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href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?hp&pagewanted=print">http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?hp&pagewanted=print</A><BR></DIV>
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<DIV class=timestamp>June 1, 2012</DIV>
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<H1><NYT_HEADLINE type=" " version="1.0">Obama Order Sped Up Wave of
Cyberattacks Against Iran</NYT_HEADLINE></H1><NYT_BYLINE><SPAN
itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="" itemprop="creator">
<H6 class=byline itemprop="name">By <A class=meta-per
title="More Articles by David E. Sanger"
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/david_e_sanger/index.html"
rel=author>DAVID E. SANGER</A></H6></SPAN></NYT_BYLINE><NYT_TEXT>
<DIV id=articleBody><NYT_CORRECTION_TOP></NYT_CORRECTION_TOP>
<P itemprop="articleBody">WASHINGTON — From his first months in office, <A
class=meta-per title="More articles about Barack Obama."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per">President
Obama</A> secretly ordered increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer
systems that run <A class=meta-loc title="More news and information about Iran."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/index.html?inline=nyt-geo">Iran</A>’s
main nuclear enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America’s first
sustained use of cyberweapons, according to participants in the program. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Mr. Obama decided to accelerate the attacks — begun in
the Bush administration and code-named Olympic Games — even after an element of
the program accidentally became public in the summer of 2010 because of a
programming error that allowed it to escape Iran’s Natanz plant and sent it
around the world on the Internet. Computer security experts who began studying
the worm, which had been developed by the United States and Israel, gave it a
name: <A class=meta-classifier title="More articles about Stuxnet and Flame."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_malware/stuxnet/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier">Stuxnet</A>.
</P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">At a tense meeting in the White House Situation Room
within days of the worm’s “escape,” Mr. Obama, Vice President Joseph R. Biden
Jr. and the director of the <A class=meta-org
title="More articles about the Central Intelligence Agency."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/central_intelligence_agency/index.html?inline=nyt-org">Central
Intelligence Agency</A> at the time, Leon E. Panetta, considered whether
America’s most ambitious attempt to slow the progress of Iran’s nuclear efforts
had been fatally compromised. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">“Should we shut this thing down?” Mr. Obama asked,
according to members of the president’s national security team who were in the
room. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Told it was unclear how much the Iranians knew about
the code, and offered evidence that it was still causing havoc, Mr. Obama
decided that the cyberattacks should proceed. In the following weeks, the Natanz
plant was hit by a newer version of the computer worm, and then another after
that. The last of that series of attacks, a few weeks after Stuxnet was detected
around the world, temporarily took out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges
Iran had spinning at the time to purify uranium. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">This account of the American and Israeli effort to
undermine the Iranian <A class=meta-classifier
title="Recent and archival news about Iran's nuclear program."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier">nuclear
program</A> is based on interviews over the past 18 months with current and
former American, European and Israeli officials involved in the program, as well
as a range of outside experts. None would allow their names to be used because
the effort remains highly classified, and parts of it continue to this day. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">These officials gave differing assessments of how
successful the sabotage program was in slowing Iran’s progress toward developing
the ability to build <A class=meta-classifier
title="More articles about nuclear weapons."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier">nuclear
weapons</A>. Internal Obama administration estimates say the effort was set back
by 18 months to two years, but some experts inside and outside the government
are more skeptical, noting that Iran’s enrichment levels have steadily
recovered, giving the country enough fuel today for five or more weapons, with
additional enrichment. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Whether Iran is still trying to design and build a
weapon is in dispute. The most recent United States intelligence estimate
concludes that Iran suspended major parts of its weaponization effort after
2003, though there is evidence that some remnants of it continue. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Iran initially denied that its enrichment facilities
had been hit by Stuxnet, then said it had found the worm and contained it. Last
year, the nation announced that it had begun its own military cyberunit, and
Brig. Gen. Gholamreza Jalali, the head of Iran’s Passive Defense Organization,
said that the Iranian military was prepared “to fight our enemies” in
“cyberspace and Internet warfare.” But there has been scant evidence that it has
begun to strike back. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">The United States government only recently
acknowledged developing cyberweapons, and it has never admitted using them.
There have been reports of one-time attacks against personal computers used by
members of Al Qaeda, and of contemplated attacks against the computers that run
air defense systems, including during the NATO-led air attack on Libya last
year. But Olympic Games was of an entirely different type and sophistication.
</P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">It appears to be the first time the United States has
repeatedly used cyberweapons to cripple another country’s infrastructure,
achieving, with computer code, what until then could be accomplished only by
bombing a country or sending in agents to plant explosives. The code itself is
50 times as big as the typical computer worm, Carey Nachenberg, a vice president
of Symantec, one of the many groups that have dissected the code, said at a
symposium at Stanford University in April. Those forensic investigations into
the inner workings of the code, while picking apart how it worked, came to no
conclusions about who was responsible. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">A similar process is now under way to figure out the
origins of another cyberweapon called <A class=meta-classifier
title="More articles about Stuxnet and Flame."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_malware/stuxnet/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier">Flame</A>
that was recently discovered to have attacked the computers of Iranian
officials, sweeping up information from those machines. But the computer code
appears to be at least five years old, and American officials say that it was
not part of Olympic Games. They have declined to say whether the United States
was responsible for the Flame attack. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many
Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every
attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his
predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of
intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade. He
repeatedly expressed concerns that any American acknowledgment that it was using
cyberweapons — even under the most careful and limited circumstances — could
enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">“We discussed the irony, more than once,” one of his
aides said. Another said that the administration was resistant to developing a
“grand theory for a weapon whose possibilities they were still discovering.” Yet
Mr. Obama concluded that when it came to stopping Iran, the United States had no
other choice. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">If Olympic Games failed, he told aides, there would be
no time for sanctions and diplomacy with Iran to work. Israel could carry out a
conventional military attack, prompting a conflict that could spread throughout
the region. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody"><STRONG>A Bush Initiative</STRONG> </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">The impetus for Olympic Games dates from 2006, when
President <A class=meta-per title="More articles about George W. Bush."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/george_w_bush/index.html?inline=nyt-per">George
W. Bush</A> saw few good options in dealing with Iran. At the time, America’s
European allies were divided about the cost that imposing sanctions on Iran
would have on their own economies. Having falsely accused Saddam Hussein of
reconstituting his nuclear program in Iraq, Mr. Bush had little credibility in
publicly discussing another nation’s nuclear ambitions. The Iranians seemed to
sense his vulnerability, and, frustrated by negotiations, they resumed enriching
uranium at an underground site at Natanz, one whose existence had been exposed
just three years before. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, took reporters
on a tour of the plant and described grand ambitions to install upward of 50,000
centrifuges. For a country with only one nuclear power reactor — whose fuel
comes from Russia — to say that it needed fuel for its civilian nuclear program
seemed dubious to Bush administration officials. They feared that the fuel could
be used in another way besides providing power: to create a stockpile that could
later be enriched to bomb-grade material if the Iranians made a political
decision to do so. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Hawks in the Bush administration like Vice President
Dick Cheney urged Mr. Bush to consider a military strike against the Iranian
nuclear facilities before they could produce fuel suitable for a weapon. Several
times, the administration reviewed military options and concluded that they
would only further inflame a region already at war, and would have uncertain
results. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">For years the C.I.A. had introduced faulty parts and
designs into Iran’s systems — even tinkering with imported power supplies so
that they would blow up — but the sabotage had had relatively little effect.
General James E. Cartwright, who had established a small cyberoperation inside
the United States Strategic Command, which is responsible for many of America’s
nuclear forces, joined intelligence officials in presenting a radical new idea
to Mr. Bush and his national security team. It involved a far more sophisticated
cyberweapon than the United States had designed before. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">The goal was to gain access to the Natanz plant’s
industrial computer controls. That required leaping the electronic moat that cut
the Natanz plant off from the Internet — called the air gap, because it
physically separates the facility from the outside world. The computer code
would invade the specialized computers that command the centrifuges. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">The first stage in the effort was to develop a bit of
computer code called a beacon that could be inserted into the computers, which
were made by the German company Siemens and an Iranian manufacturer, to map
their operations. The idea was to draw the equivalent of an electrical blueprint
of the Natanz plant, to understand how the computers control the giant silvery
centrifuges that spin at tremendous speeds. The connections were complex, and
unless every circuit was understood, efforts to seize control of the centrifuges
could fail. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Eventually the beacon would have to “phone home” —
literally send a message back to the headquarters of the National Security
Agency that would describe the structure and daily rhythms of the enrichment
plant. Expectations for the plan were low; one participant said the goal was
simply to “throw a little sand in the gears” and buy some time. Mr. Bush was
skeptical, but lacking other options, he authorized the effort. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody"><STRONG>Breakthrough, Aided by Israel</STRONG> </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">It took months for the beacons to do their work and
report home, complete with maps of the electronic directories of the controllers
and what amounted to blueprints of how they were connected to the centrifuges
deep underground. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Then the N.S.A. and a secret Israeli unit respected by
American intelligence officials for its cyberskills set to work developing the
enormously complex computer worm that would become the attacker from within.
</P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">The unusually tight collaboration with Israel was
driven by two imperatives. Israel’s Unit 8200, a part of its military, had
technical expertise that rivaled the N.S.A.’s, and the Israelis had deep
intelligence about operations at Natanz that would be vital to making the
cyberattack a success. But American officials had another interest, to dissuade
the Israelis from carrying out their own pre-emptive strike against the Iranian
nuclear facilities. To do that, the Israelis would have to be convinced that the
new line of attack was working. The only way to convince them, several officials
said in interviews, was to have them deeply involved in every aspect of the
program. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Soon the two countries had developed a complex worm
that the Americans called “the bug.” But the bug needed to be tested. So, under
enormous secrecy, the United States began building replicas of Iran’s P-1
centrifuges, an aging, unreliable design that Iran purchased from Abdul Qadeer
Khan, the Pakistani nuclear chief who had begun selling fuel-making technology
on the black market. Fortunately for the United States, it already owned some
P-1s, thanks to the Libyan dictator, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">When Colonel Qaddafi gave up his nuclear weapons
program in 2003, he turned over the centrifuges he had bought from the Pakistani
nuclear ring, and they were placed in storage at a weapons laboratory in
Tennessee. The military and intelligence officials overseeing Olympic Games
borrowed some for what they termed “destructive testing,” essentially building a
virtual replica of Natanz, but spreading the test over several of the Energy
Department’s national laboratories to keep even the most trusted nuclear workers
from figuring out what was afoot. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Those first small-scale tests were surprisingly
successful: the bug invaded the computers, lurking for days or weeks, before
sending instructions to speed them up or slow them down so suddenly that their
delicate parts, spinning at supersonic speeds, self-destructed. After several
false starts, it worked. One day, toward the end of Mr. Bush’s term, the rubble
of a centrifuge was spread out on the conference table in the Situation Room,
proof of the potential power of a cyberweapon. The worm was declared ready to
test against the real target: Iran’s underground enrichment plant. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">“Previous cyberattacks had effects limited to other
computers,” Michael V. Hayden, the former chief of the C.I.A., said, declining
to describe what he knew of these attacks when he was in office. “This is the
first attack of a major nature in which a cyberattack was used to effect
physical destruction,” rather than just slow another computer, or hack into it
to steal data. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">“Somebody crossed the Rubicon,” he said. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Getting the worm into Natanz, however, was no easy
trick. The United States and Israel would have to rely on engineers, maintenance
workers and others — both spies and unwitting accomplices — with physical access
to the plant. “That was our holy grail,” one of the architects of the plan said.
“It turns out there is always an idiot around who doesn’t think much about the
thumb drive in their hand.” </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">In fact, thumb drives turned out to be critical in
spreading the first variants of the computer worm; later, more sophisticated
methods were developed to deliver the malicious code. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">The first attacks were small, and when the centrifuges
began spinning out of control in 2008, the Iranians were mystified about the
cause, according to intercepts that the United States later picked up. “The
thinking was that the Iranians would blame bad parts, or bad engineering, or
just incompetence,” one of the architects of the early attack said. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">The Iranians were confused partly because no two
attacks were exactly alike. Moreover, the code would lurk inside the plant for
weeks, recording normal operations; when it attacked, it sent signals to the
Natanz control room indicating that everything downstairs was operating
normally. “This may have been the most brilliant part of the code,” one American
official said. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Later, word circulated through the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna-based nuclear watchdog, that the Iranians had
grown so distrustful of their own instruments that they had assigned people to
sit in the plant and radio back what they saw. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">“The intent was that the failures should make them
feel they were stupid, which is what happened,” the participant in the attacks
said. When a few centrifuges failed, the Iranians would close down whole
“stands” that linked 164 machines, looking for signs of sabotage in all of them.
“They overreacted,” one official said. “We soon discovered they fired people.”
</P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Imagery recovered by nuclear inspectors from cameras
at Natanz — which the nuclear agency uses to keep track of what happens between
visits — showed the results. There was some evidence of wreckage, but it was
clear that the Iranians had also carted away centrifuges that had previously
appeared to be working well. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">But by the time Mr. Bush left office, no wholesale
destruction had been accomplished. Meeting with Mr. Obama in the White House
days before his inauguration, Mr. Bush urged him to preserve two classified
programs, Olympic Games and the drone program in Pakistan. Mr. Obama took Mr.
Bush’s advice. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody"><STRONG>The Stuxnet Surprise</STRONG> </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Mr. Obama came to office with an interest in
cyberissues, but he had discussed them during the campaign mostly in terms of
threats to personal privacy and the risks to infrastructure like the electrical
grid and the air traffic control system. He commissioned a major study on how to
improve America’s defenses and announced it with great fanfare in the East Room.
</P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">What he did not say then was that he was also learning
the arts of <A class=meta-classifier title="More articles about cyberwarfare."
href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/cyberwarfare/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier">cyberwar</A>.
The architects of Olympic Games would meet him in the Situation Room, often with
what they called the “horse blanket,” a giant foldout schematic diagram of
Iran’s nuclear production facilities. Mr. Obama authorized the attacks to
continue, and every few weeks — certainly after a major attack — he would get
updates and authorize the next step. Sometimes it was a strike riskier and
bolder than what had been tried previously. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">“From his first days in office, he was deep into every
step in slowing the Iranian program — the diplomacy, the sanctions, every major
decision,” a senior administration official said. “And it’s safe to say that
whatever other activity might have been under way was no exception to that
rule.” </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">But the good luck did not last. In the summer of 2010,
shortly after a new variant of the worm had been sent into Natanz, it became
clear that the worm, which was never supposed to leave the Natanz machines, had
broken free, like a zoo animal that found the keys to the cage. It fell to Mr.
Panetta and two other crucial players in Olympic Games — General Cartwright, the
vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Michael J. Morell, the deputy
director of the C.I.A. — to break the news to Mr. Obama and Mr. Biden. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">An error in the code, they said, had led it to spread
to an engineer’s computer when it was hooked up to the centrifuges. When the
engineer left Natanz and connected the computer to the Internet, the American-
and Israeli-made bug failed to recognize that its environment had changed. It
began replicating itself all around the world. Suddenly, the code was exposed,
though its intent would not be clear, at least to ordinary computer users. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">“We think there was a modification done by the
Israelis,” one of the briefers told the president, “and we don’t know if we were
part of that activity.” </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Mr. Obama, according to officials in the room, asked a
series of questions, fearful that the code could do damage outside the plant.
The answers came back in hedged terms. Mr. Biden fumed. “It’s got to be the
Israelis,” he said. “They went too far.” </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">In fact, both the Israelis and the Americans had been
aiming for a particular part of the centrifuge plant, a critical area whose
loss, they had concluded, would set the Iranians back considerably. It is
unclear who introduced the programming error. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">The question facing Mr. Obama was whether the rest of
Olympic Games was in jeopardy, now that a variant of the bug was replicating
itself “in the wild,” where computer security experts can dissect it and figure
out its purpose. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">“I don’t think we have enough information,” Mr. Obama
told the group that day, according to the officials. But in the meantime, he
ordered that the cyberattacks continue. They were his best hope of disrupting
the Iranian nuclear program unless economic sanctions began to bite harder and
reduced Iran’s oil revenues. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Within a week, another version of the bug brought down
just under 1,000 centrifuges. Olympic Games was still on. </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody"><STRONG>A Weapon’s Uncertain Future</STRONG> </P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">American cyberattacks are not limited to Iran, but the
focus of attention, as one administration official put it, “has been
overwhelmingly on one country.” There is no reason to believe that will remain
the case for long. Some officials question why the same techniques have not been
used more aggressively against North Korea. Others see chances to disrupt
Chinese military plans, forces in Syria on the way to suppress the uprising
there, and Qaeda operations around the world. “We’ve considered a lot more
attacks than we have gone ahead with,” one former intelligence official said.
</P>
<P itemprop="articleBody">Mr. Obama has repeatedly told his aides that there are
risks to using — and particularly to overusing — the weapon. In fact, no
country’s infrastructure is more dependent on computer systems, and thus more
vulnerable to attack, than that of the United States. It is only a matter of
time, most experts believe, before it becomes the target of the same kind of
weapon that the Americans have used, secretly, against Iran. </P><NYT_AUTHOR_ID>
<DIV class=authorIdentification>
<P>This article is adapted from “<A
href="http://www.randomhouse.com/book/202541/confront-and-conceal-by-david-e-sanger">Confront
and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power</A>,” to
be published by Crown on Tuesday.<SPAN
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