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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Norbert, <br>
<br>
Both your initial framing of questions and the way to go forward, and
the new responses to Marilia's email, are very valid, and thought
provoking. Our proposal to look at the institutional mapping and the
way forward separately for CIT/ tech standards on one side and
social-eco-cultural policy issues on the other (not that the division
is absolutely neat) is that there are different actors involved and
actors have different roles, on the two sides. And accordingly there
are different set of legitimate concerns and fears of different actors.
The principal 'problem' on which the 'enhanced cooperation' (or
legitimate global public policy making wrt the Internet) thing is stuck
is precisely the role of different actors, issues around
multistakeholderism (and if so, what kind), the 'equal footing' issue,
technical expertise requirements, nature and legitimacy of
representativity etc, which 'problem' admits to different analysis and
solutions, generally speaking, on the two mentioned sides of the
'enhanced cooperation' issue. <br>
<br>
The technical community, for instance, which can be the most vocal
group raising the 'UN control of the Internet' alarm, may not have so
much of a problem if, say, a UN committee, with proper participative
structure, is merely doing the kind of work OECD's Committee on CICP
(OECD's Internet policy mechanism) does. There is also so much lesser
justification to block any such proposal. This opens the way for some
possibility of dialogue and moving forward in this particular
direction. Similarly, it easier, at least logically, to argue with
developing countries that CIR management and tech standards, even their
oversight aspects, are a different ballgame than typical socio-economic
policy making. In this area, therefore, one can expect more openness to
non-UN, innovative models of oversight whereby we can perhaps include
non-gov expertise/ representativity in decision-making processes in a
relatively more substantive manner. <br>
<br>
As we discuss these issues/ problems separately, the nature of
relationship between them can be discussed at another, different level.
<br>
<br>
I think, giving separate treatment to different parts of a complex
problem, like enhanced cooperation issue clearly </font><font
face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">is</font><font
face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">, is also a scientifically sound
methodology. <br>
<br>
parminder <br>
</font><br>
On Friday 01 June 2012 11:58 AM, Norbert Bollow wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:20120601062832.C53DB1F5A@quill.bollow.ch"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Marilia Maciel <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mariliamaciel@gmail.com"><mariliamaciel@gmail.com></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I think that the questions you propose are good. Could you just explain a
little further why you believe we should not separate CIR and non-CIR? I
think that a neat separation would bring more clarity to the debate.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
I don't have a very strong view on this, but i think that the
fundamental challenge of setting up a good institutional
framework for Enhanced Cooperation (including appropriate
working processes, appropriate principles to guide these
processes, and an appropriate oversight function of some kind
to ensure that the principles are followed in actual reality
and not perverted by means of powerful actors hypocitically
just paying them lip service while ensuring that something
different happens in reality) is pretty much the same
independently of the type of substantive issues (there's CIR
issues, non-CIR issues, issues with CIR and non-CIR aspects,
and issues where it's hard to decide into what category they
should be classified).
In my view, the key fundamental challenge is that any effective
Enhanced Cooperation framework will cause the power of some
currently overly powerful US companies, as well as the power
of the US government to act on behalf of the US copyright
industry, to be deminished. The US government as well as a
significant part of the technical community will be vigorously
opposed to anything with this effect, because they will
perceive any proposal to change the status quo as a threat to
what they perceive as "our ability to make things work right".
My main concern about the proposal of structuring the Enhanced
Cooperation discussion into a CIR and a non-CIR part is that such a
structuring might have effects like
* making it even more difficult than it is already to address
that fundamental challenge, because what needs to be said to
address the fundamental challenge may not necessarily fit well
under either the CIR nor the non-CIR heading,
* dividing the people who are passionate about making Enhanced
Cooperation happen, according to what subject area is where
their main substantive concerns are, instead of allowing us to
work united on establishing a good Enhanced Cooperation
framework. I'd suggest that we should work together at the
present stage and only go our separate ways to work on different
types of substative concerns after the crucial first step of
establishing a good framework for Enhanced Cooperation has
been achieved.
Greetings,
Norbert
</pre>
</blockquote>
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