smart sanctions can be an
effective foreign policy tool, and how smart
implementation of sanctions promotes
American economic prosperity and national
security.</p>
<p>We start with the reality that there are
many foreign policy priorities that will
compete with sanctions: negotiating new
trade agreements with Korea and Colombia,
managing relationships with strategic allies
such as Pakistan and Russia, and supporting
the transitions in North Africa. So where do
sanctions fit within our priorities?</p>
<p><b>Smart Sanctions</b></p>
<p>When we discuss smart sanctions, the first
question is: “What is our goal?” What are we
trying to achieve? Sanctions are generally
invoked for one of three purposes: 1) to
change a government’s or private actor’s
unacceptable behavior; 2) to constrain such
behavior going forward; and/or 3) to expose
behavior through censure. The goal is to
raise the economic cost of unacceptable
behavior and denying the resources that make
it possible.</p>
<p>Given these goals, what are our available
tools? Well, as we ratchet up pressure,
sanctions increase and change. At the most
basic level, we withhold U.S. government
cooperation, such as by prohibiting
development assistance. But, this only gets
us so far, because most of the bad actors in
this world don’t get a lot of assistance. As
we move to a higher level, we look to freeze
the assets of individuals and governments
and restrict their access to the U.S. market
or prevent them from receiving visas.
Finally, we might also ban exports or
imports from countries for certain
activities, as in the case of Iran for
refusing to address the international
community’s concerns about its nuclear
program.</p>
<p>An even more aggressive approach involves
the use of “secondary sanctions.” These
measures act against companies in third
countries who do business with a
U.S.-sanctioned target, thereby indirectly
supporting the behavior of the bad actor.
Ultimately, making that institution choose
between doing business with a rogue country
or operating in the United States.</p>
<p>But at the same time that we consider the
optimum sanctions for a given objective, an
important element for consideration is how
to ensure that sanctions are structured to
achieve the desired outcome, while
minimizing collateral damage to U.S. and
other interests.</p>
<p>This unwanted collateral damage includes
investments, economic and trade relations
that we want to maintain, and protecting
innocent citizens in the targeted country.
For example, in Iran, the door is still open
for the sale of agriculture products and
medicine. <span style="background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">Approval
was given for NGOs working to empower
Iranian women</span>, support heart
surgery for children, <span style="background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">for
consultants on a telecom fiber optic ring</span>,
for a lawyer’s association providing legal
training, and for a media company that
filmed an Iranian election. So our smart
sanctions are targeted.</p>
<p>Effective diplomatic leadership is also
crucial to effective sanctions. Sanctions
are more likely to have an impact when many
countries participate. The more global
leaders are on board in imposing sanctions,
the more powerful the message that certain
behavior is unacceptable in today’s world.</p>
<p>So, let’s look at a few recent cases –
Iran, Syria, Burma, and Libya – and review
our sanctions policy.</p>
<p><b>1) </b><b>Iran</b></p>
<p>Iran’s destabilizing actions speak for
themselves: refusal to address international
concerns about its nuclear program; defiance
of UN Security Council resolutions; support
for terrorism, and efforts to stir regional
unrest, all present a grave threat to
international peace and security. Iran
remains one of our top foreign policy and
international security priorities.</p>
<p>Smart sanctions have played a prominent
role in the success of the Administration’s
dual-track policy of pressure and engagement
to compel Tehran to address the concerns of
the international community over its nuclear
program. In fact, senior Iranian officials,
including President Ahmadinejad have
acknowledged the negative impact of
sanctions. The macroeconomic indicators tell
the story: the Iranian rial has lost nearly
half of its value in nine months, oil
exports and revenues are down significantly,
and inflation is rampant throughout the
economy.</p>
<p>The Administration’s recent actions on
sanctions include:</p>
<ul>
<li> An Executive Order targeting
development of Iran’s upstream oil and gas
industry and petrochemical sector. This
order expands existing sanctions by
authorizing asset freezes on persons who
knowingly support Iran’s ability to
develop its petroleum and petrochemical
sector, which is one of Iran’s primary
sources of funding for public projects
like uranium enrichment.</li>
<li> President Obama also enacted
legislation targeting the Central Bank and
Iran’s oil revenues. Section 1245 of the
2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) places sanctions on foreign
financial institutions for significant
transactions related to the Central Bank
of Iran (CBI) and designated Iranian
financial institutions. As a measure of
the successful implementation of the
legislation, some 20 countries have
qualified for banking exceptions under the
NDAA because they significantly reduced
their purchase of Iranian crude oil.</li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, the 27-member European Union
implemented a full embargo on Iranian crude
oil effective July 1.</p>
<p>The possibility of sanctions has persuaded
many firms to discontinue their business
with Iran - Total, Shell, Statoil (Norway),
Edison International (Italy), and many, many
others. In fact, an Iranian official
recently admitted that sanctions have led,
according to their estimates, to a 20-30
percent reduction in sales of Iranian crude
oil. This translates into almost $8 billion
in lost revenue every quarter.</p>
<p>Our efforts aren’t limited to oil: as a
result of U.S. and multilateral sanctions,
major shipping lines have ceased servicing
Iranian ports. The Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL), Iran’s major
shipping line, and the National Iranian
Tanker Company, Iran’s tanker fleet, have
had increasing difficulty in receiving
flagging, insurance, and other shipping
services from reputable providers. This
further decreases Iran’s ability to gain
revenue.</p>
<p>As we continue to seek progress on the
negotiating front, we will maintain
unrelenting pressure on Tehran. We know the
pressure we are bringing to bear has been
vital to getting Iran to the negotiating
table. We all have a stake in resolving the
international community’s concerns about
Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy if
we can, and so we will continue our work
with countries around the world to keep
pressure on Tehran.</p>
<p><b>2) </b><b>Syria</b></p>
<p>Although Iran sanctions continue to produce
results, Syria requires a different
approach. Indeed, as the death toll rises
above 17,000, the Syria crisis becomes
graver every minute. There are food
shortages. There is a lack of safe access to
adequate medical services. Syrian families
are fleeing the country and registering in
refugee camps in neighboring countries. It
is a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian
crisis.</p>
<p>Our goal in Syria is to support a
democratic transition that reflects the
legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.
The United States looks to its sanctions
toolbox to isolate Asad and deprive him of
financial resources that allow him to
continue attacking the Syrian people.</p>
<p>Even before the current outbreak of
violence in February 2011, the United States
had several sanctions programs against Syria
as a result of Syrian support for terrorism.
<span style="background-color:rgb(255,255,0)">More
recently, we applied U.S. sanctions
through a series of Executive Orders,
issued by President Obama, targeting
individuals who use information technology
to commit human rights abuses, senior
officials of the Syrian government, and
supporters of the regime such as some
Syrian businessmen.</span></p>
<p>The United States joined with likeminded
countries in a multilateral group known as
the “Friends of the Syrian People.” Through
this group, we work with other countries to
harmonize implementation of national
sanctions regimes and coordinate efforts for
implementing a multi-lateral sanctions
regime. The work of this group is especially
important given some countries have
effectively blocked a UN Security Council
resolution calling for international
sanctions.</p>
<p>In the group, we synchronize the
individuals and entities targeted by the
sanctions, and discuss ways to strengthen
sanctions by identifying measures that will
impact the Assad regime while permitting
legitimate trade to continue to flow.</p>
<p>So far, U.S. and international sanctions
have had a significant effect on Assad’s
reserves, and are making it difficult for
the regime to finance its brutality.</p>
<p>But what happens when sanctions are
successful? How quickly do you unwind?</p>
<p><b>3) </b><b>Burma</b></p>
<p>Recent positive developments in Burma, that
were unimaginable just last year, led the
Administration to implement an innovative
approach that eases certain sanctions and
incentivizes further political and economic
reform. Within the past year, over 500
political prisoners have been released, and
the government and several armed ethnic
groups (some of whom have been fighting
against the government since 1948) have
reached preliminary ceasefire agreements.
Pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi
re-registered her party and stood for office
in recent parliamentary by-elections. She,
along with 42 other candidates from her
party, was elected to Parliament in early
April.</p>
<p>The Burmese parliament has also taken
several steps towards reform, including
passing new legislation to protect the
freedom of assembly and the right of workers
to form labor unions. The government is also
taking steps to bring increased transparency
to the national budget.</p>
<p>Burma became subject to U.S. sanctions in
the 1990s. Those sanctions were not
universally emulated by many of our
traditional allies. But, our sanctions are
credited with helping to persuade Burma’s
leadership to reconsider its long-term
interests and move toward democratic reform.
And now the country is becoming a case study
in how difficult it is to be “smart” about
easing sanctions. Our sanctions were
initially developed before we gave serious
consideration to the structure of sanctions
and they were not built with an exit
strategy in mind. That’s made it more
difficult to address the developments of the
last year, and it’s been a valuable lesson
for crafting future sanctions regimes.</p>
<p>With regard to Burma, even though many of
our international partners moved to fully
suspend their sanctions, we opted for a
different route: We are easing our
sanctions, but in a calibrated manner. Even
after our most recent easing, we remain
vigilant about the protection of human
rights, corruption, and the role of the
military in the Burmese economy. Our
approach aims to support democratic reform
while aiding in the development of an
economic and business environment that
provides benefits to all of Burma’s people.</p>
<p>In forming our easing policy, we were also
mindful of the desire for American companies
to contribute to improved human rights,
worker rights, environmental protection, and
transparency in Burma, including the need to
improve the transparency of the Myanma Oil
and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Burma’s
state-owned oil company. We sought to do so
while working for a broad easing across
sectors. And we did something that hadn’t
been done before in a license context: we
integrated novel reporting requirements into
the new investment license. These
requirements, which will have a public
transparency component, cover issues such as
due diligence in protecting human rights and
worker rights, and transparency in land
acquisition and payments to the Burmese
government, including state-owned
enterprises. In addition, companies working
with MOGE must report their investment
within 60 days. The purpose of the public
reporting is to promote greater transparency
and encourage civil society to partner with
our companies toward responsible investment.
We want American companies to take advantage
of the new opportunities. We think that by
allowing them to invest in Burma provides an
opportunity to share American values,
transparency, and model corporate governance
in the country.</p>
<p>Another key element of this policy can be
found in the general license. While
permitting new investment and financial
services, we do not authorize new investment
with the Burmese Ministry of Defense, state
or non-state armed groups (which includes
the military), or entities owned by them.
U.S. persons are also still prohibited from
dealing with blocked persons, including
listed Specially Designated Nationals
(SDNs), as well as any entities 50 percent
or more owned by an SDN. It’s also important
to keep in mind that the core authorities
underlying our sanctions remain in place.
They weren’t terminated, just suspended.
This means that back sliding by the Burmese
government, or other potential spoilers, on
democracy, human rights, etc., can be
countered with the appropriate measures.</p>
<p>We took the suspension route because while
we are encouraged by the positive steps that
President Thein Sein and his government have
taken toward a more civilian led and
democratic government, concerns still
remain. These concerns include the continued
detention of hundreds of political
prisoners, ongoing conflict in ethnic areas,
and Burma’s military relationship with North
Korea. Going forward, we hope our calibrated
approach results in increased democratic
values and economic opportunities, and
diminish human rights abuses. But, again, we
have also maintained flexibility to further
ease, or re-impose, restrictions as
necessary. So stay tuned on Burma. We are.</p>
<p>So, let’s look at one of our recent
successes?</p>
<p><b>4) </b><b>Libya</b></p>
<p>After suffering from more than four decades
of erratic and abusive rule by Muammar
Qadhafi, the people of Libya rose up on
early 2011. As the Libyan grassroots
opposition grew in strength, Qadhafi
recognized that his grip on power was
threatened. He responded by unleashing the
Libyan military on his own citizens.</p>
<p>Working closely with our allies around the
world, the United States moved rapidly to
support the Libyan people. Our efforts
included launching a major economic
sanctions program specifically geared to
target Qadhafi and his cronies. The program
sought to deprive Qadhafi of the resources
necessary to sustain his assault, to
preserve Libya’s wealth for its people, and
to signal to Qadhafi and his allies that
they were isolated and their days were
numbered. These efforts were on both
domestic and multilateral fronts.</p>
<p>Domestically, the U.S. government reached
out to U.S. financial institutions to
identify assets controlled by the Libyan
government, Qadhafi, his family, and their
cronies, in anticipation of a new sanctions
program, and here we have a pleasant
surprise: freezing Libyan assets had a far
greater impact than first expected. For
example, just one financial institution held
assets of over $29 billion; another held
almost $500 million in a single portfolio.
Freezing these assets substantially
constrained Qadhafi’s campaign.</p>
<p>But we do not act alone: just as the United
States reacted with unprecedented speed, so
too did the international community. The day
after President Obama signed the Executive
Order to freeze over $30 billion in Libyan
assets, the UN Security Council imposed
sanctions targeting the individuals most
responsible for the violence. As the
conflict intensified, the Security Council
expanded its approach, imposing further
sanctions on key financial and economic
institutions, such as the Libyan Central
Bank, the National Oil Corporation, and a
number of Libyan sovereign wealth funds.</p>
<p>Unilateral and multilateral sanctions,
reinforced with intense diplomatic and
military efforts, hastened the demise of the
Qadhafi regime. Targeted sanctions appeared
to motivate Libyan leaders to defect, like
the Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa. Broad
private sector support in implementing
sanctions removed the resources Qadhafi
needed to supply his military and pay his
mercenaries, and safeguarded the wealth of
the Libyan people from Qadhafi and his
cronies. Ultimately, this allowed Libya’s
people to courageously liberate themselves
and begin a new, democratic era. Our goal
then became to lead a rapid transition to
ease sanctions and help Libya re-open for
business.</p>
<p>Last April, I traveled with representatives
from twenty U. S. companies to Tripoli. We
followed up on U.S. commitments to deepen
economic and commercial relations with Libya
in the aftermath of Qadhafi. While there, I
was met with overwhelming goodwill for the
U.S. and appreciation for U.S. leadership in
the international operation to protect
Libyan civilians against Qadhafi’s regime,
and in following through with ensuring the
new Libya was on a path to rebound.</p>
<p><b>Conclusion</b></p>
<p>Iran, Syria, Burma, and Libya remind us
there is no one-size-fits-all sanctions
strategy. Sanctions tools have to be
flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing
conditions. From each application of
sanctions, we learn a new lesson. What we
learned from unwinding the Libya sanctions,
we applied to Burma, and will help us as
events unfold in Syria.</p>
<p>We’ve seen success in Libya, changes in
Burma, and acknowledgement of an impact in
Iran. While the results may take months or
years to be apparent, we know economic
sanctions work. They can be a powerful tool
in diplomacy – a stick whose use we are
constantly evaluating and working to
improve, and to keep smart.</p>
<p>Thank you.</p>
</div>
<div><br>
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<div><br>
</div>
-- <br>
<div>Salanieta Tamanikaiwaimaro aka Sala</div>
<div>P.O. Box 17862</div>
<div>Suva</div>
<div>Fiji</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Twitter: @SalanietaT</div>
<div>Skype:Salanieta.Tamanikaiwaimaro</div>
<div>Fiji Cell: <a href="tel:%2B679%20998%202851" value="+6799982851" target="_blank">+679 998 2851</a></div><br>
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