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Bertrand,<br><br>
Very interesting analysis. From work carried on the actors of language
and multilinguistic issues in cyberspace (i.e. an highly people oriented
set of targets, based on complex technical issues) one may also consider
a different set of stakes. Instead of considering who the people are and
how they are organized, it is interesting to consider their motivations
and their capacity to reach their goals within the cyberdiversity
context. <br><br>
This leads to consider at least:<br><br>
1) three motivation/capacity economies:<br><br>
- the economy of the people looking for a salary (of any kind). They will
usually manage the community interests along the criteria of who pays and
backs them. Their operational process is usually "incremental"
looking for a minimization of the risks. <br>
- the economy of the people wanting to move things to their own best
financial, political, notoriety, fun, power, etc. etc. interests. They
usually are initially "disruptive", try to be positive enough
to become stable and rewarding enough for those who want to join and help
them on a salary basis. <br>
- the economy of the people volunteering a contribution. The adminance
being understood as what permits what a governance manages, their
contribution has to be structurally/educationally/locally (Governance)
and/or architecturally/operationally/globally (Adminance) worth enough
for their share in the community return to permit them to survive and
pursue, also to justify to their own eyes the personal cost of their
gift. <br><br>
2) three capacity levels, i.e. the results that may be credibly obtained.
<br><br>
- The incremental process is what permits an adaptative "status
quo" in a developing technical, political, commercial and social
context. <br>
- The disruptive process is what permits some to become market leaders or
even transient monopolies and intellectually politically correct.<br>
- The architectural (technical and social) process is what decides where
one should be a leader to best serve and hence for the service to
sustainably develop.<br><br>
The mix of these motivations and capacities seems also to well describe
the world digital ecosystem governance and adminance landscape (the
Internet is only a part of it). Historically, the adminance (IAB, IANA,
IETF) was assumed by volunteers. Then ICANN came to manage the governance
as if was a staff oriented resurrection of former communications Gov.
monopolies. Google, FaceBook, etc. and most of the governance activists
are on the business or intellectual disruptive side. IMHO the current
situation is affected by an Adminance evolution (IPv6; BGPs, IDNA2008,
ROAP) of a real magnitude. This corresponds to the decenial technological
change cycle of the international datanetwork (Tymnet, ISO, Internet):
this time the only new candidate technology is the "Internet
1.2" that we observe technically shaping itself, the Governance has
not yet perceived the emergence. <br><br>
Yet this is the only chance we have to meet the
(<a href="http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/" eudora="autourl">
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/</a>) millennium development goals (I
must say that I searched my three years old archives of this mailing list
for the words "millenium" and "millennium" and I only
found five mails). And probably to keep the Internet running without
degradation.<br><br>
jfc<br><br>
At 13:38 24/02/2010, Bertrand de La Chapelle wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">Dear all,<br><br>
Following Jeanette's comments on Milton's remarks, there are ambiguities
around the terms "stakeholders" and
"multi-stakeholders" that must be clarified, as I've expressed
in previous exchanges with Karl Auerbach on this topic.<br><br>
"Stakeholders" is often understood as meaning the three (or
four, or five ...) <b>"stakeholder groups"</b> or
constituencies : governments, civil society, business (plus technical
community, and IGOs). According to this approach,
"multi-stakeholder" governance looks a little bit like the ILO
(International Labor organization) with the three constituencies of
governments, employers and trade unions, each in their respective
structures. in a certain way, ICANN is still structured very much in this
way, with what I have often described as the "silo structure"
that too often prevent real interaction among actors. The two notions :
"stakeholders" and "stakeholders groups" need to be
clearly distinguished : "stakeholders" is a broader and more
diverse notion. <br><br>
"Stakeholders" is also often understood (by Karl Auerbach in
particular) as meaning i<b>nstitutional organizations only</b> (ie
incorporated structures, be they public authorities, corporations or
NGOs), limiting or even forbidding therefore the participation of
individuals. I have repeatedly mentioned that this does not need to be
the case and that individuals should have the possibility to participate
with appropriate modalities in multi-stakeholder governance frameworks.
The IGF in that respect is a very useful example with its open
registration policy that allows individuals. Important established
structures (governments, businesses, NGOs) with internal consultation and
decision-making processes are relevant stakeholders, but individuals too.
<br><br>
The corollary of the participation of individuals is that in the decision
shaping phases of multi-stakeholder processes, such individuals can
represent viewpoints and not necessarily groups of people. Provided they
are contributing, they should not be required to demonstrate specific
representation credentials (hence the classical question : but who do
they really represent ? is moot, and akin to the "how many divisions
has the Pope ?"). Any person with something to contribute should be
allowed to do so because it informs the processes and the general
understanding of an issue. The purpose of such phases is to shape issues
in the most comprehensive manner, taking into account the perspective of
all actors who have a stake in it. And in such cases, for instance, an
old white man from a developed country can perfectly have a good
knowledge of the challenges of gender for youth in poor countries and try
to ensure that this perspective is taken into account in the discussions
even if no "representative" from such communities is present.
However, actual representatives of the different interests are needed in
the decision-making phase that follows, and established institutions and
structures may have a specific role to play here. .<br><br>
This leads to a better understanding of "multi-stakeholderism".
In this context, Milton actually presents a very valid vision, up to the
last bit of the paragraph :
<dl>
<dd>MS is at best a transitional phase implying a motion from purely
intergovernmental toward a more open, democratic forms of global
governance. In this progression, we need to have a clearer idea of what
the end point is - and MS is not it. In a world of perfect global
governance the artificial division of society into "estates"
such as "government, business and civil society" no longer
exists; it is the individual that matters.
</dl><br>
Yes, what is at stake is the invention of a truly open, democratic form
of global governance. And yes, actors must not be artificially divided
into separate estates that are too rigid and prevent their interaction.
(This is why the Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group for the IGF is better
than three "Bureaus" for each group). And yes, governance
should be based on the right for any actor, including individuals, to
participate in an appropriate manner in the governance processes dealing
with the issues he/she has a stake in (is impacted by or concerned with).
<br><br>
However, multi-stakeholderism should not be understood as necessarily
meaning interaction between separate stakeholder groups, each drafting
their own statements to reconcile them later on. Furthermore, I do not
believe that the future of global governance is the generalization at the
international level of the kind of representative democracy that already
reaches some limits at lower scales. The election by 7 billion
individuals of a World President or even Parliament is not the
solution.<br><br>
This is why we must consider the different structures or groups that
individuals participate in as vectors of the representation of their
diverse interests. A single individual has different stakes in an issue -
sometimes conflicting - and would benefit from having its different
perspectives carried forward in international discussions by a diversity
of actors. To take the example of environmental issues, citizens do not
want their country to be penalized versus others in the global regime
regarding CO2 emissions, and therefore want their government to actively
defend their rights. But conscious of the future challenges for their
family or the planet as a whole, they may want an activist NGO to be part
of the discussions to exert some pressure in favor of a binding rule.
Additionally, as maybe the employees of companies in an industry that has
to support an important effort to adapt its activity, they fear that the
global regime will impact their jobs and therefore want the said company
or its trade group to participate as well. Finally, they may want to
ensure that any decision is taken on a sound technical and scientific
analysis, which requests expert participation. Etc... On such
global topics, individuals have in fact several stakeholderships in an
issue, and citizenship is one of them. A major one, but only one of them,
as the global public interest is not the mere aggregation of national
public interests. <br><br>
In such a perspective, the challenge for all of us, including
governmental representatives, is to avoid limiting our understanding of
"multi-stakeholder governance" to the separated silo approach,
and to explore/invent the mechanisms through which all stakeholders can,
collectively and collaboratively (I would even say
"collegially"), "develop and implement shared
regimes" on specific issues. As I have often said in the IGF
context, the "respective roles" of the different stakeholders
should vary according to the issue, the venue and the state of the
discussion. <br><br>
This means designing processes for decision-shaping (agenda-setting,
issue-framing, recommendation drafting), decision-making (verification of
consensus, validation), and implementation (agency, monitoring and
enforcement). The IGF and ICANN are the two major laboratories where this
discussion takes place. And this list, as exemplified by these exchanges
is one of the places, if not the main one, where the political theory
discussion can actually take place. <br><br>
I hope this helps move the discussion forward. <br><br>
Best<br><br>
Bertrand<br><br>
PS : the above comments are of course made on a personal basis.<br>
<br><br>
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 11:50 AM, Jeanette Hofmann
<<a href="mailto:jeanette@wzb.eu">jeanette@wzb.eu</a>>
wrote:<br><br>
<dl>
<dd> Second, We
<dl>
<dd>need to stop habitually using "multi-stakeholderism" as our
label for
<dd>good governance and appropriate institutions; <br>
<br><br>
</dl>
<dd>I don't understand why.<br>
<dd>MS is at best a
<dl>
<dd>transitional phase implying a motion from purely intergovernmental
<dd>toward a more open, democratic forms of global governance. In this
<dd>progression, we need to have a clearer idea of what the end point is
<dd>- and MS is not it. In a world of perfect global governance the
<dd>artificial division of society into "estates" such as
"government,
<dd>business and civil society" no longer exists; it is the
individual
<dd>that matters. <br>
<br><br>
</dl>
<dd>I completely disagree with a solely individual notion of global
governance. Autonomy and self-determination do not rest and refer to, at
least not necessarily, on individual freedom only. What we are all
arguing about here concerns democratic "rules for a life in
common", as a colleague once put it. A life in common that respects
both, individual and collective dimensions of it.
<dd>The term stakeholder is perhaps not the most fortunate way of
capturing this collective aspect, as Karl A. has said many times, but to
give it up and replace it by individuals (who interact in the form of
contracts with each other?) looks like an impoverished notion of
regulation and political rule-making to me.
<dd>jeanette
<dd>jea
<dd>In relation to this, I really enjoy the way P. skewers
<dl>
<dd>the double standard at work in the MS discourse, noting how MS is
<dd>used to fend off certain political actors in this context but somehow
<dd>does not apply when it is ACTA, WIPO or WTO. MS is about process but
<dd>not substance, and policy substance is what matters ultimately.
<dd>________________________________________ From: Parminder
<dd>[<a href="mailto:parminder@itforchange.net">
parminder@itforchange.net</a>] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 2:25 AM
To: Bertrand de La Chapelle Cc:
<a href="mailto:governance@lists.cpsr.org">governance@lists.cpsr.org</a>;
Jeremy
<dd>Malcolm; Jeanette Hofmann; Deirdre Williams Subject: Re: [governance]
<dd>REVISION 3 Draft statement to UNSG on bypassing
<dd>Jeanette and Bertrand,
<dd>First of all I must apologize that I did not read the open
<dd>consultation transcripts well. Indeed the governments of developed
<dd>countries who spoke on the issue did mention MS-ism. I must have
<dd>forgotten that part from their interventions because there principal
<dd>point was procedural which I found particularly forceful. And I am
<dd>sure that if we are indeed effective in our appeals that would be
<dd>because of this procedural part.
<dd>However, since Bertrand in the subsequent email speaks about my
<dd>'analysis of motivation of governments' that made the mentioned
<dd>interventions, while I clarify that it was not so much motivation but
<dd>the tactical aspects of their intervention that I spoke about, I can
<dd>hardly suppress the temptation of a bit of 'analysis of motivation'.
<dd>Political motivations are generally a subject requiring deeper
<dd>analysis, and while I do agree that developing countries are
<dd>interested in, as Bertrand says 'preserve(ing) the multi-stakeholder
<dd>nature of the IGF', it can hardly be said that this makes them
<dd>'naturally' more open and democratic at the global political stage,
<dd>and developing countries correspondingly more closed. One may ask in
<dd>this context why ACTA is being negotiated in such secrecy. Why not
<dd>have multistakeholder involvement in its drafting and negotiations?
<dd>Especially for its Internet chapter being discussed currently? And
<dd>why at WIPO and WTO developing countries are more-NGO
involvement
<dd>friendly and not developed countries?
<dd>Where support for multistakeholderism starts and where it ends is,
<dd>therefore, a question of deep political motivations. I understand
<dd>that developed countries want, at this stage, to limit possibilities
<dd>for more democratic global policy forums on IG issues because control
<dd>over the techno-social infrastructure of the Internet, along with
<dd>stronger IP regimes, underpin their new strategy for global
<dd>domination. This works well with promoting of a weak IGF which is
<dd>little more than an annual conference on IG, and which has this great
<dd>advantage of acting as the perfect co-option device - letting off
<dd>excess steam vis a vis desires for political participation in shaping
<dd>the emergent techno-social infrastructure. Unfortunately developing
<dd>countries mostly have not woken up to the global eco-socio-political
<dd>domination aspects of IG, and see it in terms of statist controls
<dd>within their own territories.
<dd>Developed countries want the IGF to carry on as it is. Many
<dd>developing countries want the IGF to
have more substantive
<dd>role in global IG regimes, along with a specific Internet
policy
<dd>regime, for which 'enhanced cooperation' was meant to be the place
<dd>holder. Developed countries seem not
interested in furthering
<dd>the 'enhanced cooperation' agenda, while the technical community
<dd>supports them on this, as do, regrettably, many among civil society
<dd>(dominated by North based/ oriented actors). The latter
two also
<dd>have often supported the case for weak, annual conference, nature of
<dd>IGF, with no consideration to the fact that
<dd>1. IGF's principal raison detre is of helping global Internet policy
<dd>making, and its effectiveness can only be measured by the extent to
<dd>which it does so.
<dd>2. Specifically, Tunis Agenda gives a clear mandate to IGF to make
<dd>recommendations where necessary.
<dd>I make the above analysis because I do not agree with the following
<dd>assertions in Bertrand's email, which frames the key substantive
<dd>issue in the email.<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>para 76 of the Tunis Agenda mentions "the desirability of the
<dd>continuation"; ie : the recommendations of the UN SG should
mainly
<dd>revolve around the >question : continuation Yes or No ? and not
get
<dd>into any renegotiation of the mandate or the administrative and
<dd>operational organization of the Forum.<br>
<dd>In this context, it would be inappropriate for the UN General
<dd>assembly or ECOSOS (which are governments-only bodies) to discuss
<dd>more than the Yes or >No question.<br>
<br><br>
</dl>
<dd>Section 74 of TA reads
<dd>"We encourage the UN Secretary-General to examine a range of
options
<dd>for the convening of the Forum ..........'
<dd>and 73 b reads IGF will "Have a lightweight and decentralized
<dd>structure that would be subject to periodic review".
<dd>Therefore, while a review of the IGF can certainly not renegotiate
<dd>the mandate of the IGF, the 'administrative and operational
<dd>organization of the Forum' is certainly open to review and change.
<dd>In this matter we are opposed to certain kind of changes (taking it
<dd>closer to the ITU. reducing MS nature etc) but seek other kinds
<dd>(things that can make IGF more effective - WGs, more focused agenda,
<dd>some kind of recommendations as mandated by TA, better and more
<dd>effective connections to forums where substantive Internet policy is
<dd>made, stable public funding to ensure its neutrality etc).
<dd>I also think that to ensure that progressive forces are not able to
<dd>get together to demand the kind of changes that are needed to enable
<dd>the IGF to fulfill its TA mandate and become really effective, there
<dd>is much more exclusive focus by 'status quoists' in the "IGF
review
<dd>debate' on stuff like 'ITU is going to take over the IGF' than is
<dd>needed on pure merit of the issue. Such strong posturing and
<dd>sloganeering helps push other possibilities of more progressive
<dd>changes in the IGF, which are much needed, into the background, in
<dd>fact, into the oblivion.
<dd>Parminder<br>
<dd>Bertrand de La Chapelle wrote: Dear all,
<dd>Parminder wrote : In fact the governments who spoke were not thinking
<dd>of multistakeholderism but underlying their objections was a
<dd>different politics. They suspect China (along with some others) is up
<dd>to some games here, and more open consideration of UN SG's report
<dd>give them a better chance to put their views in more solidly, not
<dd>that they wont be there at the ECOSOC and UN GA. Also, some
<dd>governments who are members of CSTD and not ECOSOC obviously are more
<dd>vocal to get matters to the CSTD and vice versa. So, since weakening
<dd>MS process was not what the government who spoke at the consultations
<dd>really spoke about, and all the concerned actors know this, our first
<dd>assertion looks really weak. These gov reps really spoke about the
<dd>proper process of WSIS follow up matters going through CSTD, that is
<dd>all.
<dd>I must correct this : preserving the multi-stakeholder spirit of
<dd>discussions was clearly in the minds of most governments who spoke in
<dd>Geneva to support having the report presented to the CSTD.
<dd>The reasoning is as follows : - the very idea of an Internet
<dd>Governance forum came principally from the discussions of the WGIG,
<dd>which was a truly multi-stakeholder group - even if the mandate of
<dd>the IGF was included in a document ultimately signed by governments
<dd>only (the Tunis agenda), many other actors have played an important
<dd>role in its definition - the functioning of the Forum itself has been
<dd>organized since its inception by a multi-stakeholder process
<dd>(including through the MAG) - para 76 of the Tunis Agenda mentions
<dd>"the desirability of the continuation"; ie : the
recommendations of
<dd>the UN SG should mainly revolve around the question : continuation
<dd>Yes or No ? and not get into any renegotiation of the mandate or the
<dd>administrative and operational organization of the Forum.
<dd>In this context, it would be inappropriate for the UN General
<dd>assembly or ECOSOS (which are governments-only bodies) to discuss
<dd>more than the Yes or No question. The capacity to self-organize,
<dd>which has made the IGF what it is today, must be preserved. The CSTD,
<dd>because of its mandate to handle the follow-up of WSIS, is not only
<dd>the legitimate entry point to prepare the draft resolutions for
<dd>ECOSOC and the GA; it is also the sole UN structure that has the
<dd>possibility to allow a discussion among a diversity of actors on how
<dd>to make the IGF even better without changing its fundamental
<dd>multi-stakehoder nature.
<dd>The governments who have spoken have indeed done so in order to
<dd>preserve the multi-stakeholder nature of the IGF.
<dd>Best
<dd>Bertrand
<dd>-- ____________________ Bertrand de La Chapelle Délégué Spécial pour
<dd>la Société de l'Information / Special Envoy for the Information
<dd>Society Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes/ French
<dd>Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs Tel : +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32
<dd>"Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes"
Antoine de
<dd>Saint Exupéry ("there is no greater mission for humans than
uniting
<dd>humans")
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____________________<br>
Bertrand de La Chapelle<br>
Délégué Spécial pour la Société de l'Information / Special Envoy for the
Information Society<br>
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes/ French Ministry of
Foreign and European Affairs<br>
Tel : +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32<br><br>
"Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes"
Antoine de Saint Exupéry<br>
("there is no greater mission for humans than uniting
humans")<br><br>
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